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operate of oil and gas development 
in Greenland
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Chapter 1
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The Arctic is changing. The environmental and socio-economic ties with the rest of the 
world are becoming increasingly apparent through the changes that are taking place in 
this region. As ‘canary in the coalmine’ it shows the world the effects of climate change 
(NASA 2013; The Economist 2004). The greenhouse gases emitted elsewhere in the 
world impact the Arctic. Sea ice extend is decreasing and temperatures are rising faster 
than anywhere else (ACIA 2004). Changes in the Arctic will in turn impact southern 
regions. The melting Greenlandic ice sheet is expected to contribute 6 meter to global 
sea level rise and threatens densely populated coastal communities around the world 
(NSIDC 2017a).
At the same time, the decreasing sea ice extent and snow cover also creates new 
opportunities. The region is opening up to activities such as fisheries, shipping, tourism, 
mining and oil and gas. Over the past decade the region experienced an increase of 
these economic activities and it is estimated that the Arctic can potentially attract over 
$100 billion of investments (Lloyds 2012). Shipping, mining and oil and gas activities 
were regarded as the largest drivers of this economic development.
Figure 1: West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices per barrel (source: www.macrotrends.net)
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However, in 2014 the global oil prices have collapsed and global prices for minerals 
decreased as well (see Figure 1; World Bank 2016). It can thus be questioned whether the 
estimated investments can still be attracted by the region, as the collapsed commodity 
prices have impacted the main drivers of the estimated economic development.
Even though the development of offshore Arctic oil and gas activities has largely come 
to a halt now, it has sparked a lot of debate and controversy over the past years. This 
thesis studies the debate and controversy of oil and gas development in the Arctic, with 
a particular focus on Greenland. As a starting point it uses the social license to operate 
concept, which is often used to study (controversial) resource extraction, including 
energy projects, from a social science perspective. Whether the traditional focus of this 
concept on the local context of a project allows for a thorough understanding of the 
social license to operate is however questioned. The case of oil and gas development in 
Greenland shows that multiple geographical layers connected with each other and that 
the development of oil and gas is not solely a national affair. It has therefore proved to 
be an interesting case to study, both from a local perspective related to balancing the 
environmental and social risks and opportunities of these oil and gas developments, 
as well as from a global perspective in relation to climate change and the transition to 
renewable energy resources.
This chapter comprises an introduction to the Arctic oil and gas context and takes a 
closer look at the developments in Greenland. It also elaborates upon the key concepts, 
the research objective, questions and methods that guided this case study.
1.2 The Arctic
The Arctic is home to approximately four million people living across eight countries, 
namely the Russian Federation, the United States of America (Alaska), Canada, the 
Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Iceland, Norway, Sweden and 
Finland (Arctic Council 2015). Different actors use different definitions of the Arctic. 
Definitions are for example based on the tree line, the Arctic Circle (at 66° 34’ North) 
or the 10 degrees Celsius isotherm (NSIDC 2017b). For this research the definition 
proposed and used by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme of the Arctic 
Council has been used (AMAP 1998), which defines the Arctic as:
“[…] the terrestrial and marine areas north of the Arctic Circle (66°320N), and north of 62°N in 
Asia and 60°N in North America, modified to include the marine areas north of the Aleutian 
chain, Hudson Bay, and parts of the North Atlantic Ocean including the Labrador Sea.”
16
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This definition is used for this research because it includes all relevant areas for studying 
oil and gas developments within the Arctic Circle and adjacent regions in North America 
and Siberia as well as parts of the Atlantic Ocean and the Bering Strait (Figure 2).
Figure 2: AMAP definition of the Arctic (source: AMAP 2014)
1.2.1  Arctic oil and gas resources
The Arctic has been home to oil and gas activities for almost a century. The Mackenzie 
Valley, the Alaskan North Slope and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug in Russia were 
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the first areas where small scale onshore oil and gas activities were taking place prior 
to World War II (AMAP 2007). Large scale onshore oil and gas activities took off in the 
same areas during the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1970s also nearshore locations were 
explored and exploited in Alaska. And during the 1970s and 1980s exploration for 
offshore oil and gas started to take place in the Norwegian Sea, the (Russian part of 
the) Barents Sea, in other Russian waters and offshore the coast of Greenland (AMAP 
2007). Nowadays four out of the five Arctic coastal states are producing oil and/or gas 
(Rekacewicz and Ahlenius 2006).
Next to the already known resources, the Arctic Ocean is expected to hold a vast 
amount of undiscovered oil and gas reserves. In 2008 the Unites States Geological 
Survey (USGS) published its findings on Arctic oil and gas resources. It is estimated that 
these resources could amount up to 90 billion Barrels of Oil Equivalent (BOE) and 1.670 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas, which are technically recoverable (USGS 2008). This 
equals approximately 22% of the world’s undiscovered technically recoverable oil and 
gas resources (Figure 3). Most of these resources are expected to be found offshore, 
whereby most of the oil is expected to be found in Arctic Alaska, the Amerasia Basin, 
the East Greenland Rift Basin, the East Barents Basins and between West Greenland 
- East Canada. Most of the gas is expected to be found in the West Siberian Basin, the 
East Barents Basins and in Arctic Alaska.
Since the start of this century the attention for oil and gas in the Arctic has surged. The 
high oil prices ($147 in July 2008), combined with the favourable geological projections 
of the USGS, advancing technologies and a politically stable climate (Brookings 2014) 
have raised the attention to unprecedented highs. The boom in offshore exploration 
activities is illustrated by activities of Cairn Energy in Greenland (2010/2011), Shell in 
Alaska (2012 and 2015) and Statoil in the Barents Sea (2011 onwards). Stimulating new 
activities to be developed, also the license rounds organised by Arctic states have 
followed each other at a fast pace, including Greenland in 2010, 2012/2013, 2014, 2016, 
2017 and 2018 (BMP 2011a; Naalakkersuisut 2014b), Norway in 2012, 2014 and 2017 
(NPD 2012; NPD 2014) and Alaska in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 (Deloitte 2014).
18
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These license rounds are in many cases subject to stringent requirements, aiming 
to select only the large, (financially) robust and experienced oil companies that can 
bear the high costs of these Arctic operations, also in the case of a potential oil spill in 
ice-infested waters. Oil companies that owned licenses throughout the Arctic include 
Shell, Total, ConocoPhillips, ENI, Statoil, Chevron and BP. Costs of Arctic operations 
differ throughout the region depending amongst others on remoteness, presence of 
sea ice and technical difficulties. Statoil for example has divided the Arctic into three 
categories (Hansen 2015):
• Workable: Including areas like the Southern Barents Sea and the east coast of 
Canada. Although conditions are cold and harsh, there is little or no ice in these 
areas. On the short to medium term it is possible to develop technological 
solutions that make it possible to operate here.
19
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• Stretched: Including areas like the north-east Barents Sea. These are areas where 
there is seasonal ice, and to operate here on the medium to long term major 
innovations are needed.
• Extreme: Including areas like north-east Greenland. Year-round heavy ice 
conditions are present in these areas, and there is a short open season. 
Technology is not yet known and investment in research & development with a 
long term focus is needed to develop these areas.
Depending on the location it would take approximately 15 to 30 years before Arctic 
discoveries reach production. It is estimated that oil and gas operations in the Barents 
Sea, a relatively easy destination, need an oil price between $80 and $110 per barrel 
depending on the size of the field to break even (Rystad Energy in Reuters 2014). Since 
the drop in oil prices in 2014 and given the current price volatility, the business cases 
of many Arctic projects have gone negative. Even though Arctic exploration efforts 
were never aiming at the short term and the demand for energy is likely to rise over the 
coming decades, many oil companies such as Shell, Statoil and Chevron have given back 
licenses they owned in Greenland and other parts of the Arctic (Financial Times 2015).
1.2.2 The Arctic in the world’s political theatre
The increasingly apparent climate change effects and new economic opportunities also 
brought the Arctic region to the centre of global political attention. Illustrative of the 
increasing international political attention for the Arctic are the many applications of 
non-Arctic states as observer at the Arctic Council. In 2013 six new countries, including 
China, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Singapore were granted observer status. 
This doubled the total number of observer countries at once.
The Arctic Council is considered as the main governance arrangement for this region. 
Established in 1996 by the Ottowa Declaration, the Arctic Council is a high level 
intergovernmental forum for cooperation, coordination and interaction among the 
Arctic States, with Arctic indigenous communities as permanent participants (www.
arctic-council.org). The chairmanship is rotating every two years, with Iceland being 
the chair from 2019 to 2021, after taking over from Finland in spring 2019. Even in the 
current international political turmoil the Arctic Council is still a platform for cooperation 
on particular issues of sustainable development and the environment, also with the 
Russian Federation. All parties stressed the fact that the Arctic should remain a place 
where a dialogue with Russia is continued (Washington Post 2015).
20
Chapter 1
The Arctic Council has a number of Working Groups and Task Forces where member 
states, permanent participants and observers work together on various topics, including 
emergency preparedness and response, sustainable development, flora and fauna and 
contaminants. The Arctic Council produces valuable reports and guidelines based on 
scientific research, indigenous knowledge and industry experience. It has produced 
the following guidelines and reports in the field of oil and gas:
• AMAP (2007) Arctic Oil & Gas Assessment;
• PAME (2009) Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines. Previous versions stem from 
2002 and 1997; and
• PAME (2014) Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Guidelines: Systems Safety Management 
and Safety Culture. Avoiding Major Disasters in Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas 
Operations.
The Arctic Council itself does not produce legally binding agreements. The Arctic states 
have however signed legally binding agreements with each other, based on negotiations 
held in the context of the Arctic Council. In 2011 the first binding agreement, on Arctic 
Search and Rescue, was signed followed by an agreement on the Cooperation on 
Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in 2013 (www.arctic-council.org).
With the increased international attention, Arctic coastal states have made it very clear 
that Arctic matters are an affair of the Arctic States and not of anyone else (Ilulissat 
Declaration 2008). Major parts of the Arctic Ocean fall under their jurisdiction and 
almost all coastal states have submitted their claim for an extension of their Extended 
Economic Zone (EEZ) under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), leaving little left as high seas (Berkman & Young 2009). The oil and gas 
activities that are taking place at the moment or were expected to take place in the 
short- to mid-term are located within the EEZ of the coastal states and therefore fall 
under their jurisdiction. Since there is no binding legal framework that covers all oil and 
gas activities in the Arctic, the regulatory regime differs per country. The requirements 
that guide the oil and gas developments may thus be more or less stringent depending 
on the country where these developments take place. Some of the environmental 
impacts however will not stop at a country’s borders. And if an oil spill would occur in 
the country with the least stringent regulations, this is likely to affect the activities in 
all other countries. So while the sector and the environmental impacts of its activities 
transcend boundaries, the regulation and implementation of the activity is very much 
organised at state level.
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1.2.3 Arctic oil and gas resources in a worldwide societal debate
What is also not confined to state boundaries is public protest against Arctic oil and 
gas activities. The increasing attention for climate change and oil and gas resources 
in the Arctic at the start of this century did not only comprise non-Arctic nation states 
and companies, but also included a societal debate held at a global level. International 
environmental NGOs that are concerned about climate change identified the increasing 
interest in oil and gas development as a risk for the vulnerable Arctic environment. Both 
Greenpeace and WWF started an Arctic campaign against these activities and put effort 
in mobilising the largest possible group of concerned global citizens. WWF focussed 
on educating citizens and politicians about the risks of these activities and issuing 
research and tools that supported this message, while Greenpeace took a more activist 
approach and attracted attention for their message by scaling drilling rigs and starting 
an online petition directed towards the Arctic activities of one company, namely Shell.
Via internet and social media, people from all over the world got involved in the debate 
on Arctic oil and gas development. The link with global climate change and a global 
transition towards renewable energy made it a relevant topic to millions worldwide. 
The debate was not only held in the digital world on the internet, but also in real life 
via panel discussions, (parliamentary) debate (i.e. in the UK with the House of Lords 
Committee on the Arctic, in the European parliament, in the Netherlands in relation 
to a new Arctic policy), conferences (i.e. Arctic Frontiers, Arctic Circle, Arctic Oil and 
Gas conferences) and protest actions (such as scaling drilling rigs and buildings of oil 
companies, petitions and demonstrations, and from example the kayaktivists from 
Seattle). The urgent environmental risk of an oil spill against the backdrop of decreasing 
sea ice and a melting Greenlandic ice sheet stimulated taking action now. The relation 
between international environmental NGOs and local indigenous communities in the 
Arctic was and is however troubled. The anti-whaling and –sealing campaigns during 
the previous century and the existing European ban on sealskin products have caused 
a lot of damage that is not forgotten (personal communication - interview Greenpeace 
2016; Quartz 2015). Also the tendency of the NGOs to regard the Arctic environment 
as an untouched sanctuary where no economic activities are allowed, is against the 
views of indigenous communities who have lived in the Arctic for centuries and have 
hunted its living resources for subsistence. With regards to the development of Arctic 
oil and gas resources different opinions exist within the indigenous communities. These 
opinions and discussions within the communities have not necessarily been part of 
the global discussion.
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In Greenland everything comes together: The melting ice sheet is illustrating global 
climate change and at the same time the government expressed the ambition to develop 
oil and gas as a means to diversify the economy and gain additional income to become 
(financially) independent from Denmark. Opening up to oil and gas development 
attracted the attention from some of the largest international oil companies, the world’s 
largest states, as well as critique from individual citizens and NGOs in Greenland and 
far beyond. It is therefore an interesting case to study both national and international 
dynamics, involving many different stakes and stakeholders, on a relevant topic namely 
oil and gas development in relation to the future of the world’s energy outlook. The next 
section takes a closer look at Greenland and its ambition to develop oil and gas activities.
1.3 Greenland
Greenland is the world’s largest island, yet it only has a population of approximately 
56.000 people. Its population lives in cities and villages scattered around the entire 
coastline as the inland is covered by the second largest ice sheet of the world (Nielsen 
2001). Approximately 89% of the Greenlandic population is Inuit, sharing their roots 
with Inuit in Canada, Alaska and Chukotka, Russia (inuit.org). The largest city and capital 
of Greenland is Nuuk, which is situated slightly below the Arctic Circle on the west 
coast and counts approximately 17.000 people (Statistics Greenland 2018). Nuuk is also 
home to the Greenlandic government (Naalakkersuisut) and Parliament (Inatsisartut). 
In 2009 Greenland obtained Self-Rule within the Kingdom of Denmark (Hansen 2014). 
The authority over the underground including oil, gas and minerals was transferred 
from the Danish state to the Greenlandic government. Only foreign affairs, security and 
defence remained shared policy domains (Queen of Denmark 2009).
Financially, Greenland still depends on Denmark via a fixed block grant1 that it receives 
on an annual basis. The level of this grant was frozen in 2009, making it decreasing in 
relative terms over time. Achieving financial independence is a long-term goal that is 
regularly expressed by the Greenlandic government (Pfeifer and Thompson 2011). At 
the moment, the Greenlandic economy is mainly based on fisheries, tourism and the 
public sector. The government is therefore looking at ways to diversify the economy. The 
development of oil, gas and mineral resources could potentially generate the additional 
income needed to replace the annual block grant (Naalakkersuisut 2014b).  
1 Definition of a ‘block grant’: a grant from a central government that a local authority can allocate to a wide 
range of services.
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1.3.1 Oil and gas exploration in Greenland
The 2008 USGS study estimated that 31 billion Barrels of Oil Equivalent (BOE) could 
be found in the north-eastern waters and 17 billion BOE in the north-western part of 
the seas around Greenland (USGS 2008a; USGS 2008b). Up until now 14 explorations 
wells have been drilled in Greenlandic waters: five in the 1970s, one in 2000 and eight 
in 2010/2011 (govmin.gl). This thesis focuses on the most recent exploration activities, 
comprising the exploration drills that were conducted by a Scottisch oil company Cairn 
Energy in 2010 and 2011. Other companies such as Shell have performed seismic 
surveys and (strategic) environmental and social studies (Naalakkersuisut 2015). These 
companies were granted a license in one of the licensing rounds that took place since 
2002. The licenses have granted them the right to explore and exploit oil and/or gas 
(BMP 2009a). The national oil company of Greenland, NunaOil, is represented in all of 
the oil and gas exploration licenses that have been granted in Greenland. It has a 12,5% 
share in each license and should build capacity and gain experience by cooperating 
with international oil companies (BMP 2009a). 
Capacity building by means of human capital development has been and still is a top 
priority for the Greenlandic government (Naalakkersuisut 2012). The average education 
level is low and school drop-out rates are high. To participate in the offshore industry, 
oil companies require a number of formally acquired skills and competencies. Even 
though offshore oil rigs offer a number of job opportunities for an unskilled or semi-
skilled workforce, these functions require high school education at minimum (Houston 
Chronicle 2012). This is a challenge in Greenland. In 2006 only one third of the potential 
workforce (age 15 – 62) had acquired an educational level that would qualify them for 
jobs above unskilled level (European Commission 2007). However, the total number 
of graduates from post-primary education in Greenland has increased by 64% during 
the first phase (2006 – 2012) of the “Greenland Education Program” (www.nanoq.gl) 
and is promising.
1.3.2 The Greenlandic regulatory framework for oil and gas development
The focus on human capital development is also apparent in the Mineral Resources 
Act (MRA or Råstofloven), which governs the oil and gas activities in Greenland. The law 
came into force in 2010 and replaced the former Danish Act on Mineral Resources in 
Greenland from 1998. The aim of the MRA is to ensure that the oil and gas exploration 
and anticipated production activities are securely conducted in terms of safety, health, 
environment, social responsibility and according to international best practice (Mineral 
Resources Act, Part 1, 1). It has been inspired by Norwegian, Canadian and other 
international oil and gas legislation (BMP 2011b). The regulatory framework obliges 
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oil companies to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and a Social 
Sustainability Impact Assessment (SSIA) for their activities in Greenland. Based on the 
Social Sustainability Impact Assessment, an Impact Benefit Agreement is negotiated 
between the company and the national and local government authorities of Greenland 
(Smits et al. 2017).
Since 2010 the MRA has been amended twice. After amendments in 2012, the division 
of tasks to govern the development of oil and gas activities was restructured and 
spread across multiple government authorities in 2013. Prior to this amendment all 
tasks related to the governance of oil, gas and mineral activities were the responsibility 
of one authority: the Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum (BMP). The advantages of 
clustering all knowledge and competencies related to oil, gas and minerals into one 
government authority include efficiency and bundling human resources that are already 
scarce within such a small bureaucracy. However, the BMP was criticised for a lack of 
transparency and mistrusted by a suggestion of wearing multiple hats at the same time 
(Aaen 2012). The Greenlandic government has therefore decided to divide the tasks 
over the following government authorities (govmin.gl: MLSA Newsletter 8-01-2014):
• Mineral License and Safety Authority (MLSA or Råstofstyrelsen): Falls under the 
Ministry of Mineral Resources and functions as the administrative authority 
and is responsible for license and safety matters.
• Ministry of Mineral Resources: Is responsible for legal, geological and marketing 
issues.
• Ministry of Industry, Labour and Trade: Is responsible for socio-economic issues, 
including the Social Sustainability Impact Assessment and Impact Benefit 
Agreement.
• Environmental Agency: Falls under the Ministry of Nature, Environment and Energy 
and is responsible for environmental issues, including the Environmental Impact 
Assessment.
Due to a lack of trust by citizens and civil society organisations, the capacity of the 
authorities to govern the development of oil and gas activities in Greenland remains 
subject of debate at the national level. The next section elaborates upon the societal 
debate of the oil and gas development including the capacity of the government in 
Greenland.
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1.3.3 Greenlandic societal debate on oil and gas development
The potential for oil and gas development has never led to large scale overt protest 
actions and demonstrations in Greenland. It did however trigger a debate in Greenlandic 
society about the risks and benefits that these activities would bring to Greenland. 
The (economic) benefits were clearly linked to the long term wish of Greenland to 
become independent from Denmark. The main risks included an oil spill, pollution 
and a potential influx of foreign workers. Over time, the critique on these activities has 
increased and divided society as some were in favour and others were against them. 
Next to Greenlandic citizens and organisations, also the international environmental 
NGOs were amongst the actors that asked critical questions about the activities in 
Greenland. Most of the critique was directed to the government and its authorities 
for not being transparent and a lack of trust in their competencies to ensure the 
interest of Greenlandic society. The government has acted on these points of critique 
by amending the legal framework and formally adjusting their organisation. Although 
the amendments to the legal framework made by the government were seen as an 
improvement, critique on the government and its authorities still existed.
1.4 The social license to operate in a multilevel context
Criticism on and protest against the decisions of governments and the way they 
enforce the regulatory framework is a worldwide phenomenon that manifests itself 
especially in the case of large industrial projects with an environmental and social 
impact. In the past, the development of these large industrial activities, such as oil and 
gas development, was predominantly the domain of state authorities and companies. 
The state authorities represented their country’s citizens and would take care of their 
interests. However, protest actions, critique and societal debate show that citizens 
and civil society organisations are increasingly dissatisfied with the implementation of 
industrial activities by private sector companies and the (lack of) enforcement by state 
authorities (Boutilier 2014). Next to the continued role of state authorities, citizens 
and civil society demand a larger say in the decision making processes leading to the 
development of large industrial activities. Illustrative of the growing level of conflict 
is that the time for oil and gas projects to reach production has almost doubled over 
the past decade. Nontechnical risks and in particular relationships with social actors, 
accounted for nearly half of the risks resulting in this delay (Franks et al. 2014).
To study the societal debate and unrest related to the oil and gas activities in the Arctic 
and in Greenland, this thesis uses the social license to operate concept. The concept 
of a social license to operate relates to the social risks of an activity and it is usually 
defined in scholarly literature as the (ongoing) acceptance/approval of an activity or 
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decision by local communities and other stakeholders (World Bank 2003b; Thomson 
& Boutilier 2011; Moffat & Zhang 2014; Hall et al. 2015). The concept originated in the 
mining industry during the late 1990s and has since then been applied in various other 
sectors as well. Typically the literature has focused on questions such as “What is a 
social license to operate?”, “What elements contribute to a successful social license to 
operate?” and “How can companies obtain and maintain a social license to operate?”. 
The interaction between local communities and private sector companies is usually 
the primary concern of this body of research (Hall et al. 2015; Moffat and Zhang 2014; 
Parsons et al. 2014; Prno, 2013; Boutilier et al. 2012; Prno & Slocombe 2012). 
The case of Greenland shows that the development of oil and gas activities is not solely 
an affair of state authorities and companies, nor is it solely a national affair: National 
level stakeholders want to become more involved in the decision making process and 
at the same time the oil and gas activities are closely linked to the globally debated 
theme of climate change and the transition towards renewable energy. The rather 
instrumental focus of the social license to operate on the local project context and 
the relation between a company and its local stakeholders therefore misses essential 
elements of today’s increasingly interconnected and complex society. What is the role 
of governments in this context? As the energy domain concerns an issue of strategic 
national importance, governments are still one of the main actors involved in the 
decision making process related to these large industrial activities. How does the social 
license to operate relate to / interacts with the regulatory framework that applies to a 
specific activity and has been formulated by governments? The regulatory framework 
sets the legal requirements companies need to comply with, but does not necessarily 
satisfy the expectations of citizens and civil society organisations (Morrison 2014; Franks 
et al. 2014). And how does societal debate on other geographical levels influence / 
interacts with local level societal concerns? Do these debates complement or contradict 
each other and in what way(s) could they influence the successful implementation of 
an activity locally? The current understanding of the social license to operate does not 
answer these questions. The case of oil and gas development in Greenland however 
shows that these questions are relevant in order to analyse and understand what 
is happening with the support of society for these large energy projects. It can thus 
be questioned whether applying the understanding of the social license to operate 
concept generates the necessary insights to adequately address societal concerns 
and contribute to the successful implementation of an internationally debated activity. 
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1.4.1 A multilevel understanding of the social license to operate
A contextually informed, multilevel understanding of the social license to operate does 
not yet exist. However, there are a few publications that go beyond the traditional local 
level and instrumental focus that dominates social license to operate literature. These 
are used as a starting point to expand the social license to operate concept. Moreover, 
other fields of social science research, such as governance and post international 
theory, offer valuable insights and concepts that could form a starting point for the 
development of a multilevel understanding of the social license to operate concept. This 
section elaborates upon the theoretical concepts that are used to create a contextually 
informed and multilevel understanding of the social license to operate.
To widen the scope of the social license to operate concept and include the interaction 
with the political domain and the legal framework, this thesis builds on the idea that 
successful implementation of an activity is determined by its social, political and legal 
licenses together (Morrison 2014). The political license is defined as ‘the authority that 
the government gives to any other organisation to undertake a particular activity’ (Morrison 
2014). A country’s regulatory framework is setting the requirements for a legal license, 
which is granted by an assigned government authority after following a set of legal 
procedures. The social license to operate can be said to have emerged as a third type 
of license, next to the other two licenses. The social license is not a ‘tick-the-box’ license, 
but rather an ongoing process that runs throughout the entire lifecycle of a project. 
In social license to operate literature it is generally acknowledged that trust and 
legitimacy play an important role in obtaining and maintaining a social license to 
operate (Thomson & Boutilier 2011; Morrison 2014). Generating trust and legitimacy 
relates to the way you engage with stakeholders, do projects and take decisions. It is 
not something that can be designed from behind a desk. Trust and legitimacy are not 
only important in the relation between society and companies, which is the current 
focus of social license to operate literature, but also play an important role in the 
political and legal licenses and the changing relationship between governments and 
society (Rosenau 1997, 2003, 2006). Next to distinguishing two forms of trust (i.e. 
interactional and institutional), the focus of the main body of social license to operate 
literature is predominantly output oriented as it often discusses the legitimacy of an 
activity in terms of its economic and/or socio-political contribution to society. However, 
literature from other scientific fields such as governance theory, political and public 
administration sciences shows that multiple forms of legitimacy exist (van Tatenhove 
2011). How do these other forms of legitimacy relate to the social license to operate 
context? And what is the role of all these forms of trust and legitimacy in the interaction 
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between the political, legal and social licenses of an activity? This thesis takes a closer 
look at these questions and studies the role of trust and legitimacy in the interaction 
between the three licenses using the case of oil and gas development in Greenland.
As was highlighted in section 2 of this chapter, human capital development is of great 
importance in the Greenlandic context. This is not only a practical matter of enabling 
as many people as possible to be able to seize the employment opportunities that 
arise from these new oil and gas activities. It is also relevant to study the relation 
between human capital development and different forms of trust and legitimacy. In 
what ways could human capital development contribute to building a basis of trust and 
legitimacy? And could it be more than an economic benefit to the local workforce? In 
order to answer these questions, this thesis does not only draw on the case of oil and 
gas development in Greenland, which is still in its infancy, but also takes a closer look 
at experiences with human capital development related to more mature developments 
of energy activities in other small Arctic societies. 
  
Next to widening the scope of the social license to operate concept at a national level, 
the case of oil and gas development in Greenland shows it is also relevant to enrich 
the concept with a multilevel focus. These oil and gas activities have been subject to 
international public debate and scrutiny, even though they are implemented within a 
local context, falling under the national jurisdiction of a democratically elected state. 
How do these two levels interact? And are they complementing or contradicting each 
other? The link between multiple geographical levels is considered especially relevant 
to activities that are regarded to be controversial from an environmental and/or social 
perspective, since environmental and social impacts often do not confine themselves 
to nation state boundaries (Harvey & Bice 2014). In this respect oil and gas activities 
are considered to be controversial as they have environmental and social impacts 
that transcend boundaries, are subject to global commodity prices and are often 
implemented by international companies (ibid.). The link between Arctic oil and gas 
activities and the global level is even stronger because of the Arctic oil and gas paradox: 
Throughout the region, snow and ice have melted due to global warming. The worldwide 
combustion of fossil fuels plays an important role in the emission of greenhouse 
gases that link to climate change. The region where the effects of climate change are 
most profound was at the same time seen as an area with a high potential for the 
development of new oil and gas activities at the start of this century. The development 
of a multilevel social license to operate concept is therefore essential in order to analyse 
and understand the social license to operate of these Arctic oil and gas activities.
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In order to develop a social license to operate concept that includes a multilevel focus, 
this thesis draws on insights and concepts from governance and post international 
theory. Given the case of oil and gas development in Greenland, which includes a 
national level context in which the oil and gas activities are implemented and an 
international level context in which the climate debate is held, the multilevel focus is 
developed based on two geographical levels: The national level and the international 
level. Since the very origin of the social license to operate concept is explained by the 
failure of the political and legal systems of a nation state and the shortcomings of 
private sector companies in the local implementation of an activity, the social license 
to operate concept in its current form is not ready to be applied on an international 
level and address multilevel challenges. In developing a new, multilevel approach to the 
social license to operate this thesis builds amongst others on the research of Rosenau 
(1997, 2003, 2006) in which he studies the role of nation states at both the national 
and international level. Over the last decades, the role of nation states has changed 
from a state-centric world to a bifurcated system where states compete, cooperate, 
interact and/or coexist with other state and non-state actors that have gained power 
and authority. States therefore engage in different types of governance arrangements 
at the same time. On the one hand this empowers states to pursue national interests 
in an international arena (Compagnon et al. 2012), on the other hand it limits their 
authority as it becomes dispersed over various arrangements and actors.
Non-state actors with which nation states compete, cooperate, interact and/or coexist 
in the international arena, consist of amongst other international environmental NGOs 
and multinational private sector companies. These companies play an increasingly 
large role in the international arena due to liberalisation of domestic markets and trade 
agreements (Ruggie 2004). The international environmental NGOs address global issues 
whereby the state is not necessarily their main point of focus, nor are government 
related tools and procedures necessarily used to reach their goals. These NGOs also 
address the social responsibility of multinational private sector companies. Worldwide 
protest actions against Arctic oil and gas, but also against climate change and rainforest 
destruction, illustrate the increasingly international character of civil society activity. 
Even though the protest actions themselves are executed on a local level, they are 
organised and debated on a global level in a digital world facilitated by the internet and 
social media (Cullen-Knox et al. 2017; Yates & Horvath 2013). As the same activities are 
thus debated at two different levels at the same time, this sparks the question if, how 
and when they interact? And what is the role of international environmental NGOs, who 
are organising the protest actions worldwide and often have local branches, as well as 
the role of multinational companies, who develop activities worldwide and implement 
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them locally, in relation to a social license to operate? As Rosenau illustrates, nation 
states now share their authority with these actors at an international level, but what is 
the influence of these international non-state actors on the authority of a state within 
the national level context and related to the three national licenses applicable to an 
activity?
Social media and smartphones could play an important role in the connection 
and interaction between social licenses at multiple levels: They enable people and 
organisations to instantly share their point of view and connect to others elsewhere 
in the world. It is both a tool to mobilise a public movement as well as a means for 
debate and dialogue (Castells 2008). The media have become a space of politics and 
the internet provides a public space, which is not geographically anchored (Castells 
2000, 2005). In this digital public space powerful images and simple messages can 
drive social change. This raises the question what role social media and the internet 
have played in the context of Arctic oil and gas development? Did it facilitate interaction 
between the national level Greenlandic debate and the international level debate on 
Arctic oil and gas development? And how did it or did it not contribute to a social license 
to operate? At the international level, international environmental NGOs such as WWF 
and Greenpeace have started social media campaigns against oil and gas activities 
throughout the Arctic region. They mainly used social media to convey their message 
to millions worldwide, supported by strong images of dark drilling rigs in a white Arctic 
environment. 
This thesis builds upon the aforementioned elements including the three different 
licenses, various additional forms of trust and legitimacy, combined with Rosenau’s 
concept of a bifurcated governance system, the shared authority between nation states 
and non-state actors and the role of social media, for the development of a multilevel 
social license to operate concept. 
1.5 Research objective and questions
As the previous sections have illustrated, debates about the social license to operate 
are emerging in relation to industrial projects with an environmental and social impact. 
This is particularly the case for controversial activities such as oil and gas development 
in the Arctic. Often a narrow definition and isolated approach towards the social license 
to operate is used. In scholarly literature and in oil and gas projects the main focus is 
on local stakeholders and their interaction with a private sector company as project 
proponent. Trust and legitimacy are key components, but also difficult to measure and 
therefore less examined. The role of human capital development is hardly studied, 
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although human capital development is one of the main social challenges in small 
Arctic societies. Influences from political and legal arenas or other operational levels 
that could influence the implementation of an activity are not necessarily integrated 
in the current social license to operate approaches. The objective of this research is 
therefore as follows:
To increase the understanding of the development of a social license to operate of controversial 
energy projects by analysing the role of trust, legitimacy and human capital development in 
an Arctic context and by developing a multilevel approach of a social license to operate that 
includes legal and political licenses.
To reach this objective this thesis investigates the case of Arctic oil and gas development, 
with a particular focus on Greenland, as it is one of the most controversial activities 
from a global energy perspective of the last decade. The following research question 
and sub-questions are posed:
How is the social license to operate of Greenlandic oil and gas activities influenced by legal 
and political licenses in a multilevel context, what is the role of trust, legitimacy and human 
capital development and how does this contribute to a multilevel approach of a social license 
to operate? 
1. What is the multilevel governance setting in which Arctic oil and gas activities take 
place and what is the authority of a state such as Greenland?
2. What is a social license to operate and how does it relate to the legal and political 
licenses of oil and gas activities in the Greenland?
3. In what way do trust and legitimacy play a role in the different licenses to operate for 
oil and gas activities in Greenland?
4. What are the challenges and opportunities for Greenland to maximise local benefits 
in the development of an oil and gas sector? 
5. In what way does human capital development contribute to a social license to operate 
for oil and gas development in Greenland and other small Arctic states?
6. How has the social license to operate of Arctic oil and gas activities developed at the 
international level and how does it interact with the local level?
1.6 Research approach
To answer the research questions outlined in the previous section, a case-study approach 
was selected. A case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
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phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2009). This approach is particularly 
suitable to study a case in great detail and from various angles, to understand how and 
why certain processes take place in the real world. The goal is to contribute to theory 
building by analytic generalisation (Yin 2009). In qualitative research this is an iterative 
process based on an ongoing interaction between theory, data gathering and analysis. 
The case-study approach is the best suitable method to study the social license to 
operate of Arctic oil and gas development, due to its contemporary and complex nature 
and the little control the researcher has over the phenomenon.
1.6.1 Case selection
A general selection criterion was that the energy projects are considered controversial 
and evoke debate in society both locally and internationally. Furthermore, information 
about the decision making process regarding these projects and legal and policy 
documents should be relatively easy to access in the public domain and in a language 
that is mastered sufficiently. The case of oil and gas development in Greenland matched 
all these requirements. Greenland, whose ice sheet is studied from a climate change 
perspective and its melt can increase global sea levels, expressed a clear ambition to 
develop oil and gas resources. The largest international oil companies took part in the 
various licensing rounds that were organised by the government. The renewed attention 
for oil and gas resulted in a doubling of the total exploration drills in 2010/2011. The 
most recent exploration drills were not only subject to a national debate, but were 
also part of an international debate on climate change and the transition towards 
renewable energy.
Greenland also qualified as case study because it is a small state within the context of 
a highly securitised energy domain and an increasingly politicised Arctic. It was only in 
2009 that they just obtained Self-Rule, including the rights to the underground. With its 
approximately 56.000 inhabitants Greenland is a (very) small state, which found itself 
in the centre of attention of not only the largest oil companies in the world, but also 
some of the world’s largest countries such as China. This context does not only make 
it interesting to study the interaction between large international companies and local 
indigenous communities, as is normally done in social license to operate research, but 
also to study the international influences on Greenlandic society and the role of the 
government in this setting. 
 
1.6.2 Data collection and analysis
This research is based on data collected via interviews, observations and document 
and literature analysis. The empirical data has been gathered between 2011 and 2016. 
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By collecting data in three different ways, data triangulation ensures that the data and 
findings are confirmed or disconfirmed in multiple ways (Yin, 2009; Vennix, 2006). In 
2011 I started with investigating numerous documents. Those gave rise to a number 
of questions that were addressed in the first set of interviews that were conducted by 
the end of 2011. In turn the interviews and later observations also initiated interests 
and topics for further investigation, which led me to study new documents and later 
conduct a second set of interviews. It was thus an iterative process between theory, 
data gathering and data analysis.
A variety of documents has been studied within the context of this case study. These 
do not only include scientific literature, but also (research) reports, project documents 
such as environmental and social impact assessments, governmental documents and 
videos, factsheets, newspaper articles and minutes of public consultations. Many of 
these documents were freely accessible on the internet, either in Dutch, English or 
Danish. I used the analysis of these documents to get a first understanding of the 
context, identify the relevant actors for this case study and identify the key issues in 
the societal debate on Arctic oil and gas development.
The social license to operate of Arctic oil and gas development does not necessarily 
manifest itself in a physical location, but is also shaped digitally. Observations did not 
take place in one location, but took place on a number of different occasions. Since 
the Greenlandic context of oil and gas development is an important part of my case 
study, I visited Greenland in December 2011 and February 2016. In 2011 I spent two 
weeks in the capital Nuuk. In 2016 I visited both Nuuk and Sisimiut. Someone from a 
country as densely populated as the Netherlands can try to imagine what it is like to 
live in a capital counting 16.000 inhabitants and not having road connections to other 
cities, but experiencing and observing this reality creates a greater understanding of 
the challenges Greenland is facing. Furthermore, participative observations took place 
in the Dutch Arctic Circle. This is a platform where the Dutch government, companies, 
nature organisations and knowledge institutes that work on Arctic issues meet each 
other and share their knowledge, expertise and experience.
The interview data for this research consists of two sets of formal semi-structured 
interviews and a number of informal, open interviews. The first set of semi-structured 
interviews was conducted in 2011 and the second in 2016. Some interviewees that 
were interviewed in 2011 were again interviewed in 2016. Prior to each interview an 
interview guide including open-ended questions was prepared based on the preceding 
document analysis and observations. The interviews took one hour on average and 
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have been documented in a transcript. Respondents were asked if they wanted to 
review the transcript, but they did not deem this necessary. The interviewed authorities, 
companies and organisations have been selected based on their involvement in the 
development of oil and gas activities in Greenland and the wider Arctic. A balanced 
representation of sectors (government, private and civil society) and of geographical 
origin (local, national or international) was ensured in the selection process (see 
Appendices). The socio-political focus of this research determined which departments 
or representatives were approached, e.g. (representatives and experts of) social/
economic/political departments within governments, companies and organisations 
rather than (representatives and experts of) the technical departments. A list of 
interviewees can be found in Appendices. 
It should be noted that some local and national organisations are so small, that 
the entire organisation consists of one to five employees. The representatives of 
the organisations that have been interviewed were all high level policy or executive 
officers that spoke on behalf of the organisation they represented. Some of them have 
been born and raised in Greenland, while others are Danes that now work and live 
in Greenland or representatives that work and live in other European countries. All 
interviews were conducted in English as I do not master the Danish and Greenlandic 
languages sufficiently to conduct semi-structured interviews. This only affected the 
selection process concerning the local civil society organisations: Some local civil society 
organisation were happy to conduct the interview in English and could therefore be 
included in this research. However, the researcher also approached the Greenlandic 
workers and fishermen and hunters organisations but due to the language barrier 
no interviews could be conducted with these two organisations. By interviewing 
the President of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the stakes of Greenlandic workers, 
fishermen and hunters were included in this research. The Inuit Circumpolar Council 
maintains close ties with these two as well as other Greenlandic NGOs. This is amongst 
others illustrated by the fact that the Greenlandic workers and fishermen and hunters 
organisation are officially part of the ICC Greenland Delegation (inuit.org). 
Furthermore, a number of informal, open interviews were held during my first visit to 
Greenland in 2011 and various conference visits, including the European Arctic Oil & 
Gas seminar (2012), the Arctic Frontiers Conference (2013, 2014 and 2015) and Arctic 
Technology Conference (2015). The informal, open interviews were conducted with 
representatives of national and international private sector companies, the public sector 
(Arctic and non-Arctic) and international civil society. Some of these conversations were 
extensive, while others were rather short, but all were informative and helped contributed 
to my understanding of oil and gas development in the Arctic and in Greenland.
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The data was analysed using different conceptual frameworks that were each formulated 
to suit the needs of the specific research question at hand. The operationalisation 
outlined in the various conceptual frameworks was used to construct a coding scheme 
in qualitative data analysis software (QDA Data Miner). The interview transcripts were 
then labelled according to the coding scheme, which made it possible to link the 
interview data to the specific research questions. These conceptual frameworks include 
concepts such as governance arrangements (Chapter 2), human capital development 
(Chapter 3), trust (Chapter 4 and 5), legitimacy (Chapter 4 and 5), and multilevel social 
license to operate (Chapter 6). It has structured the analysis of the data concerning 
actors, rules and regulations, resources, various forms and ways trust and legitimacy 
are being formed and the dynamics of a multilevel social license to operate on Arctic 
oil and gas activities. 
1.7 Outline of this thesis
The six sub-questions of this research are answered in five scientific papers, which are 
presented as the five following chapters in this thesis. An overview of the five papers 
that answer the various sub-questions of this research is presented in Figure 4.
Chapter 2 explores the multilevel governance setting of Arctic oil and gas activities 
and studies the changing spheres of authority in Greenland (sub-question 1). One of 
the biggest risks for Greenland is not being able to maximise the benefits from the 
offshore oil and gas developments. Chapter 3 therefore takes a closer look at the 
challenges and opportunities of maximising the local benefits of energy development 
for small Arctic states including Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland (sub-
question 4). It appears that creating a critical mass of local human capital is essential 
in maximising local benefits. Chapter 4 therefore examines the role of human capital 
development in relation to obtaining and maintaining a local social license to operate 
for the development of energy activities in these three Arctic states (sub-question 5). 
Chapter 5 presents a broader perspective on the social license to operate concept and 
studies the role of various forms of trust and legitimacy in the social license and its 
interaction with the legal and political licenses (sub-question 2 and 3). Chapter 6 builds 
on the more inclusive approach towards the social license to operate as developed in 
Chapter 5 and in turn develops a set of hypotheses and a typology for the interaction 
of the social license at multiple levels. 
Based on the research findings presented in Chapter 2 to 6, Chapter 7 answers the 
main research question and outlines recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER
2
Authority in Arctic governance:
Changing spheres of authority in 
Greenlandic offshore oil and gas 
developments
C.C.A. Smits
J.P.M. van Tatenhove
J. van Leeuwen 
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2014, 14, 4, 
329-348 
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ABSTRACT
The Arctic has rapidly transformed from a ‘ ‘frozen desert’ ’ into a theatre for 
high-level politics. Climate change and socioeconomic interdependencies bring 
the World more and more to the Arctic and vice versa. Increased geological 
knowledge, new technologies, and high-energy prices make it possible to develop 
oil and gas resources in the Arctic; however, the effectiveness of oil spill response 
techniques remains a key concern. To understand oil and gas exploration in the 
Arctic governance setting, and especially the authority of Greenland, we combine 
a multi-level governance framework with the concept sphere of authority from 
post-international theory. The Arctic sphere of authority on oil and gas consists 
of many different governance arrangements, of which the most well-known 
governance arrangement is the Arctic Council. This chapter focuses on the 
authority of Greenland in the changing oil and gas governance arrangements 
in the Arctic. Crucial is the changing Danish–Greenlandic relationship, in which 
the development of a Greenlandic oil and gas sector is seen as a tool to become 
financially independent. It can be concluded that the capacity of the Greenlandic 
government and civil society actors should be the primary guideline for the pace 
in which oil and gas activities are being developed. Taking this approach will ensure 
that the Greenland is retaining its central position and high degree of influence on 
the governance of oil and gas development in its country. Otherwise, it will lose 
influence and benefits will flow elsewhere.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
The Arctic has rapidly transformed from a ‘‘frozen desert’’ into a theatre for high-
level politics and geopolitical struggles. Climate change and socioeconomic 
interdependencies bring the world more and more to the Arctic and vice versa. 
Due to climate change, the sea ice and snow cover is decreasing, making the Arctic 
region increasingly accessible for all kinds of activities, such as shipping, oil and gas 
exploitation, fisheries, and tourism. Combined with increased geological knowledge, 
new technologies, and high-energy prices, it is considered possible to exploit oil and gas 
resources in the Arctic (IFPA 2012). The major concern related to the exploration and 
exploitation of oil and gas is the effectiveness of oil spill response techniques in Arctic 
waters. An oil spill would have an adverse impact on the sensitive marine environment, 
and there is no prove yet that the technology currently used can clean up oil in or under 
ice effectively (PEW 2013).
Today’s world is highly dependent on fossil fuels for its energy provision. Together 
with a growing population and increasing welfare, this causes a rise in the demand 
for fossil fuels, which is likely to continue in the (near) future. The conventional and 
easy-to-reach resources have largely been discovered and exploited. These resources 
thus come to an end, and oil companies are searching for less conventional places and 
reserves to fulfil the world’s demand. Although the costs to explore and exploit these 
resources are higher than elsewhere in the world, the operations become more and 
more feasible. This is especially the case for oil projects (Short and Murray 2011), as 
the prices for oil are higher than the prices for gas. Due to among others the recent 
shale gas developments in the USA the price of gas has been decreasing, resulting in 
a changing business case for Arctic gas projects such as Shtokman in Russia. That also 
Arctic oil projects can face difficulties is shown by the John Castberg project in Norway, 
which has been delayed due to uncertainties in the resource estimates, investment, and 
changes in the Norwegian tax system (Statoil 2013). On the short term, it could be the 
case that some already discovered Arctic resources will not immediately be exploited, 
but since exploration activities in the Arctic fall within a longer-term strategy, they are 
likely to continue in the coming years. 
As a result of these biophysical changes and technological, economic and environmental 
developments, the interest of the rest of the world in the Arctic is rising (Arctic 
Governance Project 2010). Not only the attention of Arctic states is triggered by these 
developments, but also other public and private actors enter the geopolitical stage, 
such as non-Arctic states, the European Union (EU), China, oil and gas companies, 
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mining companies, shipping companies, the tourist sector, fisheries, (environmental) 
NGOs, banks, and insurance companies. This will change the balances of power in the 
Arctic region. Looking at the exploitation of oil and gas resources, the Arctic can be 
seen as the last frontier for the oil industry.
Governing Arctic oil and gas is a dynamic, fragmented, and complex issue, giving rise to 
a debate on both the nature of fragmentation in Arctic governance as well as avenues 
for future development of Arctic governance (see Humrich 2013 for a review of this 
debate). This chapter studies the current governance of oil and gas development 
in the Arctic and in Greenland in particular. To diversify its economy and secure an 
additional source of income, the Greenlandic government wants to further develop oil 
and gas activities. Since 2009, Greenland has Self-Government, meaning that they now 
have authority over their underground and thus over the resources in it (BMP 2009a). 
The development of their oil and gas resources is watched by the rest of the world, 
particularly by other Arctic states and environmental NGOs. Finding a balance between 
economy, ecology, and society is of utmost importance if Greenland wants to make its 
oil and gas development into a success.
The challenge for Greenland will be to deal with the tensions between the nationally 
desired development of oil and gas developments and the exact authority that it 
has in shaping this development in a sustainable way, given the increasing nesting 
of governance arrangements in Arctic governance. The Arctic governance setting is 
fragmented and highly politicized, consisting of states, market parties, and several 
formal and informal institutions, such as the legal framework of UNCLOS and the 
intergovernmental Arctic Council. The increasing dependencies between the Arctic 
and the rest of the world will produce a denser web of governance arrangements for 
the Arctic and will affect the authority of individual Arctic states. The main objective 
of this chapter is to analyse the increased nesting of governance arrangements in the 
Arctic sphere of authority relevant for oil and gas developments in Greenland and the 
resulting changes in the authority of Greenland in shaping these developments. We 
will analyse the role of Greenland and how its position and authority is shaped by the 
Denmark–Greenland arrangement of Self-Government and its participation in the Arctic 
Council. Based on this analysis, we will discuss the main factors that will change the 
authority of Greenland over its gas and oil activities in the near future.
In analysing the authority of the Greenlandic government in Arctic governance, especially 
in the exploration of oil and gas, we will use the concepts of marine governance 
arrangements and sphere of authority, combining a multi-level governance perspective 
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with a post-international perspective. In Section 2.2, we introduce our theoretical 
framework after which an introduction to the history of oil and gas exploration in the 
Arctic and in Greenland is given in Section 2.3. The relevant government arrangements 
in Greenland’s offshore oil and gas development are discussed in the following section, 
and Section 2.5 discusses the changes in authority of the Greenlandic government 
in particular. Conclusions on the nested government arrangements and changing 
authority related to the development of offshore oil and gas in Greenland can be found 
in Section 2.6.
2.2 Nested governance arrangements and authority in Arctic governance
To understand oil and gas exploration in the Arctic governance setting, and especially 
the authority of Greenland, we combine a multi-level governance framework with 
the concept sphere of authority from post-international theory (PI). While multi-
level governance (MLG) understands the multi-actor and multi-level dynamics of 
policymaking and politics (Bache and Flinders 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2003), post-
international theory challenges the notion that the world is divided by territorial 
boundaries into sovereign, legally dependent states. PI departs from the observation 
that numerous actors of different types, both state and non-state, which together 
determine the process and outcome of global politics (Ferguson and Mansbach 2007) 
crowd contemporary politics. The role of states and non-state actors is changing due to 
the processes of political modernization. Political modernisation refers to ‘‘the shifting 
relationships between the state, the market, and civil society in political domains of 
societies—within countries and beyond—as a manifestation of the ‘second stage of 
modernity’ implying new conceptions and structures of governance’’ (Arts and Van 
Tatenhove 2006: 29). Structural processes of transformation, such as globalization and 
individualization, affect the political and economic domains of societies and are causing 
a skills revolution empowering individual citizens and non-state actors as well as forces 
that de-territorialise politics (Rosenau 1997, 2003, 2006). In general, globalisation is the 
widening, deepening, and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects 
of contemporary social life (Held et al. 2000). Scholars, such as Giddens, Castell, Held, 
Sassen, and Rosenau, see globalization as a central driving force behind the economic, 
social, and political changes, reshaping modern society, states, and the world order. As 
a result, politics becomes bifurcated, as it nowadays is a mixture between conventional 
inter-state politics and a new world of politics consisting of un-institutionalised 
interactions between a plethora of actors across the international–domestic divide 
(Rosenau 1997, 2006; Beck 2005).
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The increasing power of non-state actors and the forces of cross-border social, political, 
and economic processes have an effect on the authority of national governments. 
As global politics is undergoing processes of restructuring, so are states (Beck 2005; 
Spaargaren and Mol 2008). Several scholars discuss the relationship between territory, 
authority, and sovereignty. According to Held et al. (2000), ‘‘a new ‘sovereignty regime’ is 
displacing traditional conceptions of statehood as an absolute, indivisible, territorially 
exclusive, and zero-sum form of public power.’’ According to Sassen (2006), globalisation 
has destabilised the marriage of territory, authority, and rights within the nation-state 
and is characterized by the emergence of different assemblages of territory, authority, 
and rights (Sassen 2006). In this setting of complex transnational networks (Keohane 
1995) and an emerging network society (Castells 2009), individual states and their 
governments are also faced with emancipated citizens and civil society groups as well 
as with complex problems that go beyond their territorial-based control. States become 
increasingly dependent on other actors because they lack the resources or legitimacy 
to deliver public services, or face an environment that is increasingly ungovernable 
(Pierre and Peters 2000). States therefore engage in different types of governance 
arrangements at the same time —through international agreements with other states 
and partnership constructs with non-state actors— creating an ever-denser web of 
actors, institutions, and policies. This web of governance arrangements on the one hand 
empowers the state as it offers possibilities to further national interests with regard to 
certain areas, issues, and activities (Compagnon et al. 2012). On the other hand, it limits 
authority as it becomes dispersed over various arrangements and actors.
The concept sphere of authority refers to this web of arrangements in terms of 
‘‘collectivities that have the authority to evoke compliance from those who are ruled’’ 
(Rosenau 2002, 2003, 2006). Collectivities are governance arrangements in which actors 
embedded in a shared institutional setting engage in politics and policymaking. An 
arrangement is a temporary stabilisation of the organisation and substance of a policy 
domain (Arts et al. 2000) aiming to develop effective and legitimate steering mechanisms 
(Van Leeuwen 2010). The organisation of a sphere of authority is characterised by the 
actors (on different levels) involved, the power resources that these actors have, and 
the rules of the game or institutions that allow these actors to interact (Arts et al. 2000). 
The substance of a policy domain is defined by the discourses that different actors 
hold over the problem definition and possible solutions (Arts et al. 2000). Steering 
mechanisms refer to the types of law and (formal and informal) regulation used to 
shape activities of actors (Van Leeuwen 2010). The web of governance arrangements 
shapes the authority of actors within the sphere of authority. Authority is defined as 
having the right to govern and the ability to generate compliance of those persons to 
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which authority is issued (Rosenau 2002, 2003; Van Leeuwen 2010). Key in asserting 
authority is therefore the ability to influence and adopt steering mechanisms as well as 
ensuring that they are implemented and enforced effectively. Arrangements within a 
sphere of authority overlap, layer, and nest because they share the same political space 
in a certain policy domain (Van Leeuwen and Kern 2013; Van Tatenhove 2013; Ferguson 
and Mansbach 2007). For example, in the development of Arctic offshore oil and gas 
developments, several arrangements come together under one sphere of authority. The 
way in which arrangements for Arctic offshore oil and gas developments become nested 
differs per Arctic country, because each country also has its national arrangement to 
regulate offshore oil and gas developments. Together, these (nested) multi-level and 
multi-actor arrangements define the authority exercised within a sphere of authority.
2.3 History of oil and gas in the Arctic and Greenland
To define the extent of the Arctic sphere of authority, it is of importance to establish 
a clear understanding of the definition of ‘‘the Arctic.’’ Defining ‘‘the Arctic’’ is not as 
simple as it might appear at first sight. Many different definitions exist, which are used 
by different actors. For this research, the definition proposed and used by the AMAP 
(AMAP 1998, p. 2–10) of the Arctic Council has been used:
[…] the terrestrial and marine areas north of the Arctic Circle (66°32’N), and north of 62°N in 
Asia and 60°N in North America, modified to include the marine areas north of the Aleutian 
chain, Hudson Bay, and parts of the North Atlantic Ocean including the Labrador Sea.
This definition includes all areas within the Arctic Circle and adjacent regions in North 
America and Siberia as well as parts of the Atlantic Ocean and the Bering Strait (Figure 
5). For almost a century, oil and gas activities have been conducted in the Arctic. Oil 
exploration began on a small scale before World War II in the Mackenzie Valley in 
Canada, the Alaskan North Slope, and in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug area 
in Russia (AMAP 2007 pp. 2–16). However, it would last until after World War II before 
large-scale onshore exploration activities took off in Alaska, Canada, and Russia. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, large reserves were found. In case of Alaska, the oil and gas 
exploration activities also went offshore by that time. The first activities took place 
in the Beaufort Sea, but later also the Bering and Chukchi Seas were included (AMAP 
2007, pp. 2–16). In the 1970s and 1980s, offshore oil and gas exploration was also 
conducted in the Norwegian Sea, the (Russian part of the) Barents Sea, in other Russian 
waters, and offshore the coast of Greenland. In the case of Norway and Russia, major 
petroleum reserves were discovered and exploitation wells were drilled. In Greenland, 
14 exploration wells have been drilled up until 2012 (BMP n.d.) of which five have been 
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drilled in the 1970s, one in 2000, and another eight in 2010 and 2011. Nowadays, four 
out of five countries bordering the Arctic Ocean are producing oil and/or gas onshore, 
near shore, and/or offshore (Rekacewicz and Ahlenius 2006).
Figure 5: AMAP definition of the Arctic (source: AMAP 2014)
When the industry started to fully develop oil and gas in the Arctic region, the first 
protests appeared as well. In the beginning, the protests mainly came from indigenous 
people that had lived on the land for centuries, but now started to feel the impact of 
the development of onshore and offshore oil and gas on their daily practices (AMAP 
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2007, pp. 3–09; Coates 2007). However, the indigenous people often did not possess 
official land ownership rights, making their claim difficult to pursue. Besides the direct 
effects on their livelihoods resulting from changing land use, due to the construction of 
pipelines and onshore oil fields, indirect effects impacting the (marine) mammals and 
fish on which they depend were felt as well. These protests started in the 1960s and 
continued throughout the 1970s in Canada and Alaska (Coates 2007). The objections 
of indigenous people toward the development of oil and gas were picked up by the 
environmental movement that was emerging at that time (Coates 2007). Protest groups 
like the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and Greenpeace brought the development of 
Arctic oil and gas into international debates and under the attention of many people 
in the world. In the case of the Trans- Alaskan Pipeline, environmental groups made 
objections that brought the case into court (Alaska History and Cultural Studies n.d.). 
The amount of environmental legislation that was formulated at that time is reflecting 
the attention paid to environmental issues.
After this phase of environmental and indigenous protest, a relatively silent period 
started which lasted until the 2000s. Only when climate change reached the 
international agenda in the early 2000s, attention shifted again to the Arctic (Young 
2009). Climate change and its impacts were becoming particularly visible in the Arctic 
and have resulted in people’s association of climate change with melting glaciers and 
a lonely polar bear clinging on to a small chunk of sea ice in the middle of a big blue 
ocean. At the same time, the need for fossil fuels is still apparent and keeps growing. 
The potential of the Arctic region was recognized by oil companies. Worldwide attention 
was drawn to the Arctic’s potential by the release of USGS study in 2008 (USGS 2008a). 
Compared to previous decades, the technology to develop, explore, and exploit the 
Arctic has developed (Lloyds 2012; AMAP 2007, pp. 2–250), and backed by the trend 
of rising oil prices, expectations about projects in this region becoming economically 
feasible are rising. The attitude of indigenous people varies across the Arctic and 
even within regions and communities (Harris 2012; Reeves 2011). Environmental 
organizations such as Greenpeace have reinforced their campaign against Arctic oil 
and gas development and reached international media by entering drilling rigs such 
as Cairn Energy’s rig in 2011 (Vidal 2011) and disturbing meetings regarding Arctic oil 
and gas development (Agence France-Presse 2011). The reasons for these differences 
in attitudes mainly relate to the risks and challenges that come with Arctic oil and gas 
development, and in particularly the concerns related to oil spill response techniques 
and their effectiveness.
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2.4 Nested governance arrangements in Greenland’s offshore oil and gas 
development
Studying the sphere of authority governing Greenland’s oil and gas development 
begins with a deeper understanding of the individual governance arrangements that 
are nested within this sphere of authority. Currently, there are many different actors 
involved shaping Greenland’s development of offshore oil and gas production, ranging 
from states to market parties and civil society organizations. All actors have their 
agendas, power resources, and interests that they want to pursue in the sphere of 
authority governing Greenland’s oil and gas activities. These actors have entered into 
various different partnerships and are part of multiple governance arrangements at 
the same time. In this complex, governance setting actors are interdependent of each 
other, as authority is being spread over different arrangements and actors.
2.4.1 The Arctic Council
The most important state actors within the Arctic sphere of authority on offshore 
oil and gas development are the five states surrounding the Arctic Ocean, namely 
Russia, Norway, Denmark (Greenland), Canada, and the USA (Alaska). These actors 
are involved in several governance arrangements that deal with different issues in 
the Arctic. The most well-known Arctic governance arrangement is the Arctic Council, 
which is a ‘‘high-level intergovernmental forum’’ that was formally established by the 
Ottowa Declaration of 1996 (www.arctic-council.org). The Council has been established 
to deal with environmental protection and sustainable development of the Arctic, and 
to provide a forum to stimulate cooperation, coordination, and interaction between 
the Arctic states, the indigenous people, and other inhabitants of the Arctic (Ottowa 
Declaration 1996). It is unique in the world, because it gives the indigenous people a 
formal place in the decision making procedure alongside nation states. Other, non-
Arctic states and actors can apply to become an observer, so that they are allowed to 
attend all meetings of the Council. Several nation states, such as the Netherlands, and 
NGOs, such as WWF, have obtained this status (Arctic Council 2011). Others, such as the 
European Union, are eager to obtain it, but the 8 Arctic member states are well aware of 
their powerful position and have until now refused to grant the European Union (EU) an 
observer status. During the latest meeting of the Arctic Council, China, India, Italy, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, and Singapore were granted the observer status2. This illustrates 
that the role of the Arctic Council is changing, a process that is still ongoing. The Arctic 
Council is now in the centre of attention when it comes to Arctic developments. The 
Arctic Council has become a high level political organization where non-Arctic states 
2 Kiruna Declaration, Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Kiruna Sweden, May 15, 2013.
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and world powers want to be part of. The main issue will be to include these states in a 
way that does justice to their driving (industrial) influence on Arctic resources demand 
(Koivurova 2013). Besides non-Arctic states getting a more official position in the most 
important Arctic governance arrangement, also non-state actors are showing more and 
more interest in becoming part of this arrangement. Recently, the oil industry began 
showing interest in becoming part of the Arctic Council coalition, as the International 
Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) applied for an observer status in 2009 
(www.ogp.org.uk). With the Arctic now becoming a theatre of high-level politics, the 
Arctic Council is seen by multiple different actors as the most legitimate governance 
arrangement to deal with Arctic issues (personal communication— interview Shell, 
WWF, Greenland; Rottem 2013).
The changes in the role of the Arctic Council fit into a wider trend of rising interest in the 
Arctic. Since the early 2000s, climate change impacts have gained more attention on 
the international agenda (Young 2009). The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), 
published in 2004, changed the discourse from the Arctic as a ‘‘frozen desert’’ to the 
Arctic as ‘‘a dynamic region in transformation’’ and as the canary in the coalmine when 
it comes to climate change (Koivurova 2010; ACIA 2004). Nowadays, this is the dominant 
discourse within the Arctic Council and has led to policies being reformulated by Arctic 
actors since the emergence of this discourse. Also, the oil industry sees the Arctic as 
a region in change, bringing about many opportunities, but this based on a different 
discourse. They identify the development of exploration/exploitation technology, rising 
oil prices, and a better understanding of the region’s geological characteristics as the 
underlying factors for their interest in the Arctic (personal communication—interview 
Shell; Dahl-Stamnes 2012).
 
Moreover, there is not one comprehensive set of steering mechanisms that form a 
framework to structure the new interests in the region and the offshore oil and gas 
development activities across the Arctic. It is more like a patchwork of policies that 
each covers a specific subject, at least if one looks at the formal, legally binding steering 
mechanisms (Berkman and Young 2009). The Arctic Council has always been strong on 
creating a shared knowledge base through initiating, organizing, and publishing a series 
of assessment reports (Underdal 2013). Based on this knowledge base, a more or less 
comprehensive set of Arctic standards related to offshore oil and gas development has 
been formulated by updating the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines (PAME 2009). 
This steering mechanism is not legally binding, and it is left to the individual countries 
to decide which parts they implement. The non-binding nature of Arctic decisions 
limits creating a level playing field for oil and gas activities across the Arctic. However, 
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in recent years, changes can be observed in the role of the Arctic Council: It now fulfils 
a decision-shaping function for legally binding decisions as well (Molenaar 2012). 
Examples of binding agreements that are a result of the decision-shaping function of 
the Arctic Council are the Search and Rescue (SAR) agreement of 2011 (Arctic Council 
2014) and the agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness, and 
Response in the Arctic of 2013 (Boyd 2013). By functioning as a preparatory platform for 
binding agreements, the Council further secures its future. If more binding agreements 
find their origin in the Arctic Council, it will become even a more central governance 
arrangement in Arctic matters. The fear expressed by Koivurova (2010) that the Arctic 
Council could face difficulties when sector-specific arrangements would originate in the 
future seems not to have materialised until now. For example, the SAR agreement has 
not initiated the formation of new institutional arrangements, except for the meeting 
of parties (Rottem 2013).
2.4.2 Other Arctic governance arrangements
Besides the Arctic Council, there are various other governance arrangements relevant 
to offshore oil and gas development in the Arctic sphere of authority that have emerged 
over time and are based on intergovernmental cooperation. In 2008, a first meeting 
was held between the ‘‘Arctic 5,’’ in which the five Arctic coastal states2 participated 
(Revkin 2008) and a second meeting was held in 2010. The Arctic 5 made it clear to the 
rest of the world that they are the (only) legitimate actors, based on their sovereignty, 
to deal with issues concerning the Arctic Ocean. This arrangement received criticism 
from various actors, as it bypassed the Arctic Council and was limited to state actors 
only (Iceland Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010; Koivurova 2010; Sheridan 2010). 
Next to the arrangements that cover the entire Arctic, there are several governance 
arrangements that deal with specific sub-regions. Examples are the Barents Euro-
Arctic Council, forming an arrangement between European Arctic states, Russia and 
indigenous people, and the Nordic Council, including all Nordic countries3 (www.beac.
st). To an increasing extent, these arrangements also take oil and gas developments 
into account. For the Nordic Council, this is illustrated by a proposal on environmental 
protection and oil and gas extraction in the Arctic that was issued in 2012 (Norden 2012).
Also important in connection to the development of offshore oil and gas in (parts of) the 
Arctic are the UNCLOS and the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
of the northeast Atlantic (OSPAR). UNCLOS came into force in 1994, has been ratified by 
all Arctic states except for the USA, and applies to the marine environment worldwide 
(Molenaar 2012). UNCLOS consists of legally binding regulations and procedures that 
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define rights and responsibilities of states regarding the use and protection of the 
world’s oceans. Under UNCLOS, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS) provides for ways to structure claims for an extended continental shelf outside 
the EEZ of nation states. This is currently a highly relevant topic in the Arctic Ocean, as 
all Arctic coastal states (except the USA) have filed a claim for an extended continental 
shelf with the CLCS. 
The OSPAR convention is a regional arrangement that is designed to regulate all human 
activities that might have an adverse effect on the ecosystems and biodiversity within 
its jurisdiction (i.e., the northeast Atlantic Ocean. Fisheries management and shipping 
are not covered by the OSPAR convention (Koivurova and Molenaar 2009). When there 
is no competent international body governing marine environmental protection issues, 
the OSPAR Commission can exercise a residual authority (Molenaar 2012). 
Though the Nordic Council of Ministers and various departments of the United Nations 
are observers of the Arctic Council (Arctic Council 2014) and thus interact in a formal 
way with the Arctic Council as most central governance arrangement, other (regional) 
arrangements do not. In some cases, the same NGOs or state actors operate in 
more than one arrangement, stimulating the interaction and transfer of knowledge. 
However, this is not always the case, thereby hampering the coordination of activities 
and developments within Arctic governance.
2.4.3 The national Greenlandic governance arrangement on oil and gas development
One can distinguish a national Greenlandic governance arrangement concerning the 
oil and gas developments in Greenland. When gaining more authority in 2009, the 
Greenlandic government has chosen to adopt a one-stop-shop approach regarding the 
development of oil and gas resources (PAME n.d.). Following from this approach and 
the MRA (December 7, 2009) formulated at that time, the MLSA (or Råstofstyrelsen - 
previously Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum (BMP)) is the central governmental actor 
in Greenland. The MRA is still the single set of rules of the game concerning oil and gas 
development in Greenland.
The BMP used to be an entity under the government of Greenland, more specifically 
under the Ministry for Industry and Mineral Resources (www.govmin.gl), and was a 
solitaire actor standing alone from other state actors and ministries. Due to its central 
position in the governance of oil and gas activities and the fact that all responsibilities 
relating to mineral resources (including oil and gas), mineral resource activities, 
use of the subsoil for storage or purposes relating to mineral resource activities, 
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related energy activities, related pipeline activities (BMP 2012a) are concentrated in 
one organization, there was hardly any need for the BMP to cooperate with other 
state actors. This solitaire attitude was criticised by other state actors such as the 
Ministry of Environment and Nature (personal communication— interview Head of 
Section Environment Greenland 2011). The fact that this Ministry was only involved 
in the work of the BMP during the formal public hearing moments combined with the 
BMP as sole body responsible for everything, from royalty collection to enforcement 
of environmental standards, formed the main arguments of the Ministry. All other 
Arctic states have separated their environmental department from the rest of the 
responsibilities related to oil and gas development, even the USA after the Macondo 
disaster. The realisation of the MLSA can be seen as an attempt to address this criticism 
and reflects the separation of responsibilities (GEUS/MIMR 2013), by introducing an 
Environmental Agency for the Mineral Resources Area (EAMRA: Miljøstyrelsen for 
Råstofområdet). The EAMRA is the ‘‘administrative authority for environmental matters 
relating to mineral resources activities’’ and falls under the responsibility of the Ministry 
of Environment and Nature. Furthermore, the geological department has been placed 
directly in the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources (MIMR) itself. The MIMR, MLSA, 
and EAMRA are currently working together with several (Danish) research institutes, 
such as the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS), Danish Centre for 
Environment and Energy (DCE), and Greenland Institute for Natural Resources (GINR) 
regarding environmental and geological matters (BMP 2012b, 2009b).
Greenland is still a young state in its current form, whereby Self-Government is 
accompanied by more authority and responsibilities. The civil society in Greenland is 
small and consists of only a few, mainly national actors. These civil society actors are 
active when it comes to addressing the concerns, risks, and challenges related to mineral 
resources development. Due to their limited capacity, choices have to be made regarding 
the focus of their attention: the oil and gas industry or the mining industry. Since in 
the last 2 years (2012 and 2013), the oil and gas activities were limited to a number of 
preparatory activities, while the mining activities included applications for construction 
permits, the main focus of the civil society actors has been on the mining sector. This 
has resulted in the formation of a number of coalitions, such as Friends of Nuuk’s Fjord 
(Nuuk Fjords Venner) criticizing the London Mining iron ore project or the NGO coalition 
(including the Inuit Circumpolar Council Greenland (ICC Greenland), Friends of Nuuk’s 
Fjord, Transparency International, WWF, and Avataq) related to the Tanbreez mining 
project (Sermitsiaq 2013). It is likely that when the oil and gas activities pick up again in 
the near future, these NGOs and coalitions will also become active in this sector.
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(International) Environmental NGOs like Greenpeace and WWF do not enjoy a great 
level of support among the Greenlandic population due to anti-whaling and anti-
sealing campaigns in the past (personal communication—interview WWF Denmark 
Greenland, Greenpeace 2011). The limited capacity of the Greenlandic civil society 
also makes it difficult for them to comment in time on the extensive environmental 
and social documentation related with permit applications of oil companies (personal 
communication—interview WWF Denmark Greenland 2011; Macalister 2011). Moreover, 
the main criticism is that they are not consulted properly and that their comments 
and objections are not taken into account by the various industrial actors (WWF and 
ICC 2013; Duus 2012). This has led to protests in the past. That the Greenlandic civil 
society is able to mobilize society when it comes to sensitive issues related with mineral 
resources extraction is illustrated by a number of demonstrations regarding lifting the 
ban on uranium mining (Duus 2013; Rafaelsen 2013).
Within the Greenlandic parliament (Inatsisartut), the extractive industries are also 
subject to debate. Even though the two large political parties, Siumut and Inuit 
Ataqatigiit (IA), are in favour of developing oil and gas activities in Greenland, they 
have different opinions as to how these activities should be developed. Especially, the 
law on large-scale projects (storskalaloven), which applies to among others oil and 
gas projects, has attracted much attention. The law relaxes certain regulations for 
large-scale projects and would thereby enable cheap, foreign labour to come and work 
in Greenland, while the Greenlandic society faces unemployment issues itself (The 
Arctic Journal 2013). When IA was the governing party in 2012, Siumut refused to vote 
for this law. However, barely a year later, when Siumut became the governing party, it 
introduced some small changes and voted for the law (Mølgaard 2013). This law has 
caused much debate within Greenland, not only among political parties but also NGOs 
and the wider public. Moreover, it also tested the relation with Denmark as the authority 
to grant visa to foreign labour lies with the Danish authorities.
One of the primary reasons for discussion is a fundamental difference in discourse 
that exists between the oil industry on one side and most of the civil society actors 
on the other side. In general, the oil companies do not consider their Arctic activities 
as something new (Dahl-Stamnes 2012), as they argue they are already active in 
the Arctic and under extreme cold conditions since halfway the previous century. 
While the environmental NGOs do consider the activities to be new, as they argue 
the oil companies have never worked this far offshore and combined all other Arctic 
circumstances in one project. 
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The oil companies active in Greenland belong to some of the major oil companies in 
the world, such as Shell, BP, and Exxon. They have formed the Greenlandic Oil Industry 
Association (GOIA 2011) to share knowledge and resources and to speak with one voice 
to the Greenlandic government on issues concerning the oil industry in Greenland 
in general. Greenland also has a national oil company, NunaOil, who has a share in 
all the licenses that have been granted up till now (BMP 2012b). Via NunaOil and its 
participation in the current developments, the government gains more insight into the 
functioning of the industry and builds up knowledge and expertise (BMP 2009a). By 
participating in the licenses, it allows the government also to gain from the development 
of future oil and gas resources, in other ways than only royalties and taxes.
Although the oil companies might have more (financial) resources than the Greenlandic 
government, this does not mean that the government has lost control. The Greenlandic 
government has used its regulatory power resources to put in place a framework of 
steering and compliance mechanisms to steer and guide the oil and gas development 
(BMP 2009a). The government decides, based on a Strategic Environmental Impact 
Assessment, which areas will be opened for licenses and leaves it up to the oil 
companies to apply. Important in this context is that no activity is allowed if there is no 
permit and the burden of proof lays with the oil companies (BMP 2009a). However, the 
Greenlandic government does dependent on knowledge and expertise from ‘‘outside’’ 
as the MLSA/EAMRA lack the capacity to provide for all the knowledge and capacity 
that is needed.
It can be concluded that the national Greenlandic government arrangement governing 
oil and gas activities is subject to change recently. The former Bureau of Minerals and 
Petroleum used to be a closed, solitaire institution with the mandate to deal with all 
matters regarding oil and gas developments in Greenland. After continuous criticism, 
mainly from the Ministry of Environment and Nature, various NGOs, and other civil 
society actors, changes have been implemented in the past year. Responsibilities 
have been separated, and environmental matters now fall under a new agency. Their 
mandate is determined by the rules of the game, in this case the MRA, which also relates 
to their power resources and the steering and compliance mechanisms that are in place.
The limited size and capacity of the MLSA, EAMRA, the government, and civil society 
in Greenland is well known, and capacity building is a focus point of these actors. 
Knowledge and expertise are regarded as important power resources, and currently, 
the public hearing processes are criticized by civil society actors for being too short 
to make a meaningful contribution. On the side of the government, the amount of 
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people now concerned with oil and gas activities and related domains cannot possess 
all knowledge and expertise available to guide, steer, and enforce a developing oil 
industry. This makes the government of Greenland dependent on other actors for 
specific knowledge about the environment, pollution, and techniques used in the oil 
industry. Scientific institutes are a major deliverer of this kind of products, making them 
an interesting partner. Various capacity building and knowledge exchange programs 
have been initiated, and education remains high in the agenda (European Commission 
2007). Oil companies also have a vast pool of knowledge and expertise, but are at the 
same time the actors a government has to control. The oil companies that operate in 
Greenland have established a platform for information exchange and cooperation. 
Moreover, the national Greenlandic oil company, which is a party to every license, is 
seen as a tool to gain knowledge from the side of the private sector.
2.4.4 The Greenland - Denmark governance arrangement
Since Greenlandic Self-Government was established in 2009, it is a fairly new 
phenomenon to the country. Political and financial ties to Denmark still exist as 
Greenland did not become fully independent yet. Several political domains, including 
defence, foreign policy, and security, remain shared between both countries (Queen of 
Denmark 2009). This means that most activities on an Arctic level should be executed 
in cooperation or via Denmark. In the Arctic Council, it is Denmark who officially has 
a seat at the table, but in practice it is Greenland who is most active in the Council. In 
issues specifically addressing the Greenlandic Arctic, Denmark is following Greenland’s 
perspective and advice in its position taking (personal communication - interview 
Government of Greenland 2011).
Furthermore, there are some less official ties to Denmark that could influence 
Denmark’s influence on Greenland. One of the partnerships in this arrangement is the 
close cooperation of the MLSA/EAMRA (previously BMP) with Danish research institutes 
on environmental and geological matters concerning the oil and gas developments 
in Greenland. Because only limited knowledge in these fields is currently present in 
Greenland, criticism has been voiced that these research institutes de facto take the 
decisions (personal communication—interview Head of Section Environment Greenland 
2011). Furthermore, one can generally conclude that most of the civil servants are 
Danish, while the politicians tend to be Greenlandic (Binderkrantz 2011). Therefore, one 
could argue that Denmark remains influential in Greenlandic politics albeit behind the 
doors. Establishing a Greenlandic bureaucracy would limit this influence.
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Once oil and/or gas exploration activities will take place on a larger scale and eventually 
even develop into exploitation activities, the relationship between Greenland and 
Denmark will be shaped in more detail. Under the current agreements, certain authority 
that could influence the oil and/or gas developments remains in the hands of Denmark. 
An example is the visa for a foreign workforce related to the ‘‘storskalaloven,’’ of which 
the authority lies in Danish hands. Denying access to Denmark/Greenland by denial of 
visa applications could hinder developments and investments in Greenland, especially if 
it concerns large-scale workforces. This is currently an issue related to the development 
of a Greenlandic mining sector in particular but is likely to apply to the oil and gas sector 
in the future.
2.5 Changing authority of the Greenlandic government in governing oil 
and gas developments
Arctic oil and gas governance is characterized by a set of nested governance 
arrangements that interact, each covering different subjects and/or geographical areas. 
The Greenlandic government participates actively in several of these arrangements, 
as has been described above. Since recent years, the Arctic is developing into a high-
level political arena, becoming more closely connected with the rest of the world and 
its dynamics. The governance arrangements within the Arctic sphere of authority on 
offshore oil and gas development are constantly subject to change. This changing 
political environment influences the current and future role and authority of the 
Greenlandic government. This section will discuss these changes, their driving forces, 
and the potential influence on the authority of Greenland.
The currently changing role of the Arctic Council is likely to influence Greenland’s 
authority on an Arctic level. The wish of non-Arctic state actors to obtain observer 
status illustrates the fact that the Arctic has become a high-level political theatre of 
which the Arctic Council is regarded as the most important governance arrangement. 
With the acceptance of more non-Arctic states as an observer (Pettersen 2013), the 
Council is increasing its legitimacy and securing its role in future governance of the 
Arctic, but also acknowledges that matters in the Arctic region are global matters. 
In addition, the Arctic Council is more and more a decision-shaping platform where 
a solid basis for legally binding agreements is being made by its Member States. In 
the future, this type of steering mechanisms might be more frequently used by the 
Arctic Council, enlarging the potential influence on Greenland’s offshore oil and gas 
developments since the outcomes are legally binding. The Greenlandic government has 
been participating actively within the Council, even though the official seat at the table 
belongs to Denmark. The changing status and legitimacy of the Council might influence 
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the authority of the Greenlandic state, because other states are not always keen on 
Greenland’s independent participation. It remains a question whether Greenland can 
keep its unique position and matching influence in the future if the Arctic gains even 
more attention of the rest of the world. It is in the government’s own interest to ensure 
that this will be the case. The relation with Denmark is thus of utmost importance.
Greenland could benefit from the decision-shaping function of the Arctic Council, in 
case it is able to put its national agenda forward. This will always have to happen in 
close cooperation with Denmark, since the latter is still responsible for foreign policy. 
However, the other way around could also happen: namely that because legally binding 
agreements tend to be more frequently the outcome of Arctic Council’s working group 
discussions, the other Arctic countries will get more involved as well leaving less room 
for Greenland to freely manoeuvre and position their agenda. Therefore, it could benefit 
Greenland’s authority when it is able to push its national agenda within the Arctic 
Council, but could also limit it when it is pushed to agree with something which is not 
in its own interest. 
Within the governance arrangement of Denmark and Greenland, the tendency is that 
the Greenlandic state gains more authority step by step. It is a long-term process that 
has started in the 1970s. The current division in authority between Greenland and 
Denmark seems straightforward on first sight, but when one has a look at the details, 
there is room for potential conflict when it comes to (future) oil and gas development. 
How fast the Greenlandic state will gain even more authority or becomes independent 
from Denmark remains to be seen. The development of oil and gas resources is 
expected to play an important role in this process toward (economic) independency. 
However, even when Greenland could financially become independent, it remains 
to be seen if Greenland will make the choice to become fully independent. Its small 
society and human resource base could use the benefits of being connected to a larger 
(political) entity. This could be Denmark, but other governance arrangements could 
form a good alternative. At the same time, Denmark might want to keep its link with 
Greenland as well, because of access to new oil and gas resources.
Another element of the Greenlandic - Danish relationship has to do with the domestic 
organization and capacity to develop an oil and gas sector in Greenland. While the 
Greenlandic government remains fairly dependent on Danish expertise and capacity at 
the moment, it is likely that this will change over time. Greenland is working to increase 
its capacity and knowledge in the fields of, for example, environment and geology 
related to oil and gas resources and activities. As this process had already started and 
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is on the agenda since 2009, one can expect that the influence of Denmark will gradually 
decrease over time. With a stronger knowledge base, the Greenlandic government will 
be able to strengthen its position vis-a-vis other Arctic states, non-Arctic states, civil 
society, and market actors.
Within the relationship Greenland - Denmark, the Greenlandic state gains authority 
and is likely to continue to do so. The relation with Denmark will also influence the 
position of Greenland in the Arctic Council. More independency will provide a more 
legitimate ground on which Greenland can act on its own behalf in the Arctic governance 
arrangements. If it fails to secure, its current freedom Greenland will become more 
dependent on Denmark again, something they are trying to reduce. If this happens, 
it will decrease the influence of Greenland on Arctic governance arrangements and 
the opportunity to let its voice being heard. On the other hand, if Greenland is able to 
secure or even expand its position in Arctic governance arrangements, it will need to 
invest in capacity and human resources to be able to benefit from it.
Domestically, the extraction of non-living resources is subject to a lively debate 
in which many actors take part. The government plays a central role and recently 
initiated changes in its organizational structure after years of criticism by national and 
international civil society actors. It has separated responsibilities that formerly belonged 
to the closed and solitarily operating Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum. Now, the 
authority of environmental matters has been assigned to a new organization, under 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Environment and Nature. It remains to be seen what 
concrete effects this organisational change will have.
Although the civil society in Greenland is still relatively small, it is active and that is 
likely to increase in the near future. Everyone is convinced that it is crucial to include 
civil society organizations into the decision-making process to increase the legitimacy 
of developing a Greenlandic oil and gas sector; however, the implementation lacks 
effectiveness (WWF and ICC 2013). Various NGOs have now formed coalitions and 
action groups that heavily criticize the development of various mining projects, since 
these projects are more active at this moment in time. However, it is likely that similar 
situations will occur when the offshore oil and gas start to take off. The NGOs have 
proven to be able to mobilise the Greenlandic society in demonstrations against 
controversial decisions. Furthermore, international NGOs, who are also present in 
Greenland, can put pressure on the Greenlandic state by mobilizing public opinion 
in the rest of the world. To prevent this from happening, the Greenlandic government 
should reconsider the implementation of its current decision-making process. The 
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interplay between domestic and internationally organized civil society shows how the 
boundaries between domestic and international politics and policymaking are blurring.
What is striking in the sphere of authority of Greenland’s offshore oil and gas 
developments is that there seems to be a lot of institutionalized forms of interaction 
between state actors and civil society via the various governance arrangements 
discussed above, while there are hardly any of such interaction forms between private 
sector actors and both other parties. Oil companies are occasionally interacting with 
actors from the state or civil society on an Arctic level, but not (yet) in a structural, 
continuous way. The oil industry is attending Arctic Council meetings on an ad hoc 
basis since 2009; has applied for observer status; and is represented in some studies 
performed on Arctic ecosystems, governance, and oil spill response techniques. That 
the interaction between actors of the private sector and actors of state and civil society 
is not occurring on a regular basis, can be a cause as well as a result of different 
discourses prevalent in both groups. Although the Arctic is perceived by all as a region 
subject to large-scale transformations due to primarily climate change, this is by the 
oil industry not considered as a driving force underlying the increasing of oil and gas 
activities. Relating to this is the controversy around the discourse of the oil industry that 
Arctic activities are not new at all to them. The opposing discourse that is expressed 
by state actors and civil society does consider oil and gas activities as new to the oil 
industry, resulting in a fundamental difference between actors of the particular groups.
While there might be limited interaction between the state and market actors on the
Arctic level, there is more interaction on the national level between the Greenlandic 
government and oil companies. The Greenlandic government has authority over these 
companies when regulating their oil and gas production. The limited capacity of the 
government in terms of manpower and knowledge generation is an important factor 
in how the authority of the Greenlandic government evolves in the future when more 
companies want to operate in Greenland’s territory. The capacity building programs and 
focus on education that are already in place form a good start, but need to be continued 
and possibly intensified in the future. Moreover, the influence of the Arctic Council, 
international and domestically organized civil society, and other partnerships of Arctic 
states or non-state parties will increase in the near future. It is the increasing nesting 
of these governance arrangements that will shape the authority of the Greenlandic 
government over its oil and gas resources. The fact that it is a dynamic and complex 
network makes it hard to predict how the authority of the Greenlandic government will 
exactly develop in the future. Greenland needs to be constantly aware of opportunities 
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and risks, some of them discussed in this section that can influence their position in 
the Arctic policy arena.
2.6 Conclusion
The Arctic is a dynamic region, which is becoming ever closer connected to the rest 
of the world by socioeconomic and environmental processes. The world’s rising 
population and increasing level of welfare are some of the most important drivers for 
rising demands in fossil fuels and minerals. The world is entering a phase in which the 
easy-to-reach resources are coming to an end, demand continues to rise, and thus new 
regions like the Arctic or unconventional resources like shale gas become interesting. 
This chapter analysed the current development of oil and gas in the Arctic and in 
Greenland using a post-international perspective. This theoretical approach enabled 
a structured analysis of the complex and dynamic political setting of Arctic oil and gas 
governance and the factors influencing Greenland’s authority in particular. Various 
governance arrangements within the sphere of authority governing the development 
of Arctic offshore oil and gas exist, interact, and influence each other.
The Arctic sphere of authority on oil and gas consists of many different governance 
arrangements. Concerning oil and gas activities, the Arctic Council is a central governance 
arrangement, bringing together state actors and civil society (indigenous people). 
Market parties were absent until recently, but industry is becoming more involved in 
the Arctic Council. Moreover, the Arctic’s energy resources are being securitized by the 
Arctic states and the region is becoming a theatre of high-level politics.
Given the nested multi-actor and multi-level governance setting of the Arctic, the Arctic 
Council, as the most comprehensive governance arrangement on the Arctic level, could 
play a crucial role in developing sustainable solutions. In this chapter, we focused on 
the Arctic sphere of authority to understand the changing authority of Greenland in its 
emerging oil and gas developments. Crucial in this respect is the expanding role of the 
Arctic Council in developing binding regulation for offshore oil and gas activities as well 
as the increasing role of non-Arctic states in this governance arrangement. In addition, 
the changing Danish–Greenlandic relationship is important. The development of a 
Greenlandic oil and gas sector is seen as a tool to become financially independent from 
Denmark. It is expected that other Arctic states will try to influence the Greenlandic oil 
and gas arrangements when Greenland becomes more independent from Denmark.
It can be concluded that the capacity of the government and civil society of Greenland 
should be the primary guideline for the pace in which oil and gas activities are being 
developed. Taking this approach will ensure that the Greenlandic government and 
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society is retaining its central position and high degree of influence on the governance 
of oil and gas development in Greenland. If not, it would run the risk that they remain 
formally the most important player, but that de facto other actors, whether it is the 
industry, (Danish) research institutes, or states (through the Arctic Council), take over 
that position causing the risk that benefits will not maximally benefit Greenland as they 
might flow to other places.
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ABSTRACT
Like many Arctic states, Iceland and the Faroe Islands used to be the resource-based 
economies which Greenland is today. Remotely located in relation to the World 
economy, Iceland and the Faroe Islands have succeeded in developing a knowledge-
based economy, also related to their energy sector. To create a knowledge-based 
economy a sufficient mass of human capital is of crucial importance. In forming this 
critical mass, higher education and knowledge institutes play a central role. The 
cases of the Faroe Islands and Iceland show that it is possible to create a critical 
mass of human capital by developing strong knowledge institutes and stimulating 
the exchange of knowledge. Iceland has successfully developed a knowledge-based 
energy sector based on hydropower over the last century. Icelanders bringing 
home knowledge gained via graduate education at top institutes abroad, appeared 
of major importance. More recently the Faroe Islands have developed human 
capital based on oil and gas exploration activities, while no economically viable 
resources have been found yet. Greenland on the other side has made some 
important steps in creating and strengthening strong knowledge institutes, but is 
still far from a full-fledged knowledge-based economy such as the one in Iceland. 
Are there lessons to be learned from Iceland and the Faroe Islands, and how much 
do historic path-dependencies matter in this context? These are questions that 
this chapter will explore.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
Just like in many other Arctic states, natural resources form the basis of the Icelandic, 
Faroese and Greenlandic economies (Glomsrød & Aslaksen 2009). Within this context 
energy plays and has played an important role in the development of these states. 
To benefit from the exploitation of natural resources, including energy resources, the 
authors believe that a knowledge-based economy and a strong educational sector are 
essential. However, the small size of these societies brings about specific challenges 
and opportunities. All three countries can be regarded as very small or microstates, 
due to the small size of their societies: populations of 315,281, 49,709 and 57,714 for 
Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland respectively (www.cia.gov).
This chapter will analyse the challenges and opportunities in the creation of a 
knowledge-based economy around natural resources, with the development of an 
energy sector as an example. The focus of this analysis will be on the creation of human 
capital and the role of knowledge institutes, since education increases social capital 
which helps building human capital (World Bank 2009; World Bank 2003a). The question 
is whether historical path dependencies matter in developing a strong educational 
sector that is critical in the creation of human capital and a knowledge-based economy? 
To answer this question, the history and circumstances under which especially Iceland 
and the Faroe Islands have already developed their knowledge-based economy will be 
explored. Greenland finds itself much more at the beginning of developing a knowledge-
based economy, and could benefit from the lessons learned of the other two countries. 
The case of Iceland will be explored first, since it has successfully developed a 
knowledge-based energy sector based on hydropower (and geothermal power outside 
the scope of this chapter). Long established knowledge institutes like the University 
of Iceland (1911) have played a central role in the development of human capital and 
a knowledge-based economy in Iceland. Furthermore, “brain circulation” (see, for 
instance, Solimano 2008), defined as Icelanders going abroad to leading international 
universities and returning home with the gained knowledge, has been an important 
factor as well. Second, the much more recent case of the Faroe Islands will be discussed. 
Over the past 15 years the Faroe Islands have built up a knowledge-based economy 
on the back of oil and gas exploration activities, even though no economically viable 
reserves have yet been found. The Maritime College (1893) and the University of the 
Faroe Islands (1963), have played an important role in the transition from a resource-
based economy to a knowledge-based economy.
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Compared to Iceland and the Faroe Islands, Greenland stands at the early stages of 
developing a knowledge-based economy. As part of its strategy to diversify its economy, 
Greenland is currently looking to develop an energy sector. In order to maximise local 
benefits of these offshore activities, Greenland has implemented a number of tools 
in its regulation. Education is seen as a central element and much effort is made to 
prepare and qualify society for participation in these industrial activities.
3.2 Iceland
One of the teachers of Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen (co-author of this chapter) at the
Austurbæjarskóli primary school in Reykjavik was the prominent Icelandic poet and 
translator Vilborg Dagbjartsdóttir. Vilborg was born in 1930 in the east coast settlement 
of Vestdalsheiði, near Seyðisfjörður, which is now abandoned. Vilborg told stories from 
her childhood of massive losses of life to tuberculosis and other infectious diseases and 
to the sea, and the self-sufficiency of households living off the land and the sea. When 
Vilborg was born in 1930, Iceland had just become a sovereign and independent state 
as the Kingdom of Iceland, having a common king with the Kingdom of Denmark since 
1918. It would last another 14 years before Iceland would declare the republic it is today.
At the moment, we all know Iceland as an exceptionally highly developed independent 
very small state, with one of the highest levels of human development in the world 
(number 13; notwithstanding the 2008 financial crisis) (UNDP 2013). This development 
raises the question: what explains Iceland’s remarkable political and socio-economic 
achievements over the 1900s? In this chapter it is argued that an important explanation 
of those achievements is the combination of a strong educational sector, strong 
human capital and abundant natural resources (Bertelsen & Hansen 2015; Bertelsen, 
Justinussen & Smits 2015).
Iceland is a natural resources-based economy as are all Arctic economies. In particular 
marine resources (which are outside the scope of this chapter) and renewable energy 
resources (the topic of this chapter) have played and continue to play a key role in the 
Icelandic economy and society. Icelandic exports have overwhelmingly been based on 
marine resources since the mechanisation of Icelandic fisheries (the industrialization 
of Iceland) in the early 1900s. Iceland, as a micro or very small island economy and 
peripheral to the world economy, has throughout its independent history struggled to 
develop and diversify its economy. This struggle to diversify and develop the Icelandic 
economy was closely connected with Iceland’s other great natural resource: renewable 
hydro- and geothermal energy (Ármannsson 2005; Ísleifsson 2007; Jónsson 2005; 
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Karlsdóttir 2010; Kristinsson 2005; Kristjánsson 1997; Pálsdóttir 2005; Ragnarsson 
1975, 1976, 1977; Sigurðsson 2002; Þórðarson 2004).
The authors argue that Iceland has managed to create a domestically controlled, globally 
connected, knowledge-based energy sector (Bertelsen & Hansen 2015; Bertelsen et al. 
2015). This development has created work and intellectual opportunities for Icelanders 
at home and increasingly abroad. This development was driven by a fortuitous 
combination of a strong domestic tradition of primary, secondary, increasingly tertiary, 
and vocational education combined with a strong and successful tradition of “brain 
circulation”: by going abroad for study or work experience and returning to Iceland 
with new knowledge and networks. This section of the chapter will discuss how this 
combination has laid the foundation of this domestically controlled, globally connected, 
knowledge-based energy sector. This chapter acknowledges the environmental trade-
offs in hydro- and geothermal energy projects, which has been the topic of intense 
debate in Icelandic society since the early 1900s. This topic is treated extensively in 
literature (see e.g. Hálfdanarson & Karlsdóttir 2005; Karlsdóttir 2010 for historical 
overview), but is outside the scope of this chapter.
3.2.1 The history of Icelandic development
Iceland suggests a strong path dependency for the development of human capital, 
where building knowledge-based societies and economies has very deep historical 
roots in excellent domestic education in the native language combined with “brain 
circulation” with the outside world. This path dependency raises difficult questions for 
Greenland, while the Faroe Islands offer answers. Icelanders have travelled to Europe 
for knowledge since the settlement of Iceland in the Viking Age (~800 to ~1100), which 
is recorded in the Sagas. As a logical consequence of this close intellectual connection 
with Europe since its earliest settlement, the two late Viking age bishoprics of Iceland, 
first Skálholt in Southwest Iceland in the second half of the 1000s and subsequently 
Hólar in North Iceland in 1106, founded Latin Schools or grammar schools. The Skálholt 
school still exists today as the Reykjavik Grammar School (Menntaskólinn í Reykjavík, 
MR), which produced the first Kingdom of Denmark Nobel laureate, Niels Rybjerg Finsen 
(Medicine, 1903), and the literature Nobel laureate Halldór Laxness in 1955 (although 
he had left the school early). Since the Protestant reformation the school and church 
language of Iceland has been Icelandic.
The Skálholt and Hólar schools supplied lower ranking clergy and equipped Icelanders 
to travel (especially) to Denmark for higher education throughout the centuries. This 
shows that Iceland has had a long history of strong domestic primary and secondary 
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educational tradition in the national language, equipping Icelanders for going abroad 
to enjoy higher education. This “brain circulation” supplied a steady stream of Icelandic 
pastors for church leadership and education, jurists for administration and physicians 
for the nascent health service. It also maintained a vibrant Icelandic intellectual life 
in Copenhagen among Icelandic students and scholars, which would have profound 
impact on Icelandic political, social and intellectual development. In 1828 and 1832 
these Icelandic intellectual circles would voice the first calls for building tertiary 
educational capacity in Iceland, in order to supply for the necessary highly skilled 
and locally relevant human capital in theology, philosophy, medicine, natural history, 
economics and commerce for local socio-economic development. These early voices 
called for adding higher education offerings to the secondary school offerings of the 
old Skálholt school ( Jónsson 1961; Háskóli Islands 2014). It was a debate predicting 
much later debates throughout the Arctic about building higher education capacity in 
northern communities. 
The development of Icelandic higher education capacity is closely intertwined with 
state-building and independence politics. The Icelandic Althingi [Parliament] was 
reconstituted as a consultative assembly of the Danish King in 1845, and the School 
of Theology was created in Reykjavik in 1847 as a public administration capacity 
building initiative. In 1874, the Althingi gained legislative power over Icelandic affairs, 
and in 1876 the School of Medicine was created in Reykjavik to address recruitment 
problems and create locally relevant knowledge. In 1904, Iceland gained executive 
Home Rule, and in 1908 the School of Law was established in Reykjavik in light of the 
key role of building domestic law on the road to statehood. In 1911, the University of 
Iceland was founded, combining these schools and adding humanities with a clear 
purpose of supporting Icelandic state-building and independence aspirations. In 1918, 
Iceland gained sovereignty in a personal union with Denmark. In 1940, the University 
of Iceland inaugurated the main building of its future campus, which together with the 
neighbouring National Museum from 1950 (the National Museum was founded in 1863 
as a nation-building institution) are key architectural manifestations of statehood and 
the republic declared in 1944. The University of Iceland has since grown by leaps and 
bounds to an about 14,000 students-strong research university, which is supplemented 
by the University of Akureyri (1987) with the satellite campus University Centre of 
the West Fjords in Ísafjörður (2005), the private Reykjavik University (1998), Bifröst 
University (1988), Hólar University College (2003) and the Agricultural University of 
Iceland (1889/1947). These institutions have deep roots in older schools. What should 
be noted about these universities, is that they are all founded and overwhelmingly 
staffed by Icelanders with graduate credentials from leading universities of North 
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America, Europe and various other parts of the world ( Jónsson 1961; Háskóli Islands 
2014).
3.2.2 The role of brain circulation in the development of Icelandic hydro- and geothermal 
power
The renewable energy sector is the clearest example of how strong human capital 
has allowed Iceland to benefit from natural resources. Strong local human capital 
and the interaction with knowledge abroad, are leading throughout the history of 
Icelandic hydro and geothermal power. In the late 1800s, the world was gripped by the 
prospects of hydropower as an important resource fuelling the energy-intensive high-
tech industry of the day, namely nitrogen-based fertilizer. Iceland was keenly aware 
of these developments and a heated debate raged on the possibility of modernizing 
and diversifying the Icelandic economy, based on combining Icelandic hydropower 
resources, foreign capital and technology. Three key Icelanders serve to illustrate 
the importance of human capital and “brain circulation”: Frímann B. Arngrímsson 
(1855-1936) was an Icelandic emigrant to North America, who had studied science 
at the University of Manitoba. He saw the potential of combining Icelandic energy 
resources and the technology of the day, and was its first advocate in Iceland, although 
in vain. Einar Benediktsson (1864-1940) was a prominent politician, poet and lawyer, 
trained at the University of Copenhagen. It should be noticed that he was a very 
active entrepreneur who founded hydropower investment companies with foreign 
capital. However, in 1904 it was master carpenter Jóhannes Reykdal (1874-1946) from 
Hafnarfjörður, who made the first small hydro electrical power plant in Iceland, after 
having spent time with his sister in Norway, a pioneering country in hydro electrical 
technology at that time (Ísleifsson 2007; Jónsson 2005; Karlsdóttir 2010; Kristjánsson 
1997; Sigurðsson 2002; Þórðarson 2004). 
The early dreams of industrializing Iceland through hydropower, foreign capital and 
technology did not materialize for domestic, international political and financial reasons. 
Instead Iceland was electrified from the bottom-up with local installations. However, 
throughout this time, Icelandic engineering authorities did surveying work of the 
hydropower resources and from the late 1940s the National Director of Electricity 
guided large-scale geological and glaciological studies for hydropower development. 
Here it must be emphasized that this work was done by Icelanders, often as graduate 
students at or postgraduates from foreign universities working with foreign supervisors 
and colleagues, in collaboration with Harza Engineering International of the USA 
(Ísleifsson 2007; Jónsson 2005; Karlsdóttir 2010; Kristjánsson 1997; Sigurðsson 2002; 
Þórðarson 2004).
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The Conservative-Social Democratic “Restoration” government of 1959-1971 
(Viðreisnarstjórn) sought to internationalize and modernize the Icelandic economy. 
A key element was attracting the international energy-intensive industry, which was 
now the aluminium industry. In the 1960s, the Icelandic government secured funding 
from the World Bank and a power sales agreement with Alusuisse to build the Búrfell 
power station (the first large-scale hydro power station), powering the aluminium 
smelter at Straumsvík, which opened in 1969. What should be noticed here is that Harza 
Engineering International designed this first large-scale power plan, while Icelandic 
workers built it. Icelanders carried out much of the science, planning, law and financial 
negotiations. In the successive decades (1970s, 1980s and 1990s) a number of large-
scale hydro power plants were built in Iceland. These power plants were to an ever 
increasing and eventually full extent designed by Icelandic engineering companies, and 
built by Icelandic contractors. Finally, in the 2000s the enormous Fljótsdal/Kárahnjúkar 
power plant was designed again by Icelandic-international engineering companies, while 
the workers were now Portuguese and Chinese. So Iceland had come full circle from 
Icelandic workers building for American engineers to Chinese workers building for 
Icelandic engineers ( Jónsson 2005; Karlsdóttir 2010; Pálsdóttir 2005; Sigurðsson 2002). 
This development could only be realized based on the strong Icelandic human capital 
basis, which seems to be built on a thousand-year-long tradition of a strong domestic 
primary, secondary and vocational (and recent tertiary) educational tradition coupled 
with successful “brain circulation”.
Knowledge-based energy work has also become an important part of Iceland’s 
international and transnational relations with the outside world. Exploring and surveying 
these resources has linked Icelandic and foreign universities and scientists since far 
back in the 1900s. Later, the Icelandic (engineering) companies, which have developed 
around hydro- and geothermal energy, have turned to market their knowledge and 
know-how internationally. This international work is often linked to Iceland’s use of 
its hydro- and especially geothermal energy knowledge in its development work 
with developing countries that hold geothermal potential. Here the United Nations 
University Geothermal Training Programme (UNU GTP) must be emphasized. The UNU 
GTP is hosted by the National Energy Authority of Iceland. Since 1979 it has run a 
geothermal training program, which had trained 525 professionals from 53 countries 
in geothermal energy by 2012 (Friðleifsson, Svanbjörnsson & Thorsteinsson 1984; 
personal communication).
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3.2.3 Challenges in present-day Iceland
Today, Iceland is in a way threatened by its own human capital success. Especially 
graduate study opportunities have expanded exponentially at the University of 
Iceland during the past 15 years. Earlier, young Icelanders could receive an excellent 
undergraduate degree in a wide range of topics from the University of Iceland, but 
where usually forced to go abroad for graduate studies. Faced with this choice, young 
Icelanders often chose international top-universities for their graduate study. This fed 
the highly fortuitous “brain circulation”: supplying Icelandic academia, government and 
business with human capital with an excellent international background. However, 
going abroad for years of graduate studies comes with a steep economic and personal 
price. Today, young Icelanders often have the opportunity to stay at home for their 
graduate studies. If this leads to a slowdown of the “brain circulation” and internal 
recruiting practices related to especially academia, it will have very negative effects 
on Icelandic human capital. Iceland must ensure that domestic graduate studies are 
for those without the option of going abroad and foreign students, while the flow of 
Icelandic talent to and from the world’s top universities does not slow down.
3.3 Evolution of human capital and knowledge institutions in the Faroe 
Islands
The modernisation of the Faroese society has largely depended on the expansion 
of commercial fishing in the North Atlantic region, helping it to transform from an 
agricultural peasant society to a market based economy successfully integrated into 
the world economy, creating an extreme dependency on domestic resources. The 
exploitation of marine resources has therefore played a dominant role in the social, 
political and economic life on the islands for over a century and still does ( Justinussen 
1999; Mørkøre 1991; OECD 2011). However, for almost 15 years, oil and gas exploration 
has taken place in the Faroese waters. So far, no economically viable reserves have 
been found, yet the Faroe Islands have still benefitted from these activities by creating a 
thriving knowledge-based economy related to the offshore energy sector. This offshore 
sector is now operating not just in the Faroes, but also worldwide. The important point 
is that this new energy sector is not competitive because of domestic natural resources, 
because none have been found yet. It is competitive because of the knowledge and 
expertise that has been developed since exploration began, thus breaking with the 
previous development path. In this section we shall look at the role of knowledge 
institutions in this development.
The Faroe Islands has a centuries-old tradition of regionally important knowledge-
building institutions that contributed to the level of human capital apparent today. 
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Faroese formal academic education dates back at least as far as to the priest college in 
Kirkjubø that educated King Sverri of Norway in the 1200s (Debes 2000; Young 1982). 
After the Reformation, this centre of learning was closed down, and a Latin school was 
established in Tórshavn. It was a tiny school, steeped in poverty, and almost eradicated 
by small pox in 1709, but a school with far reaching consequences for the development 
of the entire Faroese society, and beyond (Debes 2000). It is possible to divide the 
evolution of modern Faroese academic institutions into four distinct phases, beginning 
with the Latin school.
3.3.1 The historical evolution of Faroese academic institutions
The first phase emerges with the creation of the Latin school in the 1500s. The main 
purpose of this school was to recruit and train candidates for the clergy. Young boys 
were educated and prepared for later university studies in Copenhagen (Denmark) or 
Bergen (Norway), where they could become educated as priests. However, the school 
produced an excess of ‘graduates’, and only a small fraction of them left the country 
for further studies. The majority went back home to their villages, where they taught 
others to read and write. Many of these candidates became Sheriffs (Síðslumaður), Law 
Men (Løgmaður), Law-officers (Løgrættarmenn), administrators, and others engaged 
in trade. Thus the unintended consequence of the Latin school was a society wide 
education of the people and the creation of a Faroese elite (Debes 2000; Hentze 2000) 
with direct ties, through classmates, abroad, creating a domestic and international 
“brain circulation”.
The second phase occurred during the social transformation from an agricultural to 
a fishery society in the second half of the 1800s. The Latin school had closed down 
and new educational demands had emerged as commercial fishery continued to 
develop. By the end of the 19th century, compulsory public education was introduced, 
and a teacher college was established (Holm 1970). Even the remotest villages were 
guaranteed education through a travelling teacher system (Petersen 1994). This was 
a huge step forward and created the basis for further education in the professional 
schools that followed. 
The third phase begins with the establishment of a Faroese scientific society (Societas 
Scientarium Færoensis) in 1952. The society started a scientific journal in Faroese and 
organised a regular public lecture series (Gaini 2002). In 1965, the University of the 
Faroe Islands was established. A modern Faroese University was now a reality. A driving 
motivation behind this initiative was the idea that the university should contribute to 
cultural nation-building (Marnersdóttir 2003), especially in light of concerns that national 
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identity was being eroded. A key element in this process was language. The main 
emphasis was therefore to develop a Faroese dictionary, and to collect and document 
Faroese language usage and traditions ( Joensen 1988). The first academic employed 
was a professor in linguistics. In this period the university offered BA programmes in 
Faroese and history.
The fourth phase begins around the turn of the 21st century. The language battle was over 
and Faroese was established as a national language taught in all schools from primary 
to university level education. Today, the Faroese scientific journal, Fróðskaparrit, is over 
50 years old, and Wikipedia has over 10,000 articles in Faroese ( Jacobsen 2014). In this 
phase, the purpose of the University is not primarily cultural nation-building anymore, but 
also to be a major driver in the economic development of the society (Fróðskaparsetur 
Føroya 2014). Having good quality higher education available at a national level has been 
a major advantage for building up human capital and supports the development of a 
knowledge-based economy, which the Faroe Islands experiences today.
3.3.2 The university in the knowledge economy
Today it is recognized that research and development play a major role in the emerging 
Faroese knowledge economy (MTI 2005; Vinnumálaráðið 2013). Two major institutional and 
technological changes took place in this phase, which have made this transition possible.
First, the rapid innovation and spread of information technology and the Internet, which 
has revolutionised the world and given rise to completely new kinds of industries, and 
new ways to organise and conduct business. This technology has been particularly 
important for the Faroe Islands, since it has minimized the impact of distance and 
remoteness and not least, has provided access to information and research databases 
anywhere in the world. This technological innovation has made a new kind of “brain 
circulation” possible that is less tied to geography, and opens up completely new 
development paths for a remote microstate such as the Faroe Islands.
Second, since oil and gas exploration commenced in Faroese waters, licence holders have 
been obliged to pay a ‘tax’ to the Competence Development Fund. The purpose of the 
Fund is to promote education and research programmes that can increase the human 
capital in the country. The Fund has financed several large-scale research programmes 
conducted at the University of the Faroe Islands as well as several PhD projects.
Together these developments have fundamentally changed the playing field for 
knowledge institutions, giving rise to many new and exciting educational and research 
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projects within the energy and other sectors. Over the last 15 years substantial 
expertise has built up in several fields, making it possible for the University to offer 
Bachelor degrees in the sciences, humanities, and social sciences, as well as Masters 
in Faroese Language and Law. Doctoral programmes are also offered on an individual 
basis. The most recent addition to the professorships at the University occurred in 2014, 
when Statoil, one of the major players in oil exploration in Faroese waters, funded a full 
professorship in energy engineering.
3.3.3 The university and the public sector
An important feature of the University lies in its close network and informal ties to 
researchers in other public institutions that conduct research related to their respective 
fields. For example, the Faroese Petroleum Administration ( Jarðfeingi) has geologists, 
physicists, and PhD students engaged in research. These researchers frequently appear 
as guest lecturers at the University, helping to supplement the faculty’s knowledge base. 
Similarly, the following public sector institutions all conduct research as a part of their 
duties and supply the University with guest lecturers on an informal basis:
• Føroya Landsbókasavn (Faroese National Library)
• Føroya Fornminnissavn (Faroese Archaeological Museum)
• Nátúrugripasavnið (Natural History Museum)
• Biofar (Kaldbak Marine Bio Lab)
• Heilsufrøðiliga Starvsstovan (Environmental Agency)
• Havstovan (Faroese Marine Research Institute)
• Landsskjalasavnið (National Archives)
• Jarðfeingi (Faroese Oil Administration)
• Fiskaaling (Aquaculture)
• Landssjúkrahúsið (National Hospital of the Faroe Islands)
• iNova (Research Park)
Since the inception of the University it has been recognized that, should the University 
have a chance to survive and flourish, it would need to draw on all available resources. 
On its own, the University does not have enough manpower and resources to cover 
all areas necessary for offering relevant research-based educational programmes. 
However, these partnerships have never been formalised in form of a contract between 
the University and the public sector, except for a recent agreement of understanding 
between the University and the Landsskjúkrahúsið (National Hospital of the Faroe 
Islands), and the recently created iNova (Research Park). Nevertheless, it has been a 
de facto practice over the years that employees in public institutions who are engaged 
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in research are allowed to give lectures at the University during their usual working 
hours ( Joensen 1988).
Though these kinds of networks are by no means exceptional, they are nevertheless 
exceptionally important for the University, since they provide vital input into the teaching 
and make it possible to offer a research-based education that extends far beyond 
the research conducted by the 73 academics currently employed at the University. 
The effect of this informal organisation is twofold. On the one hand these informal 
networks thus compensate for the limited scope for specialisation in a microstate, and 
make it possible to offer research-based teaching in a much wider range of areas than 
otherwise would have been possible. On the other hand they also integrate a much 
wider network of people in the process of research and teaching at university level 
and thus populate the critical mass necessary for an emerging knowledge economy.
3.3.4 Current challenges
One of the challenges in the development of human capital, which is so essential for 
knowledge based economy, is the integration of education and knowledge institutions 
in local society. Without a general society-wide integration of knowledge institutions, it 
is difficult to build up a critical mass for a knowledge-based economy. Education for a 
select few will not build a knowledge economy for the masses. In the Faroese case there 
has been a gradual long-term evolution of academic institutions and learning, which 
have embedded knowledge institutions into the wider society. However, the growth of 
education has outstripped the physical infrastructure and now knowledge institutes 
are widely dispersed. The University itself is scattered around the city in several 
different buildings. This sprawling decentralised development path is currently being 
counterbalanced by an attempt to centralise and integrate the many differentiated 
parts into larger units. The trend to formalise the 50-year-old tradition of informal 
cooperation between the University and other public institutions (Weihe et al. 2005), 
can be seen as a part of this process.
For years there have been talks about a new modern university campus in Tórshavn. 
However, these plans are still on the drawing board. The major challenge in the process 
will be to integrate the many different institutions into a cohesive unit, while at the same 
time living up to the nation’s proud, historical educational roots, and ensuring society-
wide backing for a national centre of learning. A more pressing challenge is the exodus 
of young people travelling abroad for education and not coming back. Here the new 
campus might curb this emigration, however, the small population sets an inescapable 
limit on the range of educational opportunities – even in the best circumstances.
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3.4 Greenland
Like many other Arctic economies, Greenland’s economy is mainly dependent on 
fisheries and the public sector. At the same time that Greenland is the largest island in 
the world, it has only ~56,000 inhabitants, which live scattered along the cost. As part of 
the strategy to diversify its economy, Greenland is looking to develop an energy sector 
based on oil and gas exploitation (Naalakkersuisut 2014b). Until now, 14 exploration 
wells have been drilled (BMP n.d.), of which five have been drilled in the 1970s, one 
in 2000 and another eight in 2010 and 2011. In order to maximise the local benefits 
of these offshore activities, Greenland has implemented a number of tools in its 
regulatory framework. Education is seen as a central element and much effort is made 
to prepare and qualify society for participation in these industrial activities. Unlike the 
cases of Iceland and the Faroe Islands, Greenland has a much shorter history of higher 
education, building up human capital and a knowledge-based economy. Important 
steps towards a knowledge-based economy have been made over the past century, 
however education and building up human capital remains a focal point for the future.
The vast distances, the limited infrastructure and the small size of the population create 
challenges as well. Transforming the economy from one that is primarily focused on 
fisheries and the public sector, into a globally competitive knowledge-based economy 
with relevance for the private sector is not easy. In a country where costs are high and 
education levels are currently low (Naalakkersuisut 2014a), a lot needs to happen before 
a competitive knowledge-based economy will become reality. The School of Minerals 
and Petroleum (Råstofskolen) plays a central role in this context and is expanding its 
network (Christensen 2012; Troelsen 2012). The challenge for Greenland will be to 
establish a critical mass of skilled labour and to deal with the challenge of foreign labour 
influx if oil and gas activities really take off.
3.4.1 The development of Greenlandic knowledge institutes and education
Greenland is part of the Kingdom of Denmark, but has gained Home Rule since 1979 
(Goldback & Winther-Jensen 1988) and it was granted Self Rule in 2009 (Hansen 2014). 
Up until 1979 Denmark was initiating the policies and reformations of the educational 
system, but since 1979 this became a major responsibility of the Greenlandic 
government. Changing the primary language from Danish into Greenlandic was one of 
the most important decisions taken just after gaining Home Rule in 1979. Since then the 
teaching system has been more and more tailored towards the Greenlandic situation 
(Goldback & Winther-Jensen 1988).
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In 1983 the Inuit Institute was founded in Nuuk as a study centre for Greenlandic 
literature, history and grammar (Olsen 2013). Later, in 1987, the Inuit Institute became 
the University of Greenland, Ilisimatusarfik (www.ilisimatursarfik.gl). The University was 
established to provide higher education in Greenland itself, instead of in Denmark. Like 
its predecessor, the University of Greenland has remained focused on social sciences, 
culture and history until to date. It has contributed to nation-building and Greenland’s 
cultural identity (European Commission 2013). Over time, the university has maintained 
and established cooperation with various foreign universities and is also part of the 
University of the Arctic (www.uni.gl).
Since 2004 the Greenlandic government has determined that education is a top 
priority (Naalakkersuisut 2012). This is reflected in the increased government budget 
and attention to education and training as of that year (European Commission 2007). 
In 2006 it became an aim of the Greenlandic government to increase the share of 
higher educated people in its workforce (European Commission 2007), supported by 
an overall education strategy up until 2020 in the “Greenland Education Program”. The 
first phase (until 2013) of the Greenland Education Program aims at vocational training 
and making sure people acquire the right skills and qualifications for jobs above an 
unskilled level. The second phase (until 2020) focuses on the provision and increase 
of higher education to build up a critical mass of human capital locally. The European 
Union has identified education as a main domain for cooperation with Greenland.
3.4.2 Creating human capital and a knowledge-based economy
In a world economy that becomes increasingly globalised it is important to create 
sufficiently large human capital that is qualified, flexible and competitive in order for 
Greenland to make economic progress and establish a knowledge-based economy. Only 
by making economic progress can Greenland pursue its long term goal of becoming 
financially independent from Denmark. In order to become financially independent 
it does not only need to diversify its economy, but also localise the benefits of the 
(new) economic activities by participation of Greenlanders (Naalakkersuisut 2014a). 
Participation can only take place if people have the right skills and qualifications.
Creating a critical mass of human capital for a knowledge-based economy is challenging. 
In 2006 only one third of the potential workforce (15-62) had acquired an educational 
level that would qualify them for jobs above unskilled level (European Commission 2007). 
However, the total number of graduates from post-primary education in Greenland has 
increased by 64% during the first phase of the “Greenland Education Program” (www.
nanoq.gl) and is promising. As dropout rates have remained roughly the same, it can be 
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concluded that more people have obtained post-primary education. This forms a positive 
basis for phase two, to increase the amount of people that have received higher education 
and thereby can contribute to the development of a knowledge-based economy.
Most of the higher education institutes are located in Nuuk, of which the University 
of Greenland is currently the largest institute of higher education in Greenland. 
The enrolment of students to this university has risen steadily over time (European 
Commission 2013), however the curriculum of the university remains limited. It includes, 
amongst other, cultural & social sciences, theology and language, but is missing (natural) 
science as a subject. The lack of (natural) science in the University’s curriculum should 
not necessarily have to do with the country’s small population size, since also the 
University of the Faroese Islands has a small population and has got science in its 
curriculum (European Commission 2013). Science is crucial in relation to economic 
progress and industrial activities, since it will educate highly-skilled (natural) scientist, 
which could well be needed by the currently developing natural resource activities. 
Developing this type of knowledge locally remains a challenge for Greenland, but 
partnerships like the ones existing in the Faroe Islands could be a solution.
Next to the University there are also a number of other institutes for higher education 
in Greenland, such as the Building School, Sanaartornermik Ilinniarfik, in Sisimiut. This 
institute includes a School of Minerals and Petroleum (Råstofskolen) and a Centre for 
Arctic Technology (ARTEK), which all have strong links with the Technical University 
of Denmark (DTU). It is the ambition of these institutes to become the technical 
powerhouse of Greenland. The School of Minerals and Petroleum in Sisimiut has been 
established in 2010 (www.sanilin.gl) and illustrates the need to build practical capacity 
and knowledge in the field of mineral resources by the Greenland society. The School 
provides training on a practical level and aims at providing Greenlanders with the 
right set of skills and qualifications to be able to apply for jobs in these industries. The 
School of Minerals and Petroleum cooperates closely with the Colorado School of Mines 
(United States), Ole Vig Upper Secondary School (Norway) and the Northern Centre for 
Advanced Technology in Sudbury (Canada) (Bell 2011). In this way “brain circulation” is 
being initiated and developed, supporting human capital building in Greenland.
3.4.3 Future Challenges and Opportunities
It is likely that the level of industrial activities related to natural resource and energy 
development is going to increase in the future (Naalakkersuisut 2014b). In recent 
years these activities have increased steadily, which are likely to continue now that a 
construction permit has been granted to the London Mining project on iron ore and 
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the ban on uranium mining has been lifted, freeing the way for other large mining 
projects (RT 2013). In the meantime, the oil and gas industry is continuing its exploration 
activities and is likely to continue doing so in the future (Naalakkersuisut 2014b). 
However, when these activities will take place exactly is not certain, and currently the 
industry tends to take longer before large investments in the Arctic region are decided 
upon. Therefore one of the challenges for Greenland will be to educate its workforce 
at the right time with the right skills.
In general one can state that the expected increased industrial activities form an 
opportunity for Greenland to diversify its economy and maximise the local benefits. 
However, both the mining and the oil and gas industries require skilled labour with the 
right qualifications to work on their projects. In order for Greenland to maximise its local 
benefits of these industries, the main challenge will be to increase the level of (highly) 
skilled workforce that has acquired the right set of skills for these industries. A recent 
study however has indicated that the shortage of a highly educated workforce will 
continue to grow in the near future and last until at least 2025 (European Commission 
2013). Various initiatives, mainly revolving around the Building School, School of 
Minerals and Petroleum and Centre for Arctic Technology in Sisimiut, have been taken 
to increase the level of skilled workers for these industries so that the Greenlandic 
society will be ready to take the employment opportunities when they arrive. Without 
having a critical mass of human capital in place, Greenland will not be able to maximise 
the local benefits and successfully create a knowledge-based economy. It will run the 
risk of foreign labour coming into the country to perform the jobs. The University of 
Greenland, which is currently focussed on social, historical and cultural sciences, can 
facilitate the creation of a highly skilled work force by including Science in its curriculum. 
It is expected that graduates from this subject will face no difficulties in finding a job 
(European Commission 2013). Lagging behind in capacity-building compared to the 
pace of industrial development could also prevent expertise and knowledge from 
becoming an export product in the future. This can become a serious strain on the 
process of becoming a self-sustaining economy.
3.5 Conclusion
The three cases that were studied more closely in this chapter illustrate the importance 
of local knowledge institutions and human capital building. The development of an 
internationally renowned knowledge-based energy sector based on hydro- and 
geothermal power in Iceland shows how local knowledge institutes, developed over 
centuries, were of crucial importance in creating human capital, which in turn enabled 
Iceland to maximise the local benefits. Century long “brain circulation”, powered by 
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Icelanders studying at top institutes abroad and returning home with the knowledge 
they gained, appears to be crucial. The development of this knowledge-based energy 
sector has been a lengthy process in which foreign (engineering) companies took the 
lead. Gradually Icelandic companies started to take over the design works, until in the 
2000s the point was reached where the design was made by Icelandic companies and 
the actual building was performed by Chinese labour. This case suggests a strong 
historic path dependency, by centuries of human capital creation leading to a full-
fledged knowledge-based economy based on natural resources in the 21st century. 
One of the main future challenges for Iceland will be to maintain a diversified portfolio 
of domestic educational and research programs, while at the same time maintaining a 
strong tradition of “brain circulation” with international top-universities.
The Faroe Islands illustrate that a knowledge-based energy sector can be created 
even though no economically viable oil and gas resources are found and with a less 
extensive history of human capital building and “brain circulation”. Over the past 100 
years the main steps have been taken to create the human capital base it has today. In 
recent years revenues from exploration activities have been used to support knowledge 
institutes and increase their capacity. In turn, these institutes supply the economic 
sectors with human capital that remains closely linked to these institutes via guest 
lectures and research opportunities. Technological innovations and the Internet have 
reduced the impact of remoteness and distance, particularly important for the Faroe 
Islands, and have thereby increased the opportunities for “brain circulation” with the 
rest of the world. The main challenge for the Faroe Islands in the future will therefore be 
to develop a new University campus in Tórshavn with the necessary facilities to attract 
more students and researchers to the country.
Greenland stands at the beginning of creating a knowledge-based economy. Human 
capital is an important factor, and the Icelandic and Faroese examples show that even a 
small state can create sufficient human capital to support a knowledge-based economy. 
This is particularly important if it wants to localise the benefits from a future energy 
sector as much as possible. The example of the Faroe Islands is most promising to 
Greenland, since it illustrates that it is not mandatory to have a century-long history in 
large scale human capital building and “brain circulation”. Breaking with an economy 
based on primarily natural resources can be achieved, provided that emphasis is placed 
on building strong knowledge institutes and creating a critical mass of human capital 
locally. Education and the creation of human capital are defined as one of the top 
priorities and receive a lot of attention in Greenland. Institutes such as the School of 
Minerals and Petroleum have been created to support knowledge development related 
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to the oil and gas sector. “Brain circulation” and exchange of experience takes mainly 
place with Denmark, Norway and North America (USA and Canada). The main challenge 
for Greenland will be to establish a critical mass of skilled labour and to deal with the 
risk of foreign labour influx if oil and gas activities really take off.
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ABSTRACT
The Arctic region is opening up due to climate change, causing sea ice extend 
and snow cover to decrease. Over the past decade economic activities, including 
fisheries, shipping, oil & gas, mining and tourism have increased throughout the 
region. Especially the oil and gas activities are subject to public debate and attract 
a lot of (international) attention. Obtaining and maintaining the support of local 
stakeholders are thus of major importance if governments and companies want to 
see these activities continue and contribute meaningfully to the resilience of Arctic 
societies. The concept of a Social License to Operate addresses the acceptance of 
an activity by local communities and other stakeholders. This manuscript explores 
the role human capital development in obtaining and maintaining a Social License 
to Operate in Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland. As trust and legitimacy 
are the two fundamental principles on which a Social License to Operate is based, 
these are being examined more closely. On the basis of three case studies, this 
chapter explores how human capital development can contribute to the legitimacy 
of Arctic energy development and trust building between various stakeholders.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
The Arctic region is opening up due to climate change, causing sea ice extend and snow 
cover to decrease (ACIA 2004). The effects of cli-mate change are most profoundly 
felt in this part of the world, also called “the canary in the coal mine” (NASA 2013; 
The Economist 2004). Over the past decade economic activities, including fisheries, 
shipping, oil & gas, mining and tourism have increased throughout the region. It is 
estimated that the resources to be found in this region could amount up to 90 billion 
BOE and 1.670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, which are technically recoverable 
(USGS 2008a). This equals approximately 22% of the world’s undiscovered technically 
recoverable oil and gas resources. With oil and gas, mining and shipping as the largest 
drivers, the Arctic could potentially attract over $100 billion of investments (Lloyds 
2012). However, these economic estimates were made before the drop in oil- and other 
resource prices, making these them currently questionable on the near- to midterm.
The increase of Arctic oil and gas activities between 2008 and 2014 attracted a lot 
of attention and sparked public and political discussions on national, regional and 
international levels. The balance between economic development and environmental 
preservation is the main subject of these discussions. Already under pressure due 
to climate change, the oil and gas activities and the associated risks of an oil spill and 
pollution are seen as another threat to the sensitive Arctic ecosystem. At the same 
time, the (local) public debate is also focussed on the balance between local benefits 
and the risks associated with these activities. Since the region’s own market for oil 
and gas is too small, the resources extracted in this region will be mainly transported 
to other parts of the world. How will the Arctic societies then benefit from these 
activities? And do these benefits compensate for the risks? As most of the resources 
are expected to be found in the EEZ of the Arctic countries, the decision to and the way 
in which these activities are developed lies primarily in their jurisdiction. Also, there 
are already a number of mechanisms to ensure the maximisation of local benefits that 
are incorporated in their regulatory frameworks. However, the mechanisms currently 
incorporated into the legislation do not necessarily meet the expectations of societies 
and other stakeholders. As a consequence public debate or opposition can arise against 
a company’s planned activities, even though it fully complies with all the rules and 
regulations set in a specific country.
From a company’s perspective, (negative) public debate and opposition is an undesired 
situation which can damage its reputation and become a costly affair. However, 
public debate and opposition is part of a democratic society and should therefore be 
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respected. The trend is that the time for oil and gas projects to come online is increasing 
and has almost doubled in the past decade, making projects significantly more costly 
(Franks et al. 2014). Remoteness and scale play a role in this increasing trend, but part 
of it can also be explained by the increase of non-technical risks including public unrest. 
A concept that is increasingly used to address these non-technical risks is a social 
license to operate, which is aiming at obtaining and maintaining the acceptance and/
or approval of an activity by local and other stakeholders. Paying attention to these 
social aspects of an activity is extremely important, especially in the Arctic region where 
deadlines are tight and the window of opportunity in the ice-free summer is limited. 
Missing any deadline here, would imply major delays and additional costs. Having not 
only the support of a national government, but also of the society at large is therefore 
crucial for companies having the ambition to operate in the Arctic. Moreover, given the 
long term timeframe these resources generally take to be developed it is important 
to build a sustainable relationship based on trust and mutual understanding. Public 
acceptance cannot simply be bought, tricked or fooled.
This chapter will explore the concept of a social license to operate of energy 
development, including hydropower and geothermal energy and offshore oil and gas, 
in the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland. Although the cases have considerable 
differences, there are also a number of similarities that make them interesting for 
comparison in this chapter: All three are located in the North-Atlantic part of the Arctic, 
were or are still part of the Kingdom of Denmark and have small societies ranging 
between 50,000 and 350,000 inhabitants. We chose three case studies because a 
comparison could generate lessons learned and conclusions applicable to a wider 
scale, compared to focussing on one case study only. To ensure the quality of the 
gathered data one has to use data triangulation. By choosing three different methods 
of data collection itis ensured that findings or data are confirmed or disconfirmed in 
multiple ways (Yin 2009; Vennix 2006]. This research is based on document analysis, 
participative observation and interviews. A total of eight interviews were conducted 
with representatives of the industry (n = 3) and governments (n = 5). The authors of 
this chapter have a background in science and the private sector.
The first section will elaborate on the concept of a social license to operate. Thereafter 
the case studies of a social license to operate for oil and gas development in Iceland, 
the Faroe Islands and Greenland will be presented. In these case studies we will look 
at how the development of human capital stimulates the institutional and business 
sector strength of that specific country. Both the short and long term opportunities 
related to human capital development in relation to a social license to operate will be 
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discussed. Finally, the findings of these three case studies will be discussed together, 
after which this chapter will end with some concluding remarks.
4.2 A social license to operate
4.2.1 The emergence of the concept of a social license to operate
The concept of a social license to operate emerged in the late 1990s, when it was 
first used by the Canadian mining executive Jim Cooney in a meeting with World Bank 
officials (Boutilier 2014). Since then, the term is increasingly used by business people, 
academia, consultants and media, and is still on the rise. Most research has focused 
on the application of this concept in the extractive industries, but is also used to an 
increasing extend in other sectors such as forestry, agriculture, renewable energy 
generation and pulp & paper manufacturing (Hall et al. 2015; Moffat & Zhang 2014). Until 
now the social license to operate concept has been predominantly considered from an 
industry point of view, while its application also makes it an interesting concept to look 
at from a government and civil society perspective (Hall et al. 2015; Morrison 2014).
Cross-sector research has indicated that the concept is differently understood among 
various (energy) sectors, and that its application changes in every context (Hall et al. 
2015). Elements that are commonly present in many of the definitions are (ongoing) 
acceptance, approval, local communities, stakeholders and industry’s activities (Hall et 
al. 2015; Moffat & Zhang 2014; Thomson & Boutilier 2011; World Bank 2003b). Generally, 
in the literature a Social License is seen as an ongoing process that runs through the 
entire lifecycle of a project. It can be granted at one point in time but can be withdrawn 
again as well at another point in time. Often the withdrawal of a social license to operate 
for an activity happens much quicker than granting one. A withdrawal or lack of a social 
license to operate might not only affect the activity itself, but also has the potential to 
influence the reputation of a company and even an entire industry. The dynamic nature 
of a social license to operate requires companies to adapt and respond to changes 
if they want to secure and maintain the public acceptance of their activities (Prno 
2013). Based on the aforementioned aspects, this chapter refers to a social license to 
operate as “the ongoing acceptance and approval of the activities of an industry by local 
communities and other stakeholders”. This definition reflects the dynamic nature of a 
social license to operate and the fact that there are more than only local communities 
as stakeholders playing a role in this process.
One of the most challenging aspects of a social license to operate is the difficulty of 
measuring whether or not it has been granted. This also raises the question of who is 
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granting the social license to operate. There will always be stakeholders opposing an 
activity, if only for fundamental beliefs or Not-In-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) phenomena. The 
lack of a social license to operate is mostly measured based on the presence of protest 
and opposing voices in the public domain (Owen & Kemp 2013; Prno & Slocombe 2012). 
If there is protest against an activity, it is challenging to determine if this opposition 
represents the majority of stakeholders and the common interest, or not. One could 
argue that the loudest voice automatically ‘wins’, which goes against the democratic 
principles on which many societies are based. When an activity is in the interest of all 
other stakeholders, it does not necessarily mean that the one stakeholder opposing 
it holds a veto (Morrison 2014). Moreover activities may continue anyway when they 
are of regional or national importance (Yates & Horvath 2013). On the other hand, 
measuring the existence of a social license to operate is difficult for a number of reasons 
too, as it is based on the assumption that a lack of objection means a social license 
to operate is present (Yates & Horvath 2013). The lack of opposition or conflict in the 
public domain does not necessarily mean that stakeholders support or even accept 
the activity. The absence of publicly known objections and conflict may for example 
be caused by stakeholders disengaging from the project, cultural habits and customs 
or resistance voiced in less tangible/overt forms (Owen & Kemp 2013). Thomson and 
Boutilier (2011) distinguish four levels of social license to operate: the lowest being the 
Social License withheld or withdrawn, then the mere acceptance of an activity, the level 
of approval when credibility is established and the level of psycho-logical identification 
when trust is established.
4.2.2 How to obtain and maintain a social license to operate?
The previous section illustrated that having a social license to operate is essential 
for companies wanting to successfully implement their activities against budget and 
time, but how does one obtain a social license to operate? And is there only one social 
license to operate? Thomson and Boutilier (2011) have developed a framework in which 
the social license to operate is seen to exist on a continuum: the lowest end on the 
continuum is if a social license to operate is withdrawn or withheld. Other stages at 
this continuum range from acceptance and approval to psychological identification with 
an activity. A company cannot influence a social license to operate directly, nor can it 
unilaterally declare to possess one (Morrison 2014). A social license to operate is heavily 
reliant on trust and legitimacy, two aspects that are hard to measure and influence 
directly. The immeasurability and thus the inability to directly manage the concept itself, 
makes it difficult for companies to use this concept in existing management systems. 
However, via the concepts of economic legitimacy, interactional trust, institutionalised 
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trust and socio-political legitimacy companies and other organisations can work on 
obtaining and maintaining their social license to operate (Thomson & Boutilier 2011).
One of the most fundamental parameters is the local benefits (IIED 2014; Prno 2013). 
An imbalance between local risks and benefits could impede local support. The level 
of local benefits influences the economic legitimacy of an activity, which can be said 
to be one of the four fundamental factors of a social license to operate (Thomson & 
Boutilier 2011). The payment of royalties and taxes to a national government does no 
longer suffice in many cases. Therefore a project proponent needs to look at creating 
a local knowledge base and employment. However, hiring a certain percentage of local 
workforce and contracting local businesses are only sustainable when linked to the 
broader economy (Harvey & Bice 2014). Only then it can create greater resilience among 
local communities.
A social license to operate is built on relationships in which meaningful participation 
and the quality, not quantity, of stake-holder contact play a key role (Moffat & Zhang 
2014; Prno 2013). By building up a relationship via high quality contact that is perceived 
as positive and pleasant, stakeholders are less likely to feel taken advantage of (Moffat 
& Zhang 2014). “The perception that the company listens, responds, keeps promises, 
engages in mutual dialogue and exhibits reciprocity in its interactions” (Thomson & 
Boutilier 2011) is the very definition of interactional trust. There are also different levels 
of trust: One can define trust in a person (i.e. personal trust), which strongly relates 
to the element of interactional trust as discussed in this section. Moreover, one can 
distinguish trust in an institution (i.e. institutionalised trust) which will be dis-cussed 
later in this section. Personal trust is based on reciprocity, and built on knowledge of the 
behaviour of one to another over time. Trust is a two-way process and involves multiple 
parties. Itis not something that can be declared to have obtained by a single actor. Trust 
can therefore be defined as a shared set of expectations between the actors involved 
(Zucker 1986). Essential in building trust between a company or industry and actors at a 
local level is the capacity of communities to meaningfully participate in the inter-action 
with a company. These relationship-building processes often take a lot of time to build 
and maintain (Prno 2013), potentially requiring too much capacity of small societies to 
be able to fully participate in it. Therefore investing in capacity building programmes for 
local societies does not only create a local workforce, but also enhances the capacity of 
a society to meaningfully engage with a company or industry. Local cluster development 
that includes businesses, knowledge institutes and government agencies offers the 
greatest opportunity for oil companies to build trust with local communities and other 
local stakeholders (Harvey & Bice 2014).
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More difficult to reach is institutionalised trust, since this requires stakeholders to 
perceive that the relationships between their institutions and the company are based 
on mutual trust with respect for each other’s interests (Thomson & Boutilier 2011). 
Institutional trust resembles the trust of societies in systems and institutions (Giddens 
1990; Zucker 1986; Luhmann 1979), which has led to our modern day society in which 
we trust the political and monetary systems. Important elements of institutional trust 
are openness, transparency, order and predictability (Giddens 1990). The interaction 
with representatives of a system can influence the people’s perceptions on the reliability 
of a system (Giddens 1990). People are more likely to trust a representative or leader of 
an institution, than the institution itself (Morrison 2014). At the same time this makes 
an institution dependent on the reputation and behaviour of its representatives and 
leaders. If an institution wants to be judged more objectively, rather than on emotional 
and irrational aspects, it needs to invest in creating informed communities (Morrison 
2014). When present, institutionalised trust often results in openly support for a 
specific activity or company. A social license to operate is also based on socio-political 
legitimacy, which relates to fairness, meeting expectations and contributing to the 
well-being of a region or country (Morrison 2014). Procedural fairness is also a strong 
predictor of trust, because if the procedures of a company are perceived to be fair, 
stakeholders will better accept or approve a project regardless of the outcome of the 
procedure (Moffat & Zhang 2014).
Working on all of the four abovementioned aspects will enhance the levels of trust and 
legitimacy, which could result in sustainable relationships with (local) stakeholders and 
ultimately in ongoing approval for an activity. In the case studies that follow, the role of 
human capital development will be explored not merely from a company’s perspective. 
Also governments want to explore for and potentially develop oil and gas resources. 
Therefore a wider perspective will be used to look at the institutional context, potential 
historical path dependencies and country-specific policy measures that are in place 
to stimulate human capital development related to offshore oil and gas development. 
The different development stages, in which the energy- and more specifically the oil 
and gas sector is currently in, make these three countries an interesting comparison.
4.3 Iceland
Around 1900 Iceland was an overseas autonomy of the Kingdom of Denmark and 
one of the poorest European societies. There was a strong political desire to expand 
political autonomy from Denmark and gain full independence, which was perceived 
as unrealistic by Danish political forces due to low socio-economic development in 
Iceland at that time. There was also a strong desire in Iceland to develop and diversify 
91
Human capital and a social license to operate
4
the economy away from its focus on agriculture and small-scale fishing (Nordal & 
Kristinsson 1996). So it appears that there are parallels in the political and economic 
dreams of Iceland a century ago and later the Faroe Islands and today Greenland. Over 
time Iceland did achieve full independence and is today a highly developed country with 
a high level of human development (number 13 globally) (UNDP 2015). The interplay 
between human capital and natural resources has played an important part in enabling 
this development, and is very relevant for the Faroe Islands and Greenland in their 
aspirations for political independence and economic diversification (Bertelsen et al. 
2015; Smits et al. 2015; Bertelsen & Hansen 2015; Smits et al. 2014a).
Iceland thus offers a valuable case for discussing questions of legitimacy, local benefits 
and natural resources in very small North Atlantic Arctic societies, undergoing processes 
of political devolution. Iceland is a positive case that shows that a very small North 
Atlantic society through democratic governance and strong human capital can make 
legitimate decisions on natural resource use, and derive local benefits and sustainable 
development illustrated by the cases of geothermal and hydro power developments. 
The 19th century energy developments in Iceland have led to the development of large 
scale hydropower activities that could potentially influence the (local) environment 
and nearby societies. The successful implementation of hydropower and geothermal 
power generation has diversified the Icelandic economy and brought the society 
knowledge, welfare and eventually independence. By thoroughly analysing this case, 
a number of success factors relevant to other small scale societies, like the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland, can be distinguished. These success factors relate to local 
benefits, legitimacy and interaction between the various parties involved, making them 
interesting for contemporary discussion about the concept of a social license to operate. 
This section will end with a brief discussion of the recent oil and gas developments, the 
social license to operate discussion related to this and if the historical success factors 
could be of use in the 21st Century.
4.3.1 Icelandic hydropower development
In the late 1800s there were many power intensive industries, such as for example 
nitrogen-based fertilizer plants. Hydropower could supply these industries with 
plenty of energy at low costs, and thus generated a lot of international attention at 
the time. Some Ice-landers, such as Frímann B. Árngrímsson (1855–1936), recognised 
the hydropower potential of Iceland and wanted to implement large scale hydropower 
activities backed by foreign investments. At the time it was the lawyer, politician 
and poet Einar Benediktsson (1864–1940) who raised international capital for these 
largescale projects in Iceland. However the timing of his efforts was unfortunate, as the 
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early 1900s Icelandic political environment was one of an independence struggle from 
Denmark, which did not allow for foreign-owned utilisation of Icelandic hydropower 
resources. In 1907 his efforts were rejected by the Althingi in the Waterfall Law, which 
required Icelandic residence for owners of waterfall rights. Later, in 1973, then governor 
of the Icelandic Central Bank Dr Jóhannes Nordal would regret that Iceland had not 
used its hydropower potential in the early 1900s. This could have supplied Iceland with 
technological knowhow and infrastructure at an earlier stage (Nordal 1973).
Even though foreign-owned hydropower development did not generate the necessary 
social and political support at the start of the 19th century, the hydropower potential was 
not left unused. Local Icelandic communities and individual farmers electrified towns, 
villages and farms on a smaller scale. Through ready-to-assemble kits and brochures 
from abroad, this foreign technology and knowledge was implemented by Icelanders at 
a local level. In the late 1950s the highly politicised economic system adverse to foreign 
investment, for example related to hydropower supporting aluminium-smelting projects, 
broke down and a Conservative-Social democratic Viðreisnarstjórn (Restoration 
Government) took office. This new government sought to diversify and internationalise 
the Icelandic economy, and large-scale hydropower development financed by foreign 
investors to support the aluminium-smelting industry was an important part of it. It 
secured World Bank funding for the development of the Búrfellsvirkjun hydropower 
station, which started operating in 1969 and would be repaid by selling power to the 
Straumsvík aluminium-smelter of Alusuisse of Switzerland. At the time the electricity 
sales agreement with Alusuisse was highly controversial concerning pricing of electricity 
to the foreign buyer compared to prices to Icelandic households, which has remained 
a contentious and complex question.
Where the Búrfellsvirkjun hydropower station was designed by Harza Engineering 
from Chicago, USA, and built by Icelandic workers, the situation changed and foreign 
technology and knowledge were transferred to Icelandic engineering companies 
from the 1970s through to the 2000s. Today, Iceland is renowned for its hydropower 
knowledge and technology, and exports it to the rest of the world. The strong (historic) 
connections of Iceland with foreign knowledge centres, the international exchange 
of knowledge, combined with strong primary, secondary, increasingly tertiary, and 
vocational education made the development of a locally controlled yet globally 
connected knowledge-based sector to a success. An important reason why this sector 
could be developed into a success and got a social license to operate of Icelandic 
society, even though it potentially has major environmental effects, was because of 
the high level of Icelandic involvement in the design, construction and operation of 
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these plants and energy-consuming industries. The Icelandic political system has been 
able to adjudicate these trade-offs, which appear broadly legitimate within Icelandic 
society. However, this legitimacy has been questioned by foreign environmental NGOs 
during the development of the large hydropower station Kárahnjúkavirkjun, which was 
opened in 2009.
4.3.2 Icelandic geothermal energy development
The development of geothermal energy in Iceland materialised earlier compared to 
the development of hydropower. It was ValtýrGuðmundsson (1860–1928), an Icelandic 
member of the Althingi at the time, who was interested in geothermal energy and wrote 
an influential article about geothermal heating in Idaho, USA (Guðmundsson 1910).From 
1930 and onwards, Iceland developed an extensive geothermal infrastructure starting 
with the heating of the public primary school of Austurbæjarskólinn and the public 
swimming pool in Reykjavík. Today, all areas of Iceland where it is possible to obtain 
geothermal energy are heated by this hot water and steam technology. In regions where 
this is not possible, hydropower is used to generate electricity for heating. Geothermal 
energy was a signature Icelandic resource and technology, controlled and financed by 
Ice-landers who heated their homes and swimming pools that were the pride of the 
nation to foreign visitors. The geothermal revolution in Iceland was more indigenous 
than the hydropower and therefore much less controversial.
However, geothermal energy recently became more controversial with the increased 
size of the installations. The large installations also come with a greater environmental 
impact, including the increase of noise and smell. Future large scale geothermal 
installations will likely be used for electricity generation meant for the export, either by 
subsea power lines or power-intensive industries. It is thus no longer meant to heat the 
homes of Icelanders, making the benefits of geothermal energy generation less tangible 
for society while the local impacts increase. For this reason future geothermal energy 
could become as controversial as hydropower has long been. However, the likelihood 
of this controversy is mitigated by the strong Icelandic human capital involved in the 
development of geothermal energy. Icelandic companies, government and universities 
have built strong competences that are relevant on a global scale, especially now that 
the world is looking for options to generate renewable energy that substitutes fossil 
fuels and facilitates the energy transition to mitigate climate change ( Jarðhitabók 2005; 
Friðleifsson et al. 1984)
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4.3.3 The historical success factors in creating societal acceptance and legitimacy
Iceland has managed to build a worldwide renowned hydropower and geothermal 
energy sector, which is controlled locally and based on the strong presence of Icelandic 
human capital. Especially related to the hydropower development the involvement 
of foreign investors was controversial for a long time. Iceland did not want to be 
controlled any longer by foreign decision makers, which resulted in the rejection of 
foreign investments during the first half of the 20th century. That is also the reason 
why the more Icelandic based geothermal energy development could take place on a 
larger scale at an earlier moment in time. Based on this case study one of the success 
factors for societal acceptance and legitimacy of implementing new energy activities 
is therefore the involvement of Icelanders in the design, construction and operation, 
thereby generating clear benefits at a local level.
However, to be able to participate and benefit from these new opportunities at a local 
level, people should have the right knowledge and skill set. Concerning geothermal 
energy a strong human capital base was already present in Iceland from the start, 
however related to large-scale hydropower this had to come from abroad. Only when 
opening up to foreign investments, and thereby creating the opportunity to transfer 
knowledge and skills to Iceland, a successful hydropower sector could be developed. 
Here Iceland benefitted from the existing quality of its local primary, secondary 
and vocational education, as well as its long tradition in undergraduate and more 
recently postgraduate education that is provided in Icelandic by Icelandic institutions 
(Bertelsen et al. 2015; Smits et al. 2015; Bertelsen & Hansen 2015; Smits et al. 2014a). 
Local education and human capital development combined with a long tradition of 
Ice-landers going abroad to study or work at leading European and North-American 
knowledge institutes and companies, proved to be one of the key success factors in 
securing local benefits and thereby the acceptance of the development of new energy 
sectors. Within the development of a successful hydropower and geothermal energy 
sector an important role was reserved for the Icelandic government. Not only was the 
government responsible for blocking any foreign investments and therefore knowledge 
transfer in the first place, it also played an important role in securing that Iceland 
would sufficiently benefit from these new developments. At a very early stage, even 
before the hydropower and geothermal energy activities came to the fore, it invested 
in educational institutes so that a human capital base was created. Later, it took the 
lead in securing World Bank funding and made sales agreements with private sector 
companies. Furthermore it adjudicated controversies and environmental trade-offs. 
Taking the lead in these matters and acting as an interface between the private sector 
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and Icelandic society, proved to be successful in addressing existing controversies and 
potential environmental impacts.
4.3.4 The recent development of a new energy sector: offshore oil and gas
Currently, Iceland is venturing into a new energy sector, namely offshore oil and gas 
in the Northeast corner of Iceland’s Exclusive Economic Zone also known as the Dreki 
area. The reason for the recent interest is the settlement of border disputes around 
Jan Mayen Island with Norway, concluding that each state has a 25%share in licenses 
on the other side of the border. At the moment two licenses to search of oil and gas 
in this area have been granted. One is owned by a consortium of the Chinese national 
oil company (CNOOC International), which has a 60% share and is also the operator, 
the Icelandic Eykon Energy ehf (15%) and Petoro Iceland AS (25%). The second license 
is owned by a consortium consisting of Ithaca Petroleum ehf. (operator) with a 56.25% 
share, the Icelandic Kolvetni ehf. (18.75%), and Petoro Iceland AS (25%) (National Energy 
Authority Orkustofnun 2016).
Iceland has little experience and local knowledge about offshore oil and gas exploration 
and production. However, interviews with Icelandic authorities and companies reveal 
strong self-confidence based on a generally high-level of international science and 
engineering skills, knowledge and experience. Knowledge-transfer from Norway 
facilitated by Scandinavian educational and professional experience of Icelanders plays 
a significant role here. Icelandic authorities have prepared and Althingi passed new 
legislation to regulate the licensing of oil and gas activities (personal communication 
with four Icelandic Government Representatives). And Icelandic companies seem 
confident that they will be able to secure their share of this development by servicing 
the IOCs (personal communication with two Icelandic companies). There is no aversion 
to foreign investment related to this development, and both authorities and companies 
are confident they can secure ample of local benefits from this development.
The Icelandic public debate on offshore oil and gas production appears to focus on 
Iceland’s global climate responsibilities and green image, rather than being exploited 
by large IOCs and foreign investment. The importance of economic legitimacy or local 
benefits from the offshore oil and gas activities seems not to be at the core of societal 
debate these days. Also, there seems to be a general level of trust in the international 
oil and gas companies that would execute these activities. The focus of Icelandic societal 
debate today, is on the socio-political legitimacy of these activities. Especially in the 
light of the recent Paris Global Climate Change Agreement, the legitimacy of starting 
new activities leading to fossil fuel extraction can be questioned. Also, it would concern 
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resources that would be exported as Iceland does not need the additional resources to 
generate electricity or heat. At the same time gas is seen as a transition energy source 
on the path towards a renewable society, and could help other countries to speed up 
this transition moving away from the use of coal and oil.
According to Thomson and Boutilier (2011), if the socio-political legitimacy of an activity 
is lacking while maybe the economic legitimacy and interactional trust are still present, 
the social license to operate of an activity may at best be approved but could also be 
withdrawn. The largest amount of stakeholders is likely to grant an acceptance level 
of the social license to operate for these activities. At the same time the socio-political 
legitimacy, such as the role of certain activities or industry in the face of climate change 
is not something that individual companies can easily influence. It is therefore becoming 
much more of a global challenge, also involving a broader set of stakeholders. The 
socio-political legitimacy aspect of a social license to operate therefore closely relates 
to a company’s or even industry’s level of involvement in the challenge of developing a 
global social contract for global problems such as climate change (Thomson & Boutilier 
2011).
4.4 The Faroe Islands
In the Faroe Islands the development of an energy sector in the form of oil and gas 
started during the 1990s, after Denmark transferred the rights to underground 
resources to the Faroe Islands in 1992. Before that, the Faroe Islands were a dependent 
territory of the Kingdom of Denmark since the Treaty of Kiel in 1814. There was no 
incentive for the Faroese authorities to proceed with oil and gas exploration, as long 
as the rights to the underground were in the hands of Denmark. Under the Home Rule 
System, which came into force in 1948, all policy domains were placed on either ‘List A’ 
or ‘List B’. The policy domains on List A could be taken over by the Faroese government 
at any time, while the domains on List B could only be taken over after negotiation and 
agreement with the Danish government. Since 1948 several attempts were made to 
gain authority over the rights to underground resources, which were on List B [18]. In 
1992 the Danish government unexpectedly changed its mind. Without having to go 
through Parliament (Folketinget), the Danish government and Prime Minster at the 
time Poul Schluter, decided to transfer these rights to the Faroe Islands. On the 22nd 
December, 1992 the agreement between Denmark and the Faroe Islands was signed. 
The Faroe Islands had secured the rights to all mineral and hydrocarbon deposits in 
the Faroese underground (Harhoff 1993; Müller & Djurhuus 2014). The transfer was 
transformative and kicked off a whole new phase of socio-economic development in 
the Faroe Islands (Bertelsen et al. 2015).
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With the rights to the underground secured, the Faroese government decided to start 
preparing for a future oil industry. It established the Hydrocarbon Planning Commission 
to investigate how future Faroese oil exploration and production legislation could be 
designed, and in such a way that it would mostly benefit the Faroese society. More 
specifically, the goal of the Commission was to advise the government on a future 
oil extraction policy and how labour, industry and social interest could be ensured 
in the best way possible if oil exploration and extraction should become reality 
(Oljuráðleggingarnevndin 1997, p. 13). In terms of the social license to operate concept, 
the private sector was thus stimulated by policy measures in the regulatory framework 
to think and act on maximising the local benefits and working on the economic 
legitimacy of their activities. In this case study it is examined whether the measures 
set out in the regulatory framework were sufficient for the companies to ensure their 
economic legitimacy for the Faroese society. Furthermore, this section will examine 
whether there have been other success factors related to the social license to operate 
for the development of an oil and gas industry in the Faroe Islands.
4.4.1 Stimulating socio-economic development from the start
Based on the advice from the Hydrocarbon Planning Commission, the key component of 
the regulatory framework was based on three main principles (Oljuráðleggingarnevndin 
1997):
1. All personnel and material to and from the oil platforms must pass through a 
Faroese harbour;
2. The Faroese workforce and industry should be given a fair and real chance to 
participate in the activities related to oil exploration and extraction; and
3. License holders had to financially commit to a Faroese Competence Development 
Fund that was to be used to finance education, research and other exploratory 
activities.
These three principles, stimulating foreign companies to engage and support the 
Faroese society, are now regarded as one of the success factors in the development 
of an oil and gas sector in the Faroe Islands. At that time, in the 1990s, the industry 
of the Faroe Islands had no experience in the oil and gas sector and very few, if any, 
personnel working for oil companies. If one were to take a snap-shot picture of the 
Faroese society anno 1998, there would not be any businesses that would have a 
chance to participate in the oil industry, and even fewer educated oil industry people. 
As a fishery nation however, many of the maritime skills could potentially be transferred 
to the offshore oil and gas industry. It was however clear from the beginning that if 
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society was to benefit from the hydrocarbon activities, a deliberate effort should be 
made to develop the necessary skill sets and experiences, and a massive investment 
had to take place in entirely new sectors.
The three principles of the hydrocarbon legislation in the Faroe Islands were introduced 
to stimulate a broad socio-economic development. However, also from the side of the 
oil companies themselves there was an interest in promoting such development and 
fund research in the Faroe Islands. According to Anderson et al., who studied BP and its 
engagement prior to entering the Faroe Islands “Cultural research was also regarded as 
‘very necessary before entering the Faroe Islands.  [in order to] get a good reputation before[it] 
even started drilling’. BP reported having substantial contact with Faroese representatives 
before maintaining a physical presence there. Furthermore, such ‘pre-work’ was deemed 
‘invaluable’.” (Anderson & Bieniaszewska 2005). This ‘pre-work’ is well documented in a 
recent publication by two Faroese journalists, Jan Muller and Tróndur Djurhuus, who 
closely followed the development of the oil industry in the Faroe Islands (Müller & 
Djurhuus 2014).
In 1999 both journalists were part of a team of sixteen key ‘influencers’, including 
industry representatives, politicians, civil servants, academics, and journalists, from 
the Faroe Islands. The key influencers were invited on a trip to Alaska, which was paid 
for by BP, to study and see the oil fields and learn how the oil industry interacted with 
local communities over there. The two journalists were surprised by the opulence they 
were suddenly offered and commented: “Faroese news reporters and others don’t have 
to live in double rooms, or student residencies, when they go abroad in ‘off-shore errands’. 
Now there is space for them in four and five star hotels. The scoop and the ‘sitting bathtub’ 
is replaced by a huge bathroom of marble, and we dined well, without anybody having to 
think about to whom the bill will be sent to” (Müller & Djurhuus 2014, p. 97). In Alaska, 
the team was met with one key message repeatedly: Oil exploration and oil extraction 
can be organized in a way that benefits both the oil industry and society as a whole. 
According Djurhuus, “Texaco does not hide that they hope that it [the trip to Alaska] also 
will benefit the oil companies, once the Faroese know how other societies cooperate with the 
companies. Over and over the slogan on the trip is win-win” (Müller & Djurhuus, p. 123).
Since the late 1990s, many influencers from the Faroe Islands have been invited to join 
similar trips, as this was a strategy pursued by the major oil companies at that time.
4.4.2 Local benefits after 15 years of exploration
In 2001 the first oil exploration well was drilled and the exploration for hydrocarbon 
resources in Faroese waters had officially begun. After 15 years of exploration, a lot of 
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experience and knowledge has been gained in the Faroe Islands, but no oil has been 
found (yet) in commercially viable quantities. Nevertheless, the exploration activities are 
ongoing and have led to some major spin-off activities with significant socio-economic 
effects on a national level. An entirely new hydrocarbon cluster was created, consisting 
of new companies and offering new support to existing companies (Bertelsen et al. 
2015; Müller & Djurhuus 2014; Smits et al. 2014a). Parties that are participating in this 
hydrocarbon cluster include for example:
• Oil Companies (Atlantic Petroleum, Faroe Petroleum)
• Offshore supply companies (Skanksi, Thor, Jacobsen)
• Shipyard (MEST)
• Offshore Supply Services (Faroese Offshore Supply Services)
• IT (Simprentis, Føroya Tele)
• Harbor (Atlantic Supply Base)
• Petroleum Administration ( Jarðfeingið)
• University of the Faroe Islands (Fróðskaparsetur Føroya)
• Maritime College (Vinnuháskúlin)
• NewsPortal (www.oljan.fo)
Important drivers in the creation of this cluster were the three principles on which the 
institutional set-up was based. For example, the legal requirement that all material 
destined for the oil platforms in the Faroe Islands must go through a Faroese harbour, 
has led to the creation of a new Atlantic supply base in the Faroese city of Runavik 
(Atlantic Supply Base 2011). The requirement that oil companies must give Faroese 
businesses and labour a real and fair chance to participate in activities of the industry, 
has led to the establishment of new offshore companies and the employment of Faroese 
personnel on platforms (Krúnborg Offshore 2012; Mest 2013; Skansi 2013; Thor 2011). 
The requirement to financially support the competence development fund has resulted 
in the investment of180 million Danish Kroner on over 500 competence development 
projects (personal communication). Also, as a result of spin-offs from these pillars, a 
growing number of citizens from the Faroe Islands have found work in the oil sector 
abroad. Migration between the Faroe Islands and the plat-forms abroad is bringing in 
about 824 million Danish Kroner a year to the Faroese economy (Hagstova Føroya 2012). 
All in all, 942 people, representing 3.4% of the total active labour force, were working 
within the hydrocarbon sector in 2013 (Hagstova Føroya 2015; Oljuvinnufelagið 2013).
This leads to an interesting observation: Until now, there is no commercially viable oil 
in the Faroe Islands, yet the nation has developed a substantial hydrocarbon cluster 
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that competes at a global level. This implies that the competitiveness is not based on 
the presence of oil deposits in the Faroe Islands, because there are none found, but 
rather on the human capital that has evolved as a result of the particular development 
path that has been intentionally and strategically pursued since the late 1990s. As a 
whole, this has benefited Faroese society and has also given the hydrocarbon industry 
a high degree of economic and socio-economic legitimacy in terms of a social license 
to operate.
4.4.3 Trust building between stakeholders in the hydrocarbon cluster
The cluster development described above has also added a new dynamic to the Faroese 
society, as these players interact at local and international conferences, offshore 
business fairs, and in joint ventures. This dynamic creates an ongoing dialogue – 
and competition of course – between these actors. Furthermore, the competence 
development fund has been managed in a way that can be described as a co-
management system, in which the oil industry (license holders) and the government 
administer the funds jointly. On the one hand, the companies were obliged to commit 
a certain amount of funds to the competence development fund. All applications to 
the fund had to go through the Petroleum Administration ( Jarðfeingi), where jointly the 
formal eligibility is established and all applicants and grants are registered. However, 
the oil companies had, and still have, the final say on which project to fund. Thus the 
final decision on whether a PhD research project is granted or not, is taken by the oil 
company and the student receives a personal letter from the oil company, not from 
the Petroleum Administration ( Jarðfeingi 2016; Oljumálaráðið 2003).This new cluster 
development and the co-management of the competence development fund, has led 
to an increasing and ongoing interaction between the Faroese oil administration, the 
oil industry, the Faroese business community and Faroese civil society. Over the past 
15 years relations between these stakeholders have been built in multiple ways and 
in multiple platforms for cooperation. This has created a basis of interactional trust 
between the various stakeholders involved.
All in all, the clear local benefits and increased cooperation between stakeholders 
over the past two decades has resulted in a high score on the social license to operate 
continuum for the oil and gas activities in the Faroe Islands. How high the social license 
to operate is exactly, is difficult to pinpoint. However, it is a fact that there has not been 
a single protest or demonstration against the oil companies and their activities until 
now. Nor are there any social movements such as NGOs, political parties, or any other 
groups that are against oil exploration in the Faroe Islands. Instead, there is a high 
degree of positive expectation and support for the industry in the Faroese society.
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It is evident that the oil companies that were involved in the early development of the oil 
sector in the Faroe Islands, even before the actual exploration began, were concerned 
about the perceived legitimacy of their business in the local society, and there seems 
to have been a convergence of the political wishes for inclusive growth and the strategy 
pursued by the major oil companies. This is regarded as a success factor contributing 
to the effectiveness of the regulatory framework and ensures the hydrocarbon sector’s 
social license to operate in the Faroe Islands.
4.5 Greenland
With a surface of more than 2 million square kilometres Greenland is the largest island 
of the world (www.cia.gov). Approximately 81% of the island is covered in ice, explaining 
why Greenland’s society lives scattered along the 44.000 km long coast-line. At the same 
time, Greenland is considered to be a microstate based on the small size of its society 
which consists of approximately 56.000 people. Today, Greenland is still part of the 
Kingdom of Denmark but has Home Rule since 1979 and Self Rule since 2009 (Smits et 
al. 2014b). The Self Rule implies that only defence, foreign pol icy and security are shared 
responsibilities between Denmark and Greenland (Smits et al. 2014b). The underground 
and its resources belong to Greenland. Eventually it is the ambition of Greenland to 
become (financially) independent from Denmark, although the timeframe in which this 
goal should be realised is subject to debate. In order to become financially independent, 
the national economy that is now mainly dependent on fisheries, tourism and the public 
sector, needs to be diversified. The development of oil and gas but also mining activities 
is seen as an important element in this strategy (Naalakkersuisut 2014a). Based on 
the estimations of the USGS (USGS 2008a) it is expected that the Greenlandic waters 
contain large oil and/or gas undiscovered hydrocarbon resources. Over the last 40 years 
a limited number of exploration activities have been undertaken in Greenland’s EEZ: 
In the 1970s a total number of 5 exploration wells were drilled followed by 1 in 2000 
and another 8 in 2010/2011. Moreover, multiple sets of seismic data as preparation for 
(future) exploration drilling activities have been acquired over time.
The strategy of the Greenlandic government to develop oil and gas resources and the 
recent exploration drilling activities in 2010/2011 by Cairn Energy have attracted a lot of 
public attention, both on the national as well as the international level. On both levels 
there are stakeholders with different opinions on this matter, and stakeholder groups 
are divided on this topic. The risk of an oil spill and other potentially negative impacts on 
the fragile ecosystem is the main topic of the discussion, along with the importance of 
this ecosystem and its marine mammals for local societies (Pfeifer & Thompson 2011). 
Because the past activities have sparked debates in society, one cannot assume to have 
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a social license to operate at the start of (future) activities. Therefore the government as 
well as the companies that would like to start their activities in the Greenlandic waters 
need to take into account the potential non-technical risks. As legitimacy and trust 
are regarded as two of the main underlying principles in obtaining and maintaining a 
social license to operate (Thomson & Boutilier 2011), focussing on these elements in 
a project’s development strategy could contribute to obtaining and later sustainably 
maintaining a social license to operate. This section explores how human capital 
development could contribute to trust building and legitimacy of oil and gas activities in 
Greenland. It will primarily focus on the role of human capital in relation to the economic 
legitimacy of an activity, as this is the basis of a social license to operate. Moreover the 
role of human capital related to interactional trust will also be examined. Findings from 
the case studies of Iceland and the Faroe Islands will be used to determine a number 
of potential success factors in the Greenlandic context.
4.5.1 Human capital development and the economic legitimacy of oil and gas activities 
in Greenland
As is the case in the rest of the Arctic region, Greenland’s economy is considered a 
small market (Ackrén et al. 2011) meaning that the majority of the resources would be 
shipped to global markets elsewhere. The most important challenge for Greenland’s 
society and government is to maximise the local benefits from the (future) oil and 
gas activities (Naalakkersuisut 2014b; Smits et al. 2014a; Smits et al. 2014b). Local 
benefits are also an important basis for a social license to operate, as is illustrated by 
the ‘economic legitimacy’ principle of Thomson and Boutilier (2011). The regulatory 
framework in Greenland already includes a number of policy measures to stimulate the 
involvement of local stakeholders in the development of an activity. Working on these 
requirements to the best extend possible can contribute to a social license to operate. 
However, assuming that only compliance with these requirements will be sufficient is 
naïve and should be examined on a continuous basis throughout the development 
process of an activity.
In order to maximise the (economic) benefits at a national level, the Oil & Mineral 
Strategy 2014 - 2018 aims to sustainably develop oil and gas activities by prioritising 
the industry’s interfaces with education, the labour market, existing infrastructure 
and social services (Naalakkersuisut 2014b). However, in order for society to maximally 
benefit, it needs to have the right education and qualifications to be able to participate in 
the industry (Bertelsen et al. 2016). These requirements do not only apply to individuals, 
but also to local businesses. Even though it can be questioned whether there will be 
any exploration drilling in the coming few years and thus why any knowledge in this 
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field should be developed, the development of human capital and getting the right 
qualifications takes time. Increasing the level of education has already been a focus 
point for the government of Greenland over the past decade. Greenland does not have 
an extensive history of developing a knowledge-based economy via higher education 
and knowledge exchange, such as Iceland and the Faroe Islands (Smits et al. 2014a). 
Under the “Greenland Education Program” (www.nanoq.gl) the number of post-primary 
graduates has increased. However, creating a critical mass of (highly educated) human 
capital remains a challenge.
To ensure that the industry contributes to this challenge, the government has 
incorporated the IBA as a policy measure in the Mineral Resources Act, which is the 
central regulatory framework concerning the development of oil and gas resources. 
The aim of IBA is to “enhance and secure the involvement of relevant Greenlandic 
stakeholders” (Naalakkersuisut 2014c), and by doing so, increasing the positive impacts 
of the industrial development on the Greenlandic society. Since all oil companies that 
want to perform activities in Greenland need to agree on an IBA with the Greenlandic 
government and the affected municipalities, this forms a good starting point to work on 
the important social license to operate elements of trust and legitimacy. However, the 
outcomes of an IBA itself are focussing on the short- and mid-term when negotiated 
in relation to exploration activities. Of course the government can ensure that the 
agreement successfully contributes to the country’s long term goals, by having their 
strategy in mind during the negotiations. If companies want to build a sustainable, long 
term relationship with local stakeholders, one should not only focus on the IBA alone.
Besides the formal requirements of an IBA, there are a number of ways in which 
companies could contribute to an increased human capital base in Greenland. Various 
initiatives in this field already exist and could form a starting point for engaging with 
local stakeholders and businesses. Preparing Greenlandic businesses for participation 
in the oil and gas industry is one of them. In 2012, the government started to sup-port 
local businesses in raising their profile and by granting support to diverse and self-
sustaining initiatives in order to strengthen the development of the national economy. 
Another way to start engaging with local businesses is via existing partnerships, such 
as Suppliers Greenland (www.suppliers.gl), that aim at the oil and gas industry. These 
partnerships could serve as a link between the IOCs and local businesses. Knowledge 
exchange and capacity building are already on their agenda and could be further 
enhanced by the involvement of international knowledge and expertise from the IOCs.
104
Chapter 4
By contributing to human capital building international companies do not only comply 
with the regulatory framework and international best practice, but it could also be a 
basis for creating economic legitimacy of their activities and thus their social license 
to operate. Increasing and tailoring the skills and qualifications of people in order for 
them to be able to participate and contribute to the industry and its related activities, 
will enhance the (economic) benefits at a local level. However, only working on the 
economic legitimacy will only create an uncertain basis for a social license to operate, 
which is dependent on three more factors according to Thomson and Boutilier (2011). 
The following section will explore the role human capital development could play in 
relation to creating interactional trust.
4.5.2 Human capital development and trust building between stakeholders
As is concluded based on the Faroe Islands case study, human capital development 
could also serve as a platform to build trust between various stakeholders. This relates 
in the first place to what Thomson and Boutilier (2011) call ‘interactional trust’ and 
could ultimately lead to more ‘institutionalised trust’. The legal frame-work already 
requires companies to engage stakeholders during the permitting process, for example 
via consultation rounds (BMP 2009c). The government facilitates this process and 
sometimes functions as an intermediate between large international companies 
and small Greenlandic societies (personal communication – interview Greenland 
Government 2016). By delivering what has is promised during the consultation process, 
a company has the opportunity to show their responsibility and build trust among local 
stakeholders. Even though the Greenland Government is in the process of revising the 
Social Impact Assessment procedures and requirements, these consultation processes 
are of a relatively short duration (6 weeks, with the possibility of extension) and limited 
to the permitting process prior to the activities itself.
Another opportunity to build trust between a private company and Greenlandic 
stakeholders is the IBA. The negotiation procedures involve not only the private company 
and the national government, but also the affected municipalities. Furthermore, the 
IBA is focussed on the use of Greenlandic labour and enterprises when performing 
activities in Greenland (BMP 2009c). This forms a basis to discuss the requirements 
and qualifications the industry needs from skilled labour and businesses, in order for 
them to participate in the industry. However, the formal stakeholders involved in the 
negotiation process are limited, as they do not include Greenlandic knowledge institutes 
and workers’ associations (Ministry of Industry, Labour and Trade 2015; BMP 2009c). 
Moreover, the recent activities of the oil and gas sector were ad hoc and of a short 
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duration (personal communication – interview Greenland Business 2016), making it 
difficult to establish a sustainable relationship build on trust.
Establishing a Greenlandic Industry Cluster, including the international company/
companies, government authorities, local businesses, NGOs/associations and 
knowledge institutes, according to Faroese example, is an opportunity to create trust 
when exploration activities would take place again in the future. Existing initiatives 
from the Greenlandic government or Greenlandic NGOs such as Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) Greenland, could serve as a basis for cooperation in such a multi-
stakeholder cluster on human capital development.
4.6 Discussion
Although the three case studies each have a different context and are at a different 
stage in the development of an energy sector, whether it is oil and gas, hydropower 
or geothermal energy, a critical comparison generates a number of valuable insights. 
The development of an energy sector and using this for export or to sup-port energy 
consuming export industries is or has been pursued by all three states to diversify their 
economy and boost socio-economic development. Having a social license to operate 
for these activities is of major importance in making this strategy a success. As appears 
from both the Icelandic and Faroese case study, it is crucial for an activity to have clear 
local benefits and thereby secure its economic legitimacy. More specifically, to generate 
this economic legitimacy and thereby create a social license to operate at acceptance 
level, these benefits should not only result from taxes and royalties but rather from 
participation of local communities in these new activities. Participation can be anything 
in the range from design, construction or operation. However especially in the case for 
large-scale developments, the local involvement should be substantial as was shown 
by the case of Iceland. Large scale foreign investments were rejected at first, because 
of little involvement of Icelanders in phases other than construction, and the fear of 
being dominated again by foreign powers. Later, when more experience was gained 
with small-scale hydropower Iceland felt more in control and foreign investments were 
seen as the key to socio-economic development. Only then the large scale hydropower 
installations were developed. Gradually, knowledge was transferred to Icelandic 
businesses, allowing for the development of hydropower to become fully Icelandic. 
And even though there are potentially large (environmental) impacts from large-scale 
hydropower development, the social license to operate is still present. Over time, 
Iceland has developed itself as a global player in the field of hydropower and Icelandic 
experts and businesses are now exporting their knowledge to other places in the world.
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Substantial involvement from the start and knowledge transfer during the development 
of a new industry seems to be a crucial element for the social license to operate. 
This is also underpinned by the case of the Faroe Islands, where involvement of the 
Faroese society and businesses was not only stimulated from the start by a number of 
policy measures, but was also explicitly present in the strategy of the IOCs. Since the 
exploration activities started, much attention has been paid to knowledge transfer and 
development. Within 15 years this has led to Faroese businesses being established, 
which do not only participate in the industry at a national level but also export their 
knowledge and experience to other places in the world. Compared to Iceland, the 
Faroe Islands have implemented more requirements in their regulatory framework to 
ensure society would benefit sufficiently from these new activities. A reason could be 
because there was no experience whatsoever with oil and gas in the Faroe Islands prior 
to the start of the exploration activities in 2001. Iceland however already had some 
experience with hydropower, albeit as small-scale hydropower, when it attracted foreign 
investments. From the Greenlandic case it appears that Greenland is following the same 
strategy as the Faroe Islands, and has implemented a number of policy measures such 
as the IBA to ensure involvement of Greenlandic society in new developments.
When requiring or desiring substantial involvement of a local society in new industrial 
activities, the right set of skills and knowledge should be available among the local 
workforce and businesses. This is thus not only in the interest of national governments, 
but also for international private sector companies. As the cases of Iceland and the 
Faroe Islands show, the high level of involvement from local people and businesses in 
new industrial activities generates clearer benefits for society and has the tendency 
to create a firm basis for a social license to operate. However, at the start of such new 
developments there is not necessarily a lot of knowledge and expertise in this field 
available among the workforce. The challenge is then to create the knowledge and 
expertise needed for these new activities, while ensuring that society is already involved 
from the start. For this reason the authors argue that human capital development 
plays a vital role in securing the local benefits and economic legitimacy of an activity, 
thereby contributing to obtaining and maintaining a social license to operate. Ideally 
the development of relevant knowledge and expertise should start prior to start of 
(large-scale) development of new activities. This facilitates the high-level involvement of 
society, as is shown by the Icelandic case. However if this is not possible, society could 
look at existing knowledge and try to apply that in the new industry, or base human 
capital development programmes on the already existing skills and expertise. This is 
how the Faroe Islands have transformed their offshore knowledge from fisheries into 
useful skills and expertise for the oil and gas industry. Establishing a fund to stimulate 
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human capital development, which is co-managed by the industry and the government, 
is enhancing this process.
Next to the economic legitimacy, the focus on human capital development can also 
contribute to the creation of interactional trust. The hydrocarbon cluster that was 
formed in the Faroe Islands brought together various stakeholders ranging from 
government authorities, private sector international and national businesses to 
knowledge institutes. Stimulated by the regulatory framework, these stakeholders 
started coming together in this cluster and established a more institutionalised dialogue 
and cooperation. While working together on competence development projects and 
interacting over the past years, these stakeholders have been able to show each 
other that they deliver as promised. Relationships are built, adding to a better mutual 
understanding. As a wide variety of stakeholders is included in this cluster it covers 
different parts of society, leading to a broader acceptance. These are elements that all 
contribute to a more established social license to operate.
A discussion that particularly relates to the development of fossil fuels is whether it 
contributes to the future of a society in terms of sustainable development, energy 
transition and climate change. In Iceland this is the main subject of societal debate 
related to the oil and gas exploration in the Dreki area. Also in Greenland there are 
critical voices in society that focus on this element. Regarding a social license to operate 
for oil and gas activities, this relates to the socio-political legitimacy of an activity. This 
is an element that is difficult to influence by one company or stakeholder alone, and is 
something that requires the input of multiple stakeholders on a larger scale. However, 
this does not mean that a company or stakeholder should not look at what can be done 
at a smaller scale or within its own circle of influence. Focussing on gas as a transition 
fuel towards renewable energy is for example regarded as a more responsible attitude 
compared to focussing on the production oil. The socio-political legitimacy aspect of 
a social license to operate therefore closely relates to a company’s or even industry’s 
level of involvement in the challenge of developing a global social contract for worldwide 
problems such as climate change.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter the role of human capital development related to obtaining and 
maintaining a social license to operate for energy activities, including oil and gas, 
hydropower and geothermal energy, has been examined based on case studies 
from Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Where Iceland and the Faroe Islands 
have already established an energy sector that allows them to export knowledge and 
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expertise elsewhere, Greenland finds itself at the start of such development. Based on 
the Icelandic and Faroese cases, human capital development plays an important role 
in maximising local benefits and thereby securing the economic legitimacy of the new 
industrial activities. The economic legitimacy is the first element of a social license to 
operate and can generate an acceptance level for an activity among society. Important 
in this respect is to ensure substantial involvement from local people at the start of 
the new activities, and focus on knowledge transfer and development throughout the 
development process of an activity.
When there is no previous experience with the specific industry that wants to develop 
these new activities, this involvement and knowledge transfer can be stimulated by 
incorporating policy measures into a state’s regulatory framework. This has proved 
to be a success in the Faroe Islands, and also Greenland is preparing itself for the 
development of a new energy sector in similar ways. For the local workforce to be able 
to participate in the new activities, their knowledge and skills should be applicable to 
this new industry. Focussing on human capital development is therefore essential. 
This is not only in the interest of a government, to ensure the benefits for its society 
are being maximised, but also for private sector companies in terms of their economic 
legitimacy and thus social license to operate. As human capital development requires 
the input of multiple stakeholders, the creation of a cluster as happened in the Faroe 
Islands can facilitate this process. Moreover, this cluster offers a platform for interaction 
between the different stakeholders over a longer period of time, thereby stimulating 
interaction and trust building between the parties involved.
Human capital development thus contributes in multiple ways to obtaining and 
maintaining a social license to operate for new energy activities in these three North 
Atlantic Arctic states. The main contribution is made related to the economic legitimacy 
of an activity via the maximisation of benefits at a local level. Maximising local benefits 
from these foreign investments was and is essential for all three societies. Especially in 
the light of a pathway towards independence, the economic diversification and benefits 
that come from the energy sector development are of major importance. In this context, 
the success factors for Iceland and the Faroe Islands that are identified in this chapter 
could be of interest to Greenland.
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ABSTRACT
Since the turn of the century, Greenland has been examining the possibilities to 
develop its potential oil and gas resources. The large scale oil and gas activities 
will impact the small Greenlandic society, both positively and negatively. In this 
chapter we employ the concept of a social license to operate to address the risks 
of an activity, represented by the acceptance or approval of an activity by societal 
actors. The focus of existing research is primarily on the interaction between local 
communities and companies. However, in an increasingly complex society, where 
the role of governments, companies and civil society is subject to constant change, 
social licenses to operate should be studied in an integrated way, to deal with all 
essential elements that influence the successful implementation of controversial 
activities.
This chapter builds on the idea that successful implementation of an activity is 
determined by social, political and legal licenses. Trust and legitimacy are regarded 
as the fundamental principles on which all three licenses are based. This chapter 
therefore adopts an integrated approach, in which the role of the political and legal 
licenses is taken into account as well as the social license. This approach provides 
for a more thorough analysis for different sources of personal and institutionalised 
trust as well as input, throughput and output legitimacy across the three licenses. 
The case study also illustrates the potential role of the government in co-shaping 
a social license to operate.
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
Oil and gas developments are subject to public debate. One source of controversy 
is that their large scale has the potential to transform communities, economies and 
environments (Harvey & Bice 2014; Slack 2012; Omeje 2005). These changes can have 
both positive and negative impacts, and the distribution of those impacts can lead to 
controversy. Over the last decade, the time for oil and gas projects to reach production 
has nearly doubled (Franks et al. 2014). Almost half of the risks that companies face 
in the development of an oil and gas activity have a nontechnical nature, of which 
relationships with other stakeholders is the largest category (Franks et al. 2014).
Since Greenland gained Self Rule in 2009, the government is looking to develop oil and 
gas activities in order to diversify its economy and become financially independent from 
Denmark (Naalakkersuisut 2014b). Such large scale oil and gas activities will impact the 
small Greenlandic population, both positively and negatively. Oil and gas development 
could therefore spark societal debate, potentially leading to delays in implementation 
of the activities.
The concept of a social license to operate relates to nontechnical risks of an activity, 
based on focussing on the acceptance or approval of a certain activity by societal actors. 
The concept originates from the mining industry where it emerged during the 1990s 
(Gunningham et al. 2004). Since then it has been used in a wide variety of industrial 
sectors (Hall et al. 2015). Typically the literature has focused on questions such as 
“What is a social license to operate?”, “What elements contribute to a successful social 
license to operate?” and “How can companies obtain a social license to operate?”. The 
interaction between local communities and private sector companies is typically the 
primary concern of this body of research (Hall et al. 2015; Moffat & Zhang 2014; Parsons 
et al. 2014; Prno 2013; Boutilier et al. 2012; Prno & Slocombe 2012). This focus is valid 
and has contributed to establishing the concept of a social license to operate, not only 
from an academic point of view, but also in best practices of companies worldwide. 
However, current developments in society ask for a broader understanding of the 
social license to operate (Owen & Kemp 2013; Harvey & Bice 2014). In an increasingly 
complex society, where the role of governments, companies and civil society are 
subject to constant change, approaches that examine the social license to operate 
in isolation from other factors miss essential elements that influence the successful 
implementation of controversial activities (see also Prno & Slocombe 2012).
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This chapter builds on the idea that successful implementation of an activity is 
determined by social, political and legal licenses (Morrison 2014). Empowered citizens 
and civil society organisations are not satisfied with how national governments and 
(multinational) private sector companies are implementing industrial activities such as 
oil and gas developments. As stakeholders have lost trust in the legal and the political 
systems to adequately deal with their concerns, the need for a social license to operate 
has emerged. Trust and legitimacy are regarded as the fundamental principles on which 
a social license to operate is based (Morrison 2014; Thomson & Boutilier 2011), but also 
play an important role in the legal and political system. An integrated analysis of the 
acceptance of an activity thus requires studying the processes through which trust and 
legitimacy are established as part of all three licenses.
To understand the role of trust and legitimacy in the interactions between these three 
licenses, the authors studied the development of oil and gas activities in Greenland. 
The level of industrial activities in the Arctic region has increased over the last decade. 
Sparked by amongst others the increased accessibility due to receding ice and snow 
cover (ACIA 2004), technological advances, political stability and high commodity prices, 
the extractive industries have expanded their activities in this region (Brookings 2014; 
Smits et al. 2014b). It is estimated that the undiscovered hydrocarbon resources in 
this region could amount up to 90 billion barrels of oil equivalent and 1.670 trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas, which are technically recoverable (USGS 2008a). This equals 
approximately 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil resources. Since the 1970s, 14 
exploration wells have been drilled in Greenland; eight of these were drilled in 2010 
and 2011. No economically viable oil and/or gas resources have been found yet (www.
govmin.gl). Now that the oil prices have dropped and are expected to remain volatile, 
the future of Greenlandic oil and gas activities is uncertain. This is a challenge for the 
Greenlandic government and society, since the development of oil in particular was 
seen as a driver for economic diversification and financial independence.
The following questions were examined in this case study: How are trust ensured 
between national government, local indigenous communities and oil companies? Who 
are legitimate decision makers on whether and under what conditions oil and gas may 
be developed in Greenland? What will be the consequences for granting a license to 
operate for future oil and gas activities? To answer these research questions, we will first 
elaborate on the case study and methods chosen for conducting the analysis (Section 
5.2). Section 5.3 discusses in more detail how the legal, political and social licenses to 
operate interact, as well as how trust and legitimacy are operationalised. Section 5.4 
analyses the three licenses in relation to the oil and gas development in Greenland, 
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followed by a discussion about trust and legitimacy in the interaction between the 
political, legal and social licenses to operate in Greenland (Section 5.5). In Section 5.6 
conclusions are drawn.
5.2 Case study and methods
The research for this chapter was conducted using a case study approach (Yin 2009), 
focused on the offshore oil and gas developments in Greenland. The methods that were 
used to gather the qualitative data for this case study consisted of semi-structured 
interviews, observation and literature and document analysis. The empirical data has 
been gathered between 2011 and 2016. By collecting data in three different ways, 
data triangulation ensures that the data and findings are confirmed or disconfirmed 
in multiple ways (Yin 2009; Vennix 2006). This chapter primarily draws upon the semi-
structured interviews conducted in 2016. The interviews were held with representatives 
of local (n = 1), national (n = 2) and international (n = 1) government authorities, local (n = 
2) and international (n = 1) private sector companies, and local (n = 3) and international 
(n = 2) civil society organisations.
The interviewed authorities, companies and organisations have been selected based 
on their involvement in the development of oil and gas activities in Greenland. In the 
selection process the authors have ensured a balanced representation of sectors 
(government, private and civil society) and of geographical origin (local, national or 
international). The socio-political focus of this research determined which departments 
or representatives were approached, e.g. (representatives and experts of) social/
economic/political departments within governments, companies and organisations 
rather than (representatives and experts of) the technical departments. It should 
be noted that some local and national organisations are so small, that the entire 
organisation consists of one to five employees. The representatives of the organisations 
that have been interviewed were all high level policy or executive officers that spoke on 
behalf of the organisation they represented. Some of them have been born and raised 
in Greenland, while others are Danes that now work and live in Greenland or work 
and live in other European countries. All interviews were conducted in English as the 
authors do not master the Danish and Greenlandic languages sufficiently to conduct 
semi-structured interviews. This only affected the selection process concerning the 
local civil society organisations: Next to the three civil society organisations that have 
been interviewed, the authors also approached the Greenlandic workers and fishermen 
and hunters organisations, however due to the language barrier no interviews could 
be conducted with these two organisations.
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All interviews have been recorded, after which a transcript was made. The 
conceptualisation of the legal, political and social licenses and the elements of trust 
and legitimacy, as outlined in Section 5.3, was used to code each of the transcripts. The 
transcripts were then analysed with qualitative data analysis software. Furthermore, 
a number of informal interviews were held during various conference visits, including 
the Arctic Frontiers (2015) and Arctic Technology Conference (2015). The observations 
stem from two visits to Greenland: one in 2011 and one in 2016. Secondary material 
such as policy documents, scholarly literature and newspaper articles were used to 
complement the data generated from interviews and observations.
5.3 Legitimacy and trust in the social, political and legal licenses
To perform industrial activities, companies need permits and political support. These 
political and legal licenses of an activity are based on formal judicial and political 
procedures. The political license is ‘the authority that the government gives to any 
other organisation to undertake a particular activity’ (Morrison 2014), and is granted 
by politicians. The legal license applies to an activity outlined by the regulatory 
framework, and is granted for example as a permit by an assigned governmental 
authority, represented by its civil servants, based on well-defined legal procedures. 
Besides these political and legal licenses the past decennia gave rise to a new type of 
license: the social license to operate. A social license to operate is generally defined as 
‘the ongoing acceptance and approval from local communities and other stakeholders’ 
(Parsons et al. 2014; Prno 2013; Thomson & Boutilier 2011; Joyce and Thomson 2000). 
Different from the political and legal licenses to operate, the social license to operate is 
not granted by a public authority, but is rather a process that runs through the entire 
lifecycle of a project and seeks a ‘license’ from in particular local communities and other 
stakeholders (Hall et al. 2015; Prno 2013). This raises the question who grants a social 
license to operate? When is it obtained? And how is it obtained?
It is generally acknowledged among scientists and practitioners that trust and legitimacy 
play an important role in obtaining and maintaining a social license to operate (Morrison 
2014; Thomson & Boutilier 2011). By focussing on how, when and by whom a private 
sector company can obtain and maintain a social license to operate, the existing 
literature is predominantly output oriented and lacks in depth examination of the 
potential relationships with the legal and political licenses. The role of the government 
and its changing relationship with society is often overlooked. The close connection 
between society’s increasing demand for influence on the development of industrial 
activities and its perception of the prevailing legal and political system and the failures 
there of, makes these political and legal systems important to study in relation to the 
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social license to operate. To study the interactions between the three licenses, it is 
important to have a closer look at the role of trust and legitimacy in each of them. The 
remainder of this section will therefore explore the various forms of trust and legitimacy.
5.3.1 Personal and institutionalised trust
Previous scholarly work on the social license to operate literature has distinguished 
different levels of trust: trust in a person (i.e. personal or interactional trust) and trust 
in an institution (ie. institutionalised trust) (Thomson & Boutilier 2011). In the present 
study the different levels of trust are applied to the relationship between society and a 
private sector actor, such as an oil company, as is usually understood in social license 
to operate literature (Thomson & Boutilier 2011), as well as analysed in relation to the 
political and legal licenses. This section operationalises the concept of these different 
levels of trust, which can be applied in the analysis of all three licenses.
Personal or interactional trust is based on reciprocity, and builds on knowledge an 
actor has of the behaviour of other actors over time. It is a two-way process involving 
multiple parties that is not obtained by a single actor. Trust can thus be defined as a 
shared set of expectations between the actors involved (Zucker 1986). Managing the 
expectations from both parties is therefore a crucial element, often a central part of 
the stakeholder engagement process of a project.
Institutionalised trust resembles the trust of actors in systems and institutions (e.g. 
political and monetary) (Giddens 1990; Zucker 1986; Luhmann 1979). Important 
elements of institutional trust are openness, transparency, order and predictability 
(Giddens 1990). The way actors view an institution is based on the performance of this 
institution, and is influenced by irrational, emotional aspects and the opinion of experts 
(Morrison 2014). Personal trust, in the form of interaction with representatives of a 
system, can enhance institutionalised trust (Giddens 1990; Morrison 2014).
In order to conduct the Greenlandic oil and gas case study, the authors expand on 
the existing social license to operate literature by distinguishing between two forms of 
institutionalised trust: integrity-based and competence-based (institutionalised) trust. 
In case of integrity-based trust, actors from local communities know the values and 
principles on which an institution operates and perceive that the institution is adhering 
to these values and principles (Moffat & Zhang 2014; De Vos 2011; Kim et al. 2004; Mayer 
et al. 1995). Competence-based trust relates to the perception of community actors 
that a government or company has the competencies and skills to manage the issues 
of interest to that community (Butler & Cantrell 1984).
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5.3.2 Input, throughput, and output and legitimacy
Existing literature on the social license to operate discusses the legitimacy of an activity 
mainly in terms of its economic and/or socio-political outcomes (Thomson & Boutilier 
2011). By doing so, the focus is predominantly on the output legitimacy. While output 
legitimacy is an important form of legitimacy when it comes to the social license to 
operate concept, it is not the only form. In addition to existing literature, the present 
study therefore makes a distinction between input, throughput and output legitimacy 
(Van Tatenhove 2011).
Input legitimacy reflects whether stakeholders that are influenced by a decision 
actually have a say in the decision making process and whether their interests are 
taken into account. In decisions made by a government authority, democratic election 
should ensure the involvement of stakeholders and the accountability of the decision 
makers (Risse & Kleine 2007). In decisions made by a non-state actor, for example a 
private sector company, other models such as an early stage and inclusive stakeholder 
engagement programme should be in place.
Throughput legitimacy relates to the decision making process itself and whether this is 
characterised by fairness, transparency, openness and efficiency (Van Tatenhove 2011; 
Risse & Kleine 2007). These elements also contribute to trust building. Recent research 
has shown that procedural fairness is the strongest predictor of trust. If the procedures 
are perceived to be fair, stakeholders will better accept or approve an activity regardless 
of the outcome of the procedure (Moffat & Zhang 2014).
Output legitimacy is derived when decisions or activities actively contribute to the 
welfare of a society and/or solve issues that cannot be solved by other actors alone. 
The present study uses the operationalisation that is widely used in social license to 
operate literature and distinguishes two types of output legitimacy, namely economic 
legitimacy and socio-political legitimacy. The economic (output) legitimacy refers to the 
local (economic) benefits that a specific activity brings to an area, as well as the balance 
between the risks and the benefits (Thomson & Boutilier 2011). The socio-political 
(output) legitimacy relates to the contributions of an activity to the general wellbeing 
and livelihood of a region and whether it meets the expectations of society (Thomson 
& Boutilier 2011).
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5.3.3 The role of legitimacy and trust in the three licenses
It is hypothesized that different forms of trust and legitimacy play a role in each of 
the three licenses. Ultimately, all forms of trust and legitimacy are important for the 
approval of an activity by society.
• The political license is typically granted by the government, which derives its 
authority mainly from its input legitimacy through political elections. While the 
input legitimacy is not under pressure in most contemporary societies, the 
output legitimacy of governments is. They are often criticized for not delivering 
what was promised or taking decisions that are not widely supported. Failing 
to meet expectations from society in delivering public goods and services has 
resulted in a decreasing level of institutional trust (Pierre et al. 2011; Pierre and 
Peters 2000). As a consequence, governments have turned to participatory 
processes in decision making to improve their levels of output legitimacy. 
However, whether participatory decision making indeed leads to improved 
output legitimacy and thus also into increased levels in institutionalised trust 
can be questioned (Boedeltje & Cornips 2004).
• Similar to the political license, the legal license is dependent on input legitimacy. 
Granting and obtaining a legal license is a form of output legitimacy. The 
authorities are judged based on the implementation and enforcement of the 
legal requirements during the permitting process. Furthermore, the legal 
license determines which activities are legal and which are illegal within a 
certain context. Institutionalised trust in the legal system is thus important for 
a well-functioning permit system and ultimately to achieve output legitimacy. 
And because throughput legitimacy plays an increasingly large role as well, 
permit procedures now often incorporate requirements regarding stakeholder 
consultation and participation.
• Although a social license to operate has emerged because of decreasing 
institutionalised trust in and legitimacy of the political and legal licenses, the social 
license does not substitute for the other licenses (Morrison 2014; Owen & Kemp 
2013). The emphasis of a social license to operate is on benefits for society (economic 
output legitimacy) and on the openness and transparency of the decision making 
process leading up to a certain activity (throughput legitimacy). Input legitimacy 
plays a role as well, as it is important which stakeholders are taken into account 
during the decision making process. In contrast to the political and legal license, 
however, it is less clear who are the legitimate stakeholders and decision makers.
120
Chapter 5
5.4 The political, legal and social licenses in the context of oil and gas 
development in Greenland
To be able to analyse the interaction between the three types of licenses described 
in Section 5.5, this section first presents the context of the political, legal and social 
licenses to operate for oil and gas development in Greenland. Section 5.4.1 describes 
the context of the political license, followed by the legal and the social licenses in 
Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 respectively.
5.4.1 The political license in Greenland: centralised decision making, but a greater 
distance to society
Greenland is a democratic society where elections determine the composition of the 
Parliament (Inatsisartut). The Parliament in turn appoints the Prime Minister, who then 
appoints its Ministers as members of the Cabinet (Naalakkersuisut). The Greenlandic 
political domain in its current form is relatively young: In 2009 Greenland obtained Self 
Rule within the Kingdom of Denmark, including the rights to the underground. Only 
a limited number of policy domains are still shared with Denmark, including Defence 
and Foreign Policy (Queen of Denmark 2009). In the longer term, the government 
of Greenland wants to become fully financially independent from Denmark. Today, 
Greenland’s economy is mainly based on the public sector, which is largely financed by 
Denmark through an annual block grant. At the moment, the private sector economy 
is heavily reliant on the export of fish and to a lesser extent on tourism.
Currently the government’s budget and spending are relatively balanced. However, 
spending is expected to increase while earnings will not automatically follow this 
trend (Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the Benefit of Society 2014). 
Based on the need for additional income to cover increasing government expenditures 
and the wish to become financially independent, the government has identified the 
development of oil, gas and minerals as key initiatives in their strategy to diversify the 
Greenlandic economy (Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the Benefit 
of Society 2014; Naalakkersuisut 2014b). Given the average unemployment rate of 
approximately 10% (Statistics Greenland 2016) and relatively low education level 
among society, as about 70% of 15–64 year olds has only completed primary education 
(Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the Benefit of Society 2014), capacity 
building and creating new job opportunities are main priorities of the Greenlandic 
government (Smits et al. 2014b; Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the 
Benefit of Society 2014; Naalakkersuisut 2014b). Therefore also the government has 
an interest in developing these activities successfully.
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To govern the development of new oil and gas activities, the MLSA (or Råstofstyrelsen) 
has been established. This authority is part of the MIMR and functions as the 
administrative authority which governs license and safety matters. The Ministry itself 
is responsible for legal, geological and marketing related policy issues. The Ministry of 
Industry, Labour and Trade governs the socio-economic issues, including the SSIA and 
IBA. Environmental issues including the mandatory EIA are the responsibility of the 
Environmental Agency, which is part of the Ministry of Nature, Environment and Energy. 
The division of tasks across three Ministries was introduced in 2013, after amendments 
to the legal framework in 2012 (govmin.gl: MLSA Newsletter 8-01-2014).
The Greenlandic government is facing an increasingly critical society, which is losing 
both its personal and institutionalised trust in the country’s politicians and governing 
authorities. There are a number of reasons for the decreasing level of trust in the 
government and its decisions. First of all, the distance between decision makers 
and local communities has steadily grown and still continues to do so. This is making 
personal trust, based on interaction, harder to achieve. As many decisions regarding 
oil and gas development are made at a national level by the government in Nuuk, the 
capital of Greenland, local communities are not directly involved in the decision making 
process anymore. This is especially the case when it comes to oil and gas development, 
because this policy domain is regarded to be a matter of national strategic importance 
and is therefore predominantly governed by national government authorities. Local 
government authorities, such as the municipalities who are the closest point of contact 
for many citizens, have a limited role in the national decision making process (personal 
communication - interview KANUKOKA Municipalities Association of Greenland 2016). 
Although the municipalities do have an official seat at the table during the negotiations 
of an IBA, it is the national government who ultimately decides upon the planning and 
the exact location of the activities (personal communication – interview KANUKOKA 
2016). As trust building in Greenland is generally linked to individual persons (for 
example people might vote for a completely different political party if a specific person 
has switched from one to another) (personal communication – interview CSR Greenland 
2016), the positive influence that interaction with a representative of the political system 
can have on the level of institutionalised trust, is therefore undermined (personal 
communication – interview KANUKOKA 2016).
Institutionalised trust (generated by the perception of having the right set of 
competencies and operating based on a shared set of values) is currently under 
pressure as well. Several civil society organisations and companies are questioning 
whether the government authorities possess a sufficient level of competencies and 
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skills to secure favourable conditions and interests of Greenland in the negotiations 
with the IOCs (personal communication – interview Greenland School of Minerals 
& Petroleum, CSR Greenland 2016; Aaen 2012; Transparency Greenland 2012). The 
government authorities recognise the decreasing level of competence-based trust, but 
are confident about their own capacity and that they are able to secure Greenlandic 
interests (personal communication – interview MLSA and Ministry of Industry, Labour 
and Trade 2016). However, society has not yet been convinced. The decreasing level of 
trust in the national government is fostered by the lack of openness and transparency 
and the feeling that concerns of people are not sufficiently taken into account by the 
government due to their eagerness to generate additional income.
The integrity of government authorities and politicians is also under pressure. The 
central authorities on oil and gas development, the MLSA and the MIMR, have been 
and to some extent are still perceived as closed institutes (personal communication – 
interview WWF 2016; Aaen 2012; Transparency Greenland 2012). It can be questioned 
whether the general public is aware of the values and principles on which these 
government authorities operate. In the recent past, also the integrity-based trust in 
the political leadership has been jeopardised. This is illustrated by the resignation of 
the previous Prime Minister (Aleqa Hammond) after 1.5 years, based on the accusation 
of misusing public funds for flights and hotels (The Arctic Journal 2016).
Politicians and the political system in general are not only facing a decreasing level 
of trust, also their legitimacy is under pressure. The MLSA and MIMR are criticized 
for lacking transparency and openness in their decision making processes, as well as 
insufficient information sharing with the public (personal communication – interview 
WWF 2016; Aaen 2012; Transparency Greenland 2012). Combined with the often 
difficult technical language and the use of English in a number of documents, this 
has resulted in a critical attitude from civil society towards the government. The 
government’s inability to make all documents available in a way that is understandable 
for Greenlandic people who do not or to a very limited extent speak English and/or 
Danish, is further undermining the throughput legitimacy and in turn decreasing the 
levels of institutionalised trust.
5.4.2 The legal license: a strong legal framework, but weak from a social perspective
In 2009 the Self Rule government created a new legal framework for oil and gas 
developments by means of the MRA. When formulating the legal framework, the laws 
and regulations of other (Arctic) countries such as Norway and the United States were 
taken as an example. The aim of the MRA is to ensure that the oil and gas exploration 
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and anticipated production activities are securely conducted in terms of safety, health, 
environment, social responsibility and according to international best practice (Mineral 
Resources Act, Part 1, 1). The regulatory framework obliges oil companies to conduct an 
EIA and a SSIA for their activities in Greenland. Based on the SSIA, an IBA is negotiated 
between the company and the national and local government authorities of Greenland. 
Although the regulatory framework is considered strong on paper, the government’s 
capacity to enforce it is being questioned (personal communication – interview CSR 
Greenland 2016; Transparency Greenland 2012). The level of trust in the legal system 
is thus very much linked to the level of competence-based trust in the government 
authorities that are tasked to execute what is in the legal framework.
Sparked by the decreasing levels of trust in the government and the lack of openness 
and transparency in the decision making process, a number of amendments have been 
introduced to the regulatory framework in 2012 and 2014. In 2014 new requirements 
concerning the public consultation process were introduced to ensure the involvement 
of stakeholders early on in the process. Prior to submission of the EIA and SSIA, the 
project proponent (i.e. the oil company) needs to submit a project description for a 
35-day public pre-consultation (Mineral Resources Act, Part 18a, 87a). Afterwards the 
project proponent can continue drafting the EIA and SSIA, taking on the comments 
received during the pre-consultation. When the EIA and SSIA have been drafted and 
submitted, a public consultation period of 8 weeks is initiated with the possibility to 
extend. Furthermore, it is mandatory to hold public meetings in the villages or towns 
affected by the project.
Throughput legitimacy and the opportunities to interact and build a relationship based 
on personal trust have increased as a function of the new moments to consult the public 
earlier on in the decision making process. However, building personal trust cannot 
be guaranteed by a legal framework itself. It can only be stimulated by incorporating 
the requirements for multiple phases of stakeholder interaction (e,g, pre-consultation 
and consultation). The legal framework aims to increase the input legitimacy by 
stimulating companies to reach out to as many stakeholders as possible during the 
public consultation process, such as the prescribed public consultation meetings 
in the potentially affected villages and towns. To ensure the best possible results in 
practice, the Greenlandic government has published the ‘Guidelines for Social Impact 
Assessments’. In these guidelines international companies can find more information 
about stakeholder identification in the Greenlandic context (Naalakkersuisut 2016). 
After the regulatory changes in 2014, this document has recently been revised and 
updated according to the new legal framework so as to include the new procedures that 
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introduce more public consultation moments in the decision making process (interview 
– Greenland Representative in Copenhagen).
Ultimately, the outcome of the procedures set forth in the legal framework is a legal 
license (i.e. a permit). This permit allows the project proponent to legally conduct its 
activities in Greenland. The aim of the legal framework and the activities it approves is to 
contribute to the diversification of the Greenlandic economy and welfare of Greenlandic 
society. The legitimacy of the license and thus the activity in itself is very much output-
oriented, focussing on its contribution to society in economic terms. However, the 
economic benefits and thus the output legitimacy can only be fully materialised if 
Greenlanders participate in the industry’s activities. This is a challenge, due to the high 
level requirements regarding technical qualifications and language skills of the workforce 
as set by the oil and gas industry in combination with the relatively low education level 
of the Greenlandic society (Bertelsen et al. 2016; personal communication – Greenland 
School of Minerals & Petroleum, Greenland Petroleum Services 2016). In this context, 
efforts related to human capital development are of great importance and contribute to 
the capacity of people to grasp the employment opportunities when they arise (Smits 
et al. 2016); such efforts have the potential to improve the output legitimacy of oil and 
gas developments in Greenland.
5.4.3 The social license: increased awareness and empowerment
The level and intensity of oil and gas activities in Greenland has been far from consistent. 
The most extensive activities in the recent past have been the eight exploration drills 
conducted by Cairn Energy in 2010 and 2011. At the start of this century, when the 
attention for Greenlandic hydrocarbon potential was on the rise, Greenlandic people 
and organisations had little experience and knowledge about the oil and gas sector. 
There were however high expectations about the benefits that the development of 
these activities would bring to Greenland. The exploration drilling activities gave rise to 
a public debate. The debate was initiated in relation to the public hearings concerning 
the exploration drilling activities. NGOs started to pose questions, handed in hearing 
comments during the public consultation moments and educated citizens on their 
rights in the decision making process (personal communication – interview Ministry 
of Industry, Labour and Trade, ICC Greenland 2016). The questions related to the risks 
and potential negative impacts of the activities added a critical voice to the decision 
making process and gave rise to even more questions from both citizens and politicians.
Greenlandic civil society consists of a number of organisations, many of which are driven 
by only a few people each. Examples of NGOs that are present in Greenland are CSR 
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Greenland, Transparency International, ICC Greenland and WWF. Greenpeace is active in 
Greenland, albeit without representation on the ground. The presence of environmental 
NGOs is still a delicate issue due to the anti-whaling and -sealing campaigns in the 
1980s. CSR Greenland and Transparency International, have been established specifically 
because of the anticipated oil and gas industry. These NGOs have helped educate local 
businesses and create general awareness on requirements related to health, safety 
and CSR (personal communication – interview CSR Greenland, Greenland Petroleum 
Services 2016). More recently these two NGOs have altered their agenda, since a basic 
level of awareness is present and the oil and gas activities have come to a halt. Other 
NGOs, such as the ICC Greenland, are informing local communities on their rights in the 
decision making process and the principle of free, prior and informed consent.
The IOCs are not originally Greenlandic and are not necessarily represented within local 
communities. The physical and language barriers hamper the communication between 
these companies and local stakeholders. To increase the level of personal trust, local 
community liaison officers hired by the international companies in every community 
could facilitate the interaction with local stakeholders, as they function as a channel 
for the company to inform people about their activities and for the community to voice 
their concerns about the company’s activities (personal communication – interview Shell 
2016). However, this approach involves a lot of training, time and upfront investment, 
which conflicts with the relatively short and ad hoc nature of the early stage exploratory 
activities related to oil and gas in Greenland.
The presence or absence of a social license to operate can be determined based on the 
level of protest that arises in society. However, large scale societal unrest in terms of 
demonstrations or protest marches did not occur in Greenland. Given the fact that no large 
scale oil and gas activities have taken place in Greenland since 2011, it remains difficult 
to assess whether a social license to operate for these activities would actually exist or 
not. However, in parallel to the oil and gas activities, mining activities are being conducted 
in Greenland. For the execution of their activities both industries demand an extensive 
geological knowledge base, the use of advanced technologies and heavy machinery.
Even though the oil and gas and mining industry are often mentioned in the same 
context, they also have particular differences. In Greenland the oil and gas activities 
mainly take place offshore whereas the mining activities take place onshore. At present, 
some of the mining activities are in or nearing construction and production. The oil 
and gas activities on the other hand have not yet exceeded the early stages of the 
exploration phase, with the exploration drilling of Cairn Energy in 2010/2011 being 
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the most advanced (www.govmin.gl). While the some of the largest IOCs are involved 
in the exploration for offshore oil and gas resources, the mining exploration activities 
are mainly executed by small, junior companies (www.govmin.gl). Given the location 
and scale of the activities and the associated skill requirements, it is likely that the 
onshore mining activities generate more employment compared to the offshore oil 
and gas activities (personal communication – interview Greenland School of Minerals 
& Petroleum, Greenland Petroleum Services 2016).
The protest movements that have been formed after the drilling activities of Cairn 
Energy finished in 2011 are illustrative of the increased level of awareness of 
extractive industries in Greenland (personal communication – interview KANUKOKA 
2016). Examples are the Nuup Kangerluata Ikinngutai (Friends of Nuuk Fjord) protest 
movement against the iron ore mine near Nuuk, and the Urani Naamik! (No to uranium) 
movement against the rare earth / uranium mine in South Greenland. These protest 
movements were sparked by environmental concerns, the feeling that the government 
did not pay attention to the stakeholders’ point of view and did not hear their critical 
voices during the hearing process (Nuttall 2015). As no large oil and gas activities have 
taken place after these protest movements towards the mining industry, it is unclear 
whether they will be formed against oil and gas activities in the future.
In general there existed and is still existing a willingness among Greenlandic people, 
organisations and companies to engage with the IOCs (personal communication - 
interview CSR Greenland 2016). The positive attitude towards the oil companies is 
primarily driven by the awareness that the economy needs diversification to enhance 
job opportunities (personal communication – interview NunaOil, CSR Greenland, 
KANUKOKA 2016). Over time, also the awareness among Greenlandic people and 
civil society organisations about the risks of offshore oil and gas activities has risen. 
People are aware of the potential environmental impacts and what this could mean 
for traditional activities like fishing and hunting for seals or other marine mammals. 
However, the general perception of the interviewed Greenlandic stakeholders is 
that in the end people and politicians will favour the economic benefits (related to 
the perception of increased welfare and a potential future independence) over 
the  environmental concerns (personal communication – interview CSR Greenland, 
KANUKOKA, WWF, Greenland Petroleum Services 2016).
The IBA is a legal requirement that is aiming to maximise the economic benefits for 
society in Greenland. The funds that are associated with an IBA are divided in a fund for 
educational purposes and a fund for cultural purposes. Both funds are governed by a 
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committee, consisting of various Greenlandic stakeholders (personal communication 
– interview Greenland School of Minerals & Petroleum 2016). In case multiple oil and 
gas companies have an IBA with the government at the same time, all contributions are 
deposited in the same fund. By having an impartial committee deciding on the allocation 
of the money that is deposited in the fund, the level of transparency is enhanced. By 
having an impartial committee, a company cannot be accused of ‘buying’ its social 
license to operate by funding specific projects or stakeholder groups directly. The 
education fund is aiming to raise the level of education and support the development 
of qualifications necessary to participate in the industrial activities. This is enhancing 
the chances for people to grasp the economic benefits in terms of employment, thereby 
providing a stronger basis for economic output legitimacy.
In order for a social license to operate to exist in Greenlandic society, the main elements 
are economic and educational benefits (personal communication – all interviews 
2016), with an open and transparent decision making process in which the concerns 
of society are addressed. In terms of trust and legitimacy, the social license to operate 
is mainly based on economic output legitimacy and throughput legitimacy combined 
with building of personal trust.
5.5 Trust and legitimacy as key elements in the interaction between the 
political, legal and social licenses in Greenland
Given the context of the three licenses as elaborated upon in the previous section, this 
part of the chapter analyses the role of trust and legitimacy in the interaction between 
the political, legal and social license to operate. Although large scale societal unrest 
concerning offshore oil and gas development has not occurred in Greenland to date, 
one cannot conclude that there is a social license to operate. Interestingly, the critique 
of Greenlandic civil society and companies about the distribution of local benefits and 
a lack of information with regards to oil and gas exploration is not so much aiming at 
the oil and gas companies, but is rather aiming at the government.
As this case study shows, the expected economic benefits mainly generate the 
acceptance of oil and gas activities in Greenland. However, the capacity of the 
government to secure and maximise these economic benefits, while at the same time 
effectively dealing with the environmental and social risks, is questioned by Greenlandic 
society and NGOs. This is further enhanced by the feeling of citizens and NGOs that 
the government is not taking into account their concerns raised during the public 
consultations. Driven by a focus on additional income and economic diversification, 
the government would not be sufficiently critical towards the international companies 
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that bring in the new activities. In addition, the integrity of the political system in general 
is being put under pressure as a result of recent scandals. The lack of openness and 
transparency of the main responsible government authorities in the decision making 
process related to oil and gas projects, has not helped to convince societal actors that 
the government is acting in their interest. It can thus be concluded that the level of 
competence based institutionalised trust is low, the integrity based institutionalised 
trust in the government is under pressure and also the throughput legitimacy is low. As 
a result, citizens and NGOs demand a larger formal role in the decision making process.
The Greenlandic government is trying to act on this critique by proactively amending 
the legal framework. Trying to accommodate the requirements of societal actors, 
the Greenlandic government has already amended the regulatory framework twice 
since 2009. The changes included amongst others more public consultation and a 
restructuring of government authorities to divide responsibilities. These measures 
were implemented to create more openness and transparency, to enhance the feeling 
that stakeholders can meaningfully participate in the decision-making process and to 
increase the opportunities for personal trust building through interaction. Due to the 
changes that have been introduced over the past years, a number of social license to 
operate elements related to openness and transparency, as well as personal trust are 
now formalised in the legal framework.
The proactive attitude of the government has both positive and negative consequences. 
The positive side is that citizens and NGOs have the feeling that something is being done 
and that the government is willing to improve. Furthermore, the wish of stakeholders to 
get a larger formal role in the national decision making process is being accommodated. 
However, having people meaningfully participate in the extended consultation process 
is a challenge in terms of both physical and intellectual accessibility to the consultation 
process. As the offshore oil and gas activities could potentially affect a large coastal 
area, it is a logistical challenge to give every local community a chance to be involved 
in the decision making process (personal communication – interview NunaOil 2016). 
Many cities and villages are isolated from each other and can only be reached by 
airplane/helicopter, if the weather is good, or by ship, if the waters are not frozen. 
Furthermore, the level of English and sometimes also Danish can be very low. Ensuring 
that everybody can meaningfully participate and contribute to the decision making 
process, requires that people understand the information documents and what is being 
said. Given that the amount of Greenlandic translators is limited and need to compete 
with other international industries, such as the mining activities, it is a challenge to make 
all information accessible in time. To assist the international companies in this challenge, 
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the national oil company of Greenland, NunaOil, supports them in overcoming some of 
the logistical and language barriers by providing assistance in arranging a proper means 
of travel and translating services (personal communication – interview NunaOil 2016).
Moreover, changing the regulatory framework by adding requirements to the 
procedures for obtaining a legal license can negatively influence the decisions of 
international companies to invest in oil and gas activities in Greenland. Frequent 
changes can create an image that the rules of the game are fluid, making long term 
investment decision more risky. At the start of the investment no one knows what the 
future will bring and what the financial implications of the potential changes will be. 
Especially since Arctic operations are already more expensive than oil and gas activities 
elsewhere in the world, a stable political climate and clear rules of the game are even 
more important for investors.
The Greenlandic government, as an important actor in the political license, is not only 
proactively changing the regulatory framework to improve the level of trust in society 
and make its decisions more legitimate, but it is also playing a large role in facilitating 
the relationship between international companies and local stakeholders. The national 
government is taking the lead in the consultation process, initiates the town meetings 
and arranges a translator (Mineral Resources Act, part 18a, 87). By doing this, the 
government succeeds in creating an easy to work environment for the international 
companies, next to the logistical and technical challenges they face when developing 
activities in Greenland. On the one hand this is beneficial for the oil companies, who 
are still in the exploration phase and activities are performed while keeping expenses 
as low as possible and with an exit plan in mind (personal communication – interview 
Shell). However, as a consequence the government is taking on more responsibilities, 
while its capacities are already questioned.
Local people often address their complaints or concerns regarding a specific project 
or company to government authorities, rather than to a company itself (personal 
communication – interview Greenland Government 2016). Society predominantly 
considers the government to be mainly responsible for the oil and gas development. 
Due to the active role of the government in the entire decision making process, 
companies themselves are less visible. This creates a threshold for society to come 
into contact with them and making it easier to hold the government responsible. The 
large role of the government combined with the historically close connection between 
local communities and NGOs on the one hand and public sector decision makers on the 
other hand (personal communication – interview CSR Greenland 2016), is fostering this 
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process. This is even further enhanced by the absence of a requirement for companies 
to have a grievance mechanism in place until recently (personal communication – 
interview Greenland Government 2016).
On the one hand, the proactive attitude of the government and formalisation of 
society’s requirements into the legal framework is positive for companies, because it 
facilitates stakeholder engagement and people voice their critique to the government 
in the first place. However, on the other hand there is also a risk for the companies 
in the increased responsibilities of the government: Due to the limited capacity of 
the government to execute the increased number of responsibilities, induced by the 
additional requirements in the legal framework, society is not necessarily satisfied. 
Combined with the low level of competence and integrity based institutional trust in 
the political system and the perceived lack of throughput legitimacy of the decision 
making process governed by the authorities, companies cannot assume a social license 
to operate already exists. The absence of a social license to operate voiced as critique 
towards the government might not directly harm companies or their reputation. It is 
nevertheless likely to affect the decision making process regarding their legal license 
to operate due to a lack of or decreasing level of political license.
5.6 Conclusion
The social license to operate concept has emerged to address a worldwide trend of 
increasingly empowered civil society actors combined with a decreasing level of trust in 
the political and legal system. Remarkably, existing scholarly literature does not discuss 
the interdependencies between the emerging social license to operate concept on the 
one hand and political and legal licenses to operate on the other.
This chapter used a more integrated approach by studying the role of trust and 
legitimacy related to the social, legal and political licenses: The political license is 
mostly dependent on institutionalised trust and input legitimacy, whereas the legal 
license is predominantly focussing on throughput and output legitimacy combined 
with institutionalised trust. The emphasis of the social license to operate is in contrast 
on personal trust, output and throughput legitimacy. It can thus be argued that the 
licenses are complementary to each other, as each have a different emphasis with 
regards to trust and legitimacy.
Based on a lack of throughput legitimacy, integrity- and competence-based trust, 
Greenlandic stakeholders have put pressure on the political system outside the 
regular election procedures. It illustrates how the level of the social license to operate 
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is influencing the political license, which in turn influences the legal license: The 
legal framework now includes an increased number of mandatory interactions with 
stakeholders to enhance throughput legitimacy and personal trust building via face-
to-face interaction. Furthermore, by redefining the responsibilities of government 
authorities, the legal framework is also used to increase the level of integrity-based 
institutional trust. Instead of substituting for any existing gaps, a social license to 
operate can thus enhance a legal license. The legal license can in turn contribute to 
establishing a social license to operate as well.
It can however be questioned whether the proactive role of the government will have 
the desired effect, namely broad societal support for the development of oil and gas 
activities. The relationship between the government, as the main actor involved in the 
legal and political licenses, and society is far from optimal. It is doubtful whether this 
will improve after the recent legal and political changes. Critique on the government still 
exists, but large scale public protests related to future oil and gas activities have not 
occurred in Greenland to date. However, the most recent exploration drilling activities 
took place in 2010 and 2011, while the amendments to the legal framework were made 
in 2012 and 2014. Since then most oil and gas activities have come to a halt, making it 
difficult to assess whether protest would arise if activities would be developed today. 
Given the status of the relationship between Greenlandic society and the government, it 
could be more beneficial for a social license to operate of oil and gas activities when the 
involved companies take on a more proactive role, in cooperation with the government.
The analysis in this chapter shows that an integrated approach towards a social license 
to operate, in which the role of the political and legal licenses is taken into account, helps 
to understand the way in which trust and legitimacy for a certain activity are shaped. A 
number of initial expectations have been put forward about the specific way in which 
the different licenses contribute to the acceptance of an activity by society at large. 
Further research will have to be conducted to find out which conditions influence the 
way in which the different types of trust and legitimacy are related to each of the three 
licenses identified.
CHAPTER
6
Multi-level dynamics in a social license 
to operate: What can we learn from 
Arctic oil and gas development?
C.C.A. Smits
J. van Leeuwen
T.F. Huber
J.P.M. van Tatenhove
Perseverance
134
Chapter 6
ABSTRACT
The transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy has environmental, spatial 
as well as social and economic consequences, as new infrastructure for the 
production, transportation and storage of (renewable) energy will arise. Both 
(existing) fossil fuel and renewable energy activities face social resistance. The 
social license to operate concept is used in a growing body of literature to study 
social resistance against energy activities, but predominantly uses a local level 
perspective. However, the production, transportation and storage of energy 
is not solely a local or national affair. Noting this contradiction between a local 
empirical and conceptual focus of the social license to operate literature and the 
emergence of a strong international public debate regarding energy projects, we 
expect there is a need to reconceptualise the social license to operate concept to 
consider these international dynamics. This chapter therefore explores a multilevel 
approach towards the social license to operate, by developing a set of hypotheses 
and a typology for the interaction of the social license at multiple levels. We draw 
on various examples within the energy domain that are or have been subject 
to societal debate, including the development of oil and gas in the Arctic and 
renewable energy in Europe.
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6.1 INTRODUCTION
Reducing CO2 emissions to minimise the effects of global climate change is high on the 
agenda in many countries in the world. The objective set by the Paris Agreement (2015) 
to limit global warming to 1,5 degree Celsius requires a transformation of the energy 
sector. To reach these objectives the share of renewable energy should grow, while 
the use of fossil fuel has to decline (International Energy Agency 2017). The transition 
from fossil fuels to renewable energy has environmental, spatial as well as social and 
economic consequences, as new infrastructure for the production, transportation 
and storage of (renewable) energy will arise. With the heightened urge to switch to 
renewable energy, the exploitation of non-renewable energy resources, such as oil and 
gas, is becoming increasingly subject to societal debate. Both existing activities (such 
as gas extraction in Groningen (the Netherlands), and new exploration initiatives (such 
as oil and gas exploration in the Arctic) face social resistance. 
There is an increasing body of literature that studies resistance against the 
implementation of mining and energy activities, by using the concept of ‘Social License to 
Operate’ (Hall et al. 2015; Yates and Horvath 2013). This body of literature predominantly 
focusses on local level resistance to such industrial developments, both conceptually 
as well as empirically. The social license to operate concept addresses the emergence 
of increasingly critical civil society organisations and citizens at a local level that seeks 
to have influence on the development of large industrial activities. The capacity of 
local communities and civil society to delay or postpone permit procedures indefinitely 
has made companies and governments recognise the importance of obtaining and 
maintaining the consent of these stakeholders (Franks et al. 2014; Harvey & Bice 2014; 
International Council for Mines and Metals 2010). 
However, debates on climate change, the energy transition and associated energy 
development projects are debated internationally and a strong civil society exists 
that fuels this debate. Some examples are the Urgenda lawsuit against the Dutch 
government to accelerate carbon emission cuts and the #SavetheArctic campaign by 
Greenpeace. Also in other ways, the production, transportation and storage of energy 
is not solely a local affair, for example commodity prices for fossil fuels (i.e. oil and gas) 
are global and renewable energy asks for transnational cooperation due to fluctuations 
in production and (currently) limited opportunities for large scale storage.  Noting this 
contradiction between a local empirical and conceptual focus of the social license to 
operate literature and the emergence of a strong international public debate regarding 
energy projects, we expect there is a need to reconceptualise the social license to 
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operate concept to consider these international dynamics. This chapter therefore 
explores a multilevel approach towards the social license to operate. 
Given that the social license literature does not incorporate these multi-level dynamics, 
this chapter will offer a conceptual exploration of how the social license to operate 
manifests itself in a multilevel setting. In doing so it will develop a set of hypotheses 
and a typology for the interaction of the social license at multiple levels. We will draw 
on various examples within the energy domain that are or have been subject to societal 
debate, including the development of oil and gas in the Arctic as one of the most 
controversial energy activities of the last decade and the development of renewable 
energy in Europe. This set of examples does not only explore the differences between 
more authoritarian and deliberative state organisations, but also takes a closer look 
at both fossil and renewable energy development. 
The chapter thereby aims to contribute to the current social license to operate 
discussion and theory. The conceptual contribution to the social license to operate 
concept presented in this chapter are based on empirical research, which includes 
primary data that was mainly obtained in two rounds of semi-structured interviews 
(2011 and 2016) with national and international actors involved in the oil and gas 
development in Greenland. The concepts presented in this chapter build on empirical 
findings about authority of Greenland (Smits et al.2014b), the role of human capital 
development in the social license to operate of Arctic energy development (Smits 
et al. 2016), and  trust and legitimacy in the social license to operate of oil and gas 
development in Greenland (Smits et al. 2017).
Section 6.2 provides a brief summary of the traditional focus of the social license to 
operate concept. Section 6.3 elaborates upon globalisation and social license to operate 
processes. Section 6.4 considers the conditions for overlap to occur (or not) between 
the same licenses on different levels (nationally and internationally). It also explores 
the consequences of the potential (lack of) overlap. In Section 6.5, this chapter puts 
forward a number of hypothetical situations in which the licenses are presented as fully 
separated, fully overlapping as well as a number of hybrid situations in which licenses 
partly overlap. In Section 6.6, it is examined how in the case of oil and gas development 
in Greenland, the political, legal and social licenses manifest itself in a multilevel context 
and what we can learn from this empirical example. Section 6.7 outlined the conclusions 
and suggestions for further research. 
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6.2 Current conceptualisation of the social license to operate 
The social license to operate concept, recognizing the increasing ability of communities 
and civil society to effectively express their concerns, studies how this growing unrest 
in society influences the development of large, industrial activities. Generally, the 
social license to operate concept is defined as the ongoing acceptance and approval 
of an activity by local communities and other stakeholders (Thomson & Boutilier 2011; 
Parsons & Moffat 2014; Prno 2013). The literature has studied the factors that lead 
to obtaining a social license and how the existence (and absence) of a social license 
can be measured (Moffat & Zhang 2014; Parsons et al. 2014; Yates & Horvath 2013; 
Prno 2013; Prno & Slocombe 2012; Thomson & Boutilier 2011). Different forms of trust 
(personal and institutional) and legitimacy (input, throughput and output) are key to 
obtaining and maintaining a social license to operate. (Thomson & Boutilier 2011; Smits 
et al. 2017; Van Tatenhove 2011), ranging from complete rejection to full acceptance (or 
identification) (Thomson & Boutilier 2011)
However, trust and legitimacy of an activity is not only determined by the SLO, but in the 
interaction between the social license with the legal and political licenses (Smits et al. 
2017; Morrison 2014). The emphasis of the different forms of trust and legitimacy differs 
per license (Smits et al. 2017). For example, in general a political license emphasises 
institutionalised trust and input legitimacy, while throughput and output legitimacy 
combined with institutionalised trust are supported through the legal license. The social 
license itself mainly focusses on personal trust, (economic) output and throughput 
legitimacy. Due to their emphasis on different forms of trust and legitimacy, it can be 
argued that the three licenses are complementary to each other (Smits et al. 2017).
Since the rise of the social license to operate concept is driven by empowered citizens 
and civil society organisations, who are increasingly dissatisfied with the implementation 
of industrial activities by private sector companies and the (lack of) enforcement by 
state authorities (Boutilier 2014), the concept and its practical application in industrial 
projects are mainly studied from a company’s perspective within a national level 
context. The focus is mainly on the relation between private sector companies and 
local communities. For example Prno (2013), has studied the social license to operate 
in a national context, focussing on community acceptance in four different case studies 
comprising mining activities in the USA, Canada, Peru and Papua New Guinea. Riabova 
and Didyk (2014) have studied the relationship of two mining and processing companies 
with local communities on the Kola Peninsula and the Murmansk region in Russia. 
Yates and Horvath (2013) illustrated the importance of a local community’s approval or 
acceptance of an activity using three different case studies: A hydroelectric project and 
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a LNG project in Australia, and a LNG project in Indonesia. And Hall et al. (2015) looked 
at energy industries as a whole, to see how the social license to operate concept had 
been translated into practice. These and other studies have provided valuable insights 
and brought social considerations within both projects and companies to the next level. 
Since an activity does not only have a relationship with a local community, but has 
an array of relationships with multiple actors, including governments, some scholars 
have been rather critical to the narrow focus of the literature on communities and 
companies. Identifying those stakeholders that might influence a SLO is in fact one 
of the key challenges (Filer and Gabriel 2018; Wilburn and Wilburn 2011). Extending 
this critique, we argue that the array of stakeholders not only manifests itself on 
the local or national level, but also on the international and transnational level. The 
complex, transnational problems that society faces today go beyond the authority and 
span of control of individual nation states. Also (environmental) concerns and politics 
regarding large industrial activities, such as oil and gas development, do no longer 
confine themselves to the national level. The influence of globalisation and with that 
the increasing influence of transnational actors, politics and societal debates and their 
profound effect on the social license of industrial (energy) activities will only increase 
in the future. 
6.3 Globalisation and social license to operate processes
The social license to operate literature has not yet acknowledged the potential influence 
of globalisation dynamics. While the very origin of the social license to operate concept 
is explained by the failure of the political and legal systems of a nation state and the 
shortcomings of private sector companies in the local implementation of an activity, 
the concept in its current form does not analyse the way in which globalised civil society 
and policy networks change national and local social license to operate processes. 
Worldwide protest actions against Arctic oil and gas, but also against climate change 
and rainforest destruction illustrate the increasingly international character of civil 
society activity. Protest actions are often executed locally, like scaling a drilling rig, but 
are supported, sparked, organised and debated in the (international) digital world on 
social media. Internet and social media enable citizens around the world to connect 
with each other faster and against lower cost than ever before. Citizens increasingly 
use (social) media and the internet to seek information and stress their point of view 
at any moment in time (Cullen-Knox et al. 2017; Yates & Horvath 2013). 
To incorporate a multilevel component in the social license to operate concept, we 
build upon the theory of Rosenau (2003). Rosenau focusses on the role of nation states 
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at both the national and international level, thereby providing useful input for the 
operationalisation of multilevel political and legal licenses as part of the social license 
to operate concept. He states that over the last decades, the role of nation states has 
been transforming due to a number of social changes, including globalisation and the 
empowerment of citizens and civil society. These social changes do not only affect the 
political and economic domains within countries, they also drive a de-territorialisation of 
politics (Rosenau 1997, 2003, 2006). This de-territorialisation has led to the emergence 
of horizontal relations in networked governance arrangements and to a multi-centric 
world, where there is a whole plethora of sovereign-free actors that gain power and 
authority (Rosenau 2003). Rosenau stresses that a bifurcated system has emerged in 
which actors in the state-centric world compete, cooperate, interact or coexist with 
counterparts in a multicentre world comprised of an array of diverse actors and rule 
systems. This has implications for especially the political and legal licenses of energy 
projects as a multitude of political and legal forums, at different levels, can influence 
the political and legal licenses of local energy developments. 
The skills revolution of citizens in turn provide for a stronger civil society. In the multilevel 
dynamics of civil society in this networked, multi-centric world, internet and social 
media play an important role. They enable networks to share information instantly, 
coordinate actions and manage complexity while retaining flexibility (Castells 2000). It 
also allows networks to grow and become truly global, as the high costs associated with 
geographical distances and thus the international information exchange via air travel, 
mail or telephone and the associated language barriers have vanished (Keck & Sikkink 
1999). Information is increasingly accessible, shared and contested via internet, which is 
in turn increasingly easy to access on tablets and smartphones for large groups in the 
world (Pew Research Center 2016). Castells’ concept of the network society provides 
useful input on the operationalisation of an international level social license to operate. 
Individual citizens and/or NGOs are the most important actors driving societal debate. 
Internet and social media offer citizens and NGOs a means of what Castells (2007) 
calls ‘mass self-communication’ meaning “many-to-many in the sending and receiving 
of messages in a multimodal form of communication that bypasses mass media and often 
escapes government control”. It can be used as space for dialogue and a tool to mobilise 
large groups of people instantly. Furthermore it works in a way that closely connects to 
the very nature of NGOs who, together with individual citizens, drive the international 
societal debate on energy issues in practice: they use simple messages supported by 
strong images to convey a message and influence social change (Castells 2008). Since 
internet and social media are local and global at the same time, they can be regarded 
as an important means of connecting different (social) licenses on the different levels. 
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It is this mutual influence and potential tension of the interaction between licenses on 
multiple levels that is explored further in the remainder of this chapter. 
6.4 Exploring the conditions and consequences of overlapping and 
separate licenses on the national and international level
In exploring a multilevel conceptualization of the social license to operate concept 
we first examine under what conditions and with which consequences the individual 
political, legal and social licenses overlap or exist separately on the national and 
international level. For the purpose of this hypothetical exercise only the two extremes 
are being considered: The national and international licenses are either fully overlapping 
and can therefore be regarded as one, or the licenses are not overlapping at all and 
can therefore be regarded to be separate. 
When considering the connection between the same licenses on different levels, the 
authors note that the speed with which the licenses connect with each other on different 
levels may also vary. Internet and social media play a major role in the social license 
to operate and have the ability to connect large groups of people and organisations 
instantly. The connection between legal licenses on multiple levels is often much 
slower and of a more indirect nature: The effect of international binding agreements 
on national level legislation might take years. The connection between the national and 
international political license lies somewhere in between: Formal international political 
decisions can take years to trickle down in national realities, while national politicians 
nowadays also increasingly use internet and social media to convey their (international) 
point of view and thereby try to influence people’s minds and social change directly.
6.4.1 Conditions for and consequences of overlapping or separate political licenses
In order to be able to speak about one political license, where the national and 
international levels fully overlap, hypothetically a strong international political forum 
or government should exist. This would mean that (a large part of) the political mandate 
of nation states has been transferred to the international level. In this situation, core 
decisions on global topics (in this case energy development) would be taken at the 
international level. The influence of the international level on national level politics 
would be large, as the main decisions would be taken internationally. Consequently, 
the distance between decision makers and local communities would grow. 
Separate national and international political licenses would exist when the core 
decisions in e.g. the energy domain are taken at the national level. In this case, 
international political decisions are marginal and would not have a major influence 
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on national level politics. As a consequence, international stakeholders that want to 
influence political decisions will have to aim at national level decision making processes. 
Achieving alignment between nation states on global issues such as energy (transition) 
would be time consuming, as global goals (less CO2 emissions from fossil fuels) do not 
necessarily match national interests (job creation and tax income from oil and gas 
activities).
6.4.2 Conditions for and consequences of overlapping or separate legal licenses
If an overarching, binding international legal framework for (Arctic) oil and gas activities 
would exist, one could imagine that the national and international legal licenses would 
fully overlap and therefore be one. This would mean that the same conditions for oil 
and gas activities would apply to all Arctic countries, thereby creating a level playing field 
for international oil companies and enabling knowledge transfer and capacity exchange 
between countries. The enforcement of the legal framework could for example be 
organised internationally with the help of national departments, so as to ensure to be 
close to the locations where the activities are actually being implemented. Having one 
international legal framework in place would leave nation states with fewer possibilities 
to amend the legal license and tailor it to local concerns.
Separate legal licenses would exist when there is hardly any/no interaction between 
the national and the international legal licenses. This could be the case when nation 
states decide not to be part of the few international binding agreements that exist in 
relation to oil and gas activities. When the majority of the (Arctic) states is not part of 
an international agreement or hardly any/no international agreements exist at all, it is 
likely to result in a fragmented Arctic governance setting for oil and gas activities: Each 
country has its own legal framework and conditions that companies need to comply 
with. The enforcement of the legal framework would in this case depend on national 
authorities and their individual capacities (or lack thereof). 
6.4.3 Conditions for and consequences of overlapping or separate social licenses
One could envisage that when the goals, values and beliefs of the national and 
international social licenses are the same and when individuals and organisations of 
the national level are active on the international level (and vice versa), the social licenses 
of both levels fully overlap and can therefore be regarded as one. This means that 
citizens and/or national civil society organisations are immersed in and co-shaping the 
societal debate held on the international level, and the international debate is in turn 
shaping the national level societal debate. It is hypothesised that the licenses of both 
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levels can only fully overlap when all actors have access to the debate and no barriers 
exist in terms of for example language proficiency and internet access.
Two separate licenses could be identified when there is hardly or no connection between 
the national and international level societal debates. This could be the case when there 
is limited access from the national level to the international level societal debate, for 
example because of limited internet access or language barriers. Divergent stakes and 
viewpoints regarding the same activity could also be a reason of a lack of connection 
between both levels, resulting in contradicting licenses. These contradictions could 
make it difficult to balance the stakes of both societal debates for the proponent of 
an activity, if the actor is active on both levels (such as an international oil company). 
It should be noted that the social license to operate is always an ongoing process that 
runs throughout the entire lifetime of an activity. It can change over time, meaning 
that also the degree to which the social licenses of the national and international level 
overlap might change.
6.5 Exploring the multilevel interaction between licenses and the 
influence on the local implementation of an activity
Now that we have explored the conditions under which the national political, legal or 
social licenses can overlap with or be separate from its counterpart at the international 
level, we can start to conceptualise how the interaction between all licenses manifests 
itself. In order to do so, we develop a number of typologies in which the interaction 
between licenses is explored. We first identify three main categories of multilevel social 
license to operate processes, based on the level of overlap (fully overlapping, partly 
overlapping, not overlapping). In a second step we further operationalise the hybrid 
type of partly overlapping licenses as this category in itself can come in various forms. 
The full set of types are:
1. All licenses are separate: Each license occurs both at the national and the 
international level, but there is no multilevel interaction between the licenses.
2. All licenses are one: Each license fully overlaps with its national/international 
counterpart.
3. Licenses are partly overlapping. To further operationalise this, three hybrid types 
can be distinguished based on which licenses partly overlap: 
a) There is one social license (national and international fully overlap), but there 
are separate political and legal licenses on both levels.
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b) There is one political license and one legal license (for these two licenses 
the national and international level fully overlap), but the social license is 
separate.
c) All licenses partly overlap with their national/international counterpart.
We do recognize however, that not all types mentioned above are likely to occur in 
practice. Type 1 and 2 are considered to represent the extremes (fully separated and 
fully overlapping) and are mentioned above to provide a complete overview. Type 1, 
where there is no interaction between licenses at all, is in the current globalised world 
not likely to occur. This is even more the case with regards to energy developments, 
as there is always interaction between international and national level via political and 
policy processes as well as market prices and investment decisions. Type 2, where all 
licenses fully overlap with their national/international counterpart, is also not likely to 
occur as it would assume that national boundaries have completely evaporated. Since 
energy is still considered to be a matter of national security, this is not considered 
realistic even in the current globalised world.
The hybrid types are therefore regarded to provide the best reflection of the 
interactions that could take place between licenses on different levels. For hybrid type 
a) and b) to occur, it is hypothesised that one legal license for both the national and 
international level can only occur when there is also one political license for both levels. 
The reason is that for such a dominant (international) legal framework to be put in place, 
nation states would have already had to transfer most of their legislative authority to 
the international level. This implies that there is also a political consent and overlap 
between the national and the international level. Below, different cases are used to 
illustrate each of the aforementioned hybrid types: Oil and gas development in Russia 
is illustrative of hybrid type a), renewable energy development in Europe is used as 
an example of hybrid type b), and the case of oil and gas development in Greenland is 
used to illustrate hybrid type c). 
6.5.1 Hybrid type a) One social license, but separate legal and political licenses
In this hybrid type there is one social license to operate, but separate legal and political 
licenses to operate for the national and international level (see Figure 6). This type is 
thought to occur when nation states, as leading actors in the political and legal licenses, 
do hardly/not participate in international governance arrangements and have their 
own regulatory framework. However, citizens and NGOs participate in an international 
societal debate, where shared goals and views are dominant. It could be argued that in 
this type the political and legal licenses on the national level are organised in a state-
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centric and traditional way in which hierarchical power dominates, while the social 
license has evolved to a transnational arrangement. For an (international) proponent 
of an activity this would mean that it is subject to two, potentially conflicting regulatory 
frameworks and political decisions at different levels. It could be hypothesised that 
when the national and international social licenses are one, the social license has a 
greater power to pressure nation states and/or the activity’s proponent in order to 
achieve changes in for example the conditions of political and/or legal licenses and/or 
influence directly the way in which the proponent implements the activity.
Figure 6: One social license, separate legal and political licenses
An example of this type is oil and gas development in Russia. Although Russia is 
part of several international binding (environmental) agreements, such as the Paris 
Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol, the translation into domestic policy is slow (Henry 
and Mc Intosh Sundstrom 2014, 2012) and participation in environmental agreements is 
mainly focussed on achieving other benefits, such as great power status and economic 
advantages (Newell and Henry 2016). During the summer of 2014, it was even considering 
to eliminate environmental impact assessments for projects, including offshore oil and 
gas drilling (ibid.). Illustrative for Russia’s non-interference policy is its withdrawal from 
the Energy Charter Treaty. Russia signed the Energy Charter Treaty in the 1990s, but 
never ratified it because it would have too much influence on domestic policies and the 
management of Russian petroleum resources (Austvik and Lembo 2016). Eventually 
Russia withdrew from the Energy Charter Treaty in 2009 (Roche and Petit 2009). 
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However, the international and national social licenses (consisting of environmental 
NGOs) are well connected. For various reasons it can even be regarded as one social 
license: The licenses share the same goals, values and beliefs, namely to protect the 
environment from the negative impacts of oil and gas activities and to prevent the 
degradation of the existing legal framework. The Russian government is trying to limit 
the (international) influence of this one social license and trying to move the two licenses 
apart, by imposing the Law on Foreign Agents in 2012. This law requires that “public 
organizations receiving foreign funding and engaging in “political activity” register as “foreign 
agents,” pay significant fines, or cease operating” (Newell and Henry 2016). In 2015, a 
number of NGOs with an explicit environmental purpose were registered as foreign 
agents by the Ministry of Justice (ibid.).
In sum, in hypothesising on how the interaction between different licenses at multiple 
levels can look like, this type shows that while the political and legal licenses are different 
at the international and national level, the social license at the international and national 
level could still converge into one. In the case of Russia this has been a result of a 
conscious attempt of the government to keep full control over the political and legal 
decisions on energy developments. 
6.5.2 Hybrid type b) One legal license and one political license, but separate social licenses
Another hybrid type that could occur is that there is one legal license and one 
political license, but that there are separate social licenses to operate for the national 
and international level (see Figure 7). In this type a nation government supports a 
strong political forum that shapes the political license not only internationally but 
also nationally. Moreover, there also exists an international legal framework that has 
been ratified and translated into the national one, creating overlapping legal licenses. 
However, this does not necessarily means that local/national societal stakes (i.e. job 
creation by developing oil and gas activities) do not differ from international societal 
stakes (i.e. combatting climate change by stopping oil and gas activities). 
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Figure 7: One legal and one political license, separate social licenses
It is likely that a continuous power play exists between civil society on both levels, who 
are trying to influence the implementation of the activity via the project proponent and/
or the state actors of the legal and political licenses. This could result in:
• Changes in the political and/or legal licenses; or
• Changes in the practical implementation of the activity (within the boundaries 
of the existing legal framework); or
• Cancellation of the entire activity, due to the impossibility to balance the different 
societal stakes and the risks this could impose on for example the proponent’s 
reputation.
Hypothetically the political license could also get separated into a national and an 
international license (thereby also separating the legal licenses into a national and 
international license). In this case all licenses become separated, corresponding with 
type 1 mentioned at the start of this section.
An example of this type is the development of wind farms on land or near the coast in 
several European countries. The national and international political and legal license 
regarding the development of wind energy in European countries are often very closely 
connected, since the national level development of wind energy is driven by formal 
EU regulations (Directive 2009/28/EC) and international treaties (Paris Agreement). 
International environmental NGOs as part of the international civil society are advocating 
for a transition towards 100% renewable energy generation and see wind energy as a 
solution that contributes to achieving this goal (Greenpeace 2015; Cambridge Econometrics 
for Greenpeace and WWF-UK 2012). However, nationally the development of wind farms on 
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land and near the coast faces societal protest. In the Netherlands Dutch fishermen have 
sailed into Amsterdam as a protest against new offshore wind farms (The Guardian 2018) 
and citizens have organised petitions and other forms of protest against local wind farms on 
land (De Volkskrant 2017; AD 2017); in France fishermen, residents and dockers protested 
against the development of wind farms (The Local 2018). The international and national 
social licenses in these cases are clearly not aligned and can be defined as separate licenses. 
In sum, this hybrid type draws attention to the fact that while both political and legal 
licenses might be strongly influence by international policy making, civil society does 
not necessarily have to be. There can still be differences in the kinds of stakeholders 
and concerns that influence the debate over the activity at the international or national 
level. Indeed renewable energy developments have – in general -  strong civil society 
support at the international level, but face resistance at the local level. 
6.5.3 Hybrid type c) All licenses partly overlap with their national/international counterpart
Another hybrid form that could also be hypothesised, is when none of the licenses 
are fully overlapping nor are they fully separated from their national/international 
counterparts (see Figure 8). An example of this type is the oil and gas development in 
Greenland. Since this is the most complex type with the highest number of licenses and 
interactions involved, a more extensive analysis of this type is presented in the following 
section by using the example of oil and gas development in Greenland.
Figure 8: All licenses partly overlap with their national/international counterpart
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6.6 Oil and gas development in Greenland as an example of a multilevel 
social license to operate
The case of oil and gas development in Greenland illustrates that one activity’s social 
license can be under pressure on both the national and the international levels at the 
same time. What is noteworthy is that the focus of the debates on these two levels is 
different and that both debates do not necessarily interact. They both however have 
the potential to influence the social license and therefore the implementation of the 
activity. Before the political, legal and social licenses are analysed in their multilevel 
context in more detail, the case of oil and gas development in Greenland is introduced. 
6.6.1 Oil and gas development in Greenland: national and international dynamics
Energy development in the Arctic is highly politicised and predominantly a national 
affair. Because energy is a matter of national importance, the majority of the applicable 
rules and regulations are organised at the national level. Similar to other Arctic 
countries, also Greenland expressed its ambition to develop its potential oil and gas 
resources as a means to diversify its economy and become financially independent 
from Denmark (BMP 2009a; BMP 2009b). Some of the world’s largest international oil 
companies obtained licenses to explore for oil and gas resources in Greenlandic waters 
(incl. Shell, BP, Chevron, ENI, Statoil and Conoco Phillips – govmin.gl). During the good 
weather seasons of 2010 and 2011 Cairn Energy drilled eight exploration wells in the 
waters of West Greenland (govmin.gl). These drills were not only subject to a national 
debate, but were at the same time also part of a bigger international debate on Arctic 
oil and gas activities. 
The national debate mainly focussed on the balance between potential positive 
impacts, such as increased national income and job creation, versus potential negative 
impacts such as an oil spill. The international debate mainly focussed on whether the 
world should want to develop oil and gas in the Arctic given the impacts of climate 
change and the risk of an oil spill to the already sensitive environment (Smits et al. 
2017). These two debates briefly coincided when Greenpeace scaled the rig that was 
performing the drills in both 2010 and 2011. The international debate was shaped by 
state actors in intergovernmental fora (United Nations), by scientists, by international 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and by individual citizens in court cases 
and digital arenas. Individual companies and projects were subject to global scrutiny 
and international protest actions initiated by NGOs and often spread through (social) 
media and the internet. As simple messages are often the strongest messages, the 
most prominent companies and their most controversial projects were used to convey 
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a point of view. An example is the #SavetheArctic campaign by Greenpeace focussing 
on Shell’s activities in Alaska.
6.6.2 The political license at the national and international level
Greenland has a democratically elected government that governs all aspects of oil 
and gas development. Also in other (Arctic) countries, energy development is a highly 
politicised and predominantly national affair: This is fostered by the point of view that 
energy is a matter of national importance and that the majority of the applicable rules 
and regulations are organised at the national level. For various reasons the governments 
of the Arctic states were looking to explore for new offshore oil and gas resources in 
their waters at the start of this century: The Greenlandic government wanted to develop 
oil and gas resources to diversify its economy and gain additional income to become 
financially independent from Denmark (BMP 2009). Alaska was looking to develop new 
oil and gas resources to replenish the decline of existing ones (www.eia.gov; Resource 
Development Council n.d.), while  Russia as well as Norway were looking to expand their 
existing oil and gas exports as part of their export strategy (CIEP 2015; Vidal 2016).
Even though the development of oil and gas is mainly organised at the national level, 
within the larger domain of energy development it is also subject of global politics. As 
global politics is increasingly based on non-institutionalised inter-state cooperation 
combined with a range of interactions between state and non-state actors (Rosenau 1997, 
2006; Beck 2005; Ferguson and Mansbach 2007) we need to look at a range of platforms 
and institutions to find sources of an international political license. At the international 
level, political processes are embedded in intergovernmental forums such as the United 
Nations, The World Trade Organisation etc. The organisation and mandate of such 
intergovernmental fora however differ and other inter-state and forms of cooperation 
have emerged as well (e.g. in Roundtables for Sustainable Development or the Forest 
Stewardship Council). Greenland is participating in a number of international platforms 
and institutions, including the Arctic Council and United Nations, mostly via Denmark as 
Foreign Affairs is a shared policy domain between the two (naalakkersuisut.gl). 
6.6.3 The legal license at the national and international level
Typically, national laws and regulations determine where and how oil and gas resources 
may be explored and exploited. The national legal framework describes the steps and 
procedures that need to be followed in order to obtain a legal license. This involves 
procedures around environmental and social impact assessment, stakeholder 
consultation and impact benefit agreements. In the national context of Greenland, 
for example, licencing rounds are organised to open up certain areas for oil and gas 
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exploration and exploitation. Companies that find it economically interesting and 
qualify to participate in these licensing rounds, put in a bid. The company with the 
winning bid is granted a license to explore or exploit for the resources in a specific 
area. Following the license, the oil company needs to submit a number of plans (e.g. 
an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment and a development plan) for formal 
approval by government authorities prior to any field work (govmin.gl). Which plans 
are needed, which government authorities are in charge of evaluating these plans and 
when and how these plans are made available to the public is set out in the Greenlandic 
Mineral Resources Act.
For the formulation of its Mineral Resources Act Greenland included elements of 
the existing laws in other (Arctic) countries, such as Norway, and international legal 
agreements, such as OSPAR (Vermont Law School 2011). Furthermore, Greenland 
is – via Denmark – part of a number of Arctic legally binding agreements including 
the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response 
(2013) and the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue (2011). The national Greenlandic legal framework applicable to oil and gas 
activities therefore overlaps with Arctic and international legally binding agreements. 
However, Greenland did not sign the Paris Climate Agreement (C.N.819.2016.TREATIES-
XXVII.7.d) and did not undertook any commitments under the Kyoto Protocol’s second 
commitment period (2013 – 2020) (C.N.772.2017.TREATIES-XXVII.7.c). 
Additionally, at the international level there is no common (Arctic) legal framework for 
oil and gas activities, it is rather a patchwork of different policies and agreements that 
partly cover the range of topics that need to be governed when developing oil and gas 
activities (Smits et al 2014b). As a result it differs per country what is expected to be 
studied from an environmental and social perspective, whether or not there should 
be an Impact Benefit Agreement (or something similar) in place, and whether or not 
an additional drilling rig should be located nearby to intervene when something goes 
wrong on the rig drilling the well (Dagg et al. 2011). Let alone that there is a governance 
arrangement or agreement that governs in which areas oil and gas resources will be 
developed and which areas will be closed for these developments. Also the Conference 
of Parties (COP) 21 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) that was held in Paris in 2015 did not include such a decision. The COP21 
agreement set a goal to keep global temperature rise below two degrees Celsius, but left 
it to the individual countries themselves to decide whether this means that (some of) 
their oil and gas resources should be left in the ground. It can therefore be concluded 
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that the legal licenses at the national and international level interact, but cannot be 
regarded as one nor are they completely separate.
6.6.4 The social license at the national and international level
At the time of the oil and gas exploration activities in Greenland a national societal 
debate arose on the trade-offs between positive impacts (i.e. increased national income 
and job creation) and negative impacts (i.e. in case of an oil spill). Furthermore, people 
and NGOs not necessarily criticised the company but the government about the way 
they were engaged in the (formal) decision making procedures: they demanded to have 
more opportunities to engage in the legal process and more time to make a meaningful 
contribution. As a consequence some nation states such as Greenland have amended 
their legal framework to varying degrees, to include moments and tools to engage with 
stakeholders during the decision making process (Smits et al. 2017). In this way civil 
society organisations and citizens have gained more opportunities to influence local 
and national level decisions related to oil and gas development.
The increasing oil and gas aspirations of the Arctic countries at the start of this century 
not only gave rise to national level societal debates, but also to an international protest 
movement, who was trying to limit and preferably stop new oil and gas developments 
in the region. Two international environmental NGOs (World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and 
Greenpeace) initiated the protest against Arctic oil and gas activities. They both launched 
Arctic campaigns that targeted the plans and activities of international oil companies 
and Arctic nation states to develop new offshore oil and gas resources. It is easier to 
prevent the development of new activities than to stop ongoing activities for which large 
corporate investments already have been made (personal communication – interview 
Greenpeace Denmark 2016). The actions and Arctic campaigns of these NGOs covered 
on social media, contributed to the mobilisation of public opinion around the world. 
The relationship of both NGOs with indigenous communities in the Arctic is in many 
cases troubled due to the anti-whaling and anti-sealing campaigns of international 
environmental NGOs in the 1980s (personal communication – interview Greenpeace 
Denmark, WWF Greenland 2016). It was only in 2015 that WWF, as the first international 
environmental NGO, opened an office in Greenland (www.panda.org). Still there are 
conflicts of interest between the international environmental NGOs and the local 
indigenous communities. The NGOs see the Arctic as a pristine area and want to 
conserve what is there, including polar bears and marine mammals. For the communities 
the Arctic is their home and a place where they live and hunt the animals living there, 
including the polar bears and marine mammals (personal communication – interview 
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Greenland Petroleum Services; WWF Greenland 2016). Also the focus of the societal 
debate is different on both levels: The national level focusses on a balance between 
risks and benefits, while the international level focusses on the contribution of oil and 
gas on climate change. 
Even though there are a several reasons why separate social licenses to operate could 
be distinguished for both levels, there is also some (limited) interaction between the 
two: WWF has a local office in Greenland from where it contributes to the national 
level debate and tries to engage with Greenlandic organisations and people (personal 
communication – interview WWF Greenland 2016). And also Greenpeace contributes 
to the national level debate, albeit without a permanent physical representation 
within the country: They have amongst others used the formal public consultation 
procedures of the government to pose questions during public hearing sessions 
and make formal comments on the proposed plans regarding environmental issues, 
the lack of interaction and/or the lack of job generation (personal communication – 
interview Greenpeace Denmark 2016). Also, when Greenpeace scaled the drilling rig 
of Cairn Energy in Greenlandic waters in 2010 and 2011, their action did not only spark 
international debate but was also part of the national debate. It can thus be concluded 
that even though both social licenses are separate and have their own specific focus, 
there are ways in which the international environmental NGOs interact with national 
level stakeholders and try to be part of the national level societal debate. 
6.6.5 Separate but interacting national and international political, legal and social licenses
As the previous sections have illustrated, nation states have a central role in the 
political and legal licenses on the national level, but are one of many actors in different 
governance arrangements when it comes to the international political and legal licenses. 
The case of oil and gas in the Arctic shows that the national level social license debate 
in Greenland focussed on influencing the formal decision making of the national 
government, while the international level societal debate did not only focus on the 
national government(s) but also on general public opinion and private sector companies. 
The social licenses to operate debates on the two levels are too different to regard them 
as one. At the same time they are not completely separate either, as (limited) interaction 
was taking place between international and national level stakeholders. 
The same accounts for the legal and political licenses: In the formulation of its legal 
framework, Greenland incorporated elements from existing laws and regulations of 
other (Arctic) countries. It also incorporated international legally binding agreements 
such as OSPAR of which it is, via Denmark, a part of. However, there are also some 
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international legally binding agreements of which Greenland is not a part, such as 
the Paris Agreement, and at present an overarching international legal framework 
on (Arctic) oil and gas activities is non-existent. The legal licenses on the national 
and international level thus show some interaction, but cannot be regarded as one. 
The same accounts for the political licenses, because Greenland does participate in 
the international political arena via Denmark, but the core decisions on oil and gas 
development (including where to drill or not) are taken by national governments. The 
two levels thus interact, but cannot be regarded as one. 
6.7 Conclusion
The cases of energy development in Russia, Europe and Greenland show that an activity 
can be debated at different levels at the same time. It also shows that the different levels 
interact and both have the potential to influence the implementation of the activity 
locally. Where the case of oil and gas development in Russia shows that the social license 
between both levels can be regarded as one, while separate legal and political licenses 
are distinguished for both levels. The case of wind energy development in Europe 
illustrates that the legal and political licenses on both levels are one, while separate 
social licenses exist on the national and international level. And last but not least, the 
case of oil and gas development in Greenland shows that each license exists on both the 
national and the international level, but interacts with its counterpart on the other level.
Hybrid situations such as in Greenland, where the licenses do not fully overlap and 
are not completely separate, are indeed becoming more likely in our globalising 
society. The nation states system still exist but is increasingly becoming networked 
through involvement in multiple governance arrangements across different scales. This 
bifurcated system, where the national state system evolves through its co-existence 
and interaction with the network (civil) society and global markets, influences the way 
in which the different licenses manifest themselves at different levels. 
As licenses on both levels could influence the implementation of an activity locally, this 
chapter has studied the multilevel dimension of the social license to operate through 
a number of hybrid types where interaction and overlap occur (or not). This typology 
of hybrid SLO types helps to both conceptually and analytically identify how an energy 
development (or other large-scale industrial projects) can be influenced by different 
licenses, i.e. the political, legal and social licences, at multiple levels. Where this chapter 
has especially highlighted the national versus the international level, it is to be expected 
that the typology can also be applied on other levels, for example the local versus the 
national level.
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Incorporating a multilevel dimension in the social license to operate concept contributes 
to go beyond the narrow and local focus of the SLO concept and hence makes it more 
suitable to analyse the implementation of, among others, energy activities from a social 
perspective.  Future research has to determine whether the typology developed in this 
chapter is complete or whether additional (hybrid) types can be defined. Moreover, a 
next step in furthering this conceptual framework would be to gain more insight in which 
conditions influence the overlap or separation between licenses on multiple levels.
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7.1 INTRODUCTION
The development of offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic has been one of the 
most controversial energy activities of the last decade and is subject to public scrutiny 
and protest. While it was once regarded as a frozen desert, the Arctic region has rapidly 
become the theatre of high level politics and global attention. Also Greenland, one of 
the smallest states yet biggest island in the world, expressed the ambition to develop 
offshore oil and gas activities. Opening up their waters for oil and gas exploration 
attracted the interest of some of the largest international oil companies as well as 
critique from individual citizens and other stakeholders within Greenland and far beyond.
The objective of this study was therefore to understand the development of a social license 
to operate of controversial energy projects by analysing the role of trust, legitimacy and 
human capital development in an Arctic context and by developing a multilevel approach of 
a social license to operate that includes legal and political licenses.
To reach this objective the following research question and sub-questions were posed:
How is the social license to operate of Greenlandic oil and gas activities influenced by legal 
and political licenses in a multilevel context, what is the role of trust, legitimacy and human 
capital development and how does this contribute to a multilevel approach of a social license 
to operate? 
1. What is the multilevel governance setting in which Arctic oil and gas activities take 
place and what is the authority of a state such as Greenland?
2. What is a social license to operate and how does it relate to the legal and political 
licenses of oil and gas activities in the Greenland?
3. In what way do trust and legitimacy play a role in the different licenses to operate for 
oil and gas activities in Greenland?
4. What are the challenges and opportunities for Greenland to maximise local benefits 
in the development of an oil and gas sector? 
5. In what way does human capital development contribute to a social license to operate 
for oil and gas development in Greenland and other small Arctic states?
6. How has the social license to operate of Arctic oil and gas activities developed at the 
international level and how does it interact with the local level?
In section 7.2 each of the research sub-questions is answered. Section 7.3 answers the 
main research question. Section 7.4 reflects on the contribution of this research to social 
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license to operate and governance theory. Section 7.5 reflects on the methodology used 
during this study. In Section 7.6 the recommendations for future research and the daily 
practices of governments and companies are given.
7.2 The social license to operate of Arctic oil and gas development
This section answers the research sub-questions of this thesis. Based on the findings 
of this research, an analysis is made of how the social license to operate of Arctic oil 
and gas activities is influenced by the legal and political licenses in a multilevel context. 
This is done by looking at the role of trust, legitimacy and human capital development. 
7.2.1 The multilevel governance setting of Arctic oil and gas activities and the authority 
of Greenland
The Arctic governance setting is fragmented and highly politicised, consisting of 
states, market parties, and several formal and informal institutions, such as the legal 
framework of UNCLOS and the intergovernmental Arctic Council. There was and is 
however no overarching legal framework, governing the development of new offshore 
oil and gas activities in this region. Within this fragmented, highly politicised and 
dynamic governance setting, Greenland gained extended autonomy under the rule of 
Denmark and expressed the ambition to develop offshore oil and gas activities. The 
oil and gas activities were expected to generate the necessary funds and employment 
opportunities to become financially independent from Denmark. 
In order to maximally benefit from the oil and gas development it is necessary for the 
Greenlandic government to secure its central position and high degree of influence 
on the governance of oil and gas activities in Greenland. This accounts both to the 
regional level, when it comes to the influence of other states, as well as the national 
level, in relation to the influence of international oil companies. Regionally, other Arctic 
states will try to influence the Greenlandic oil and gas arrangements when Greenland 
becomes more independent from Denmark. Nationally, the limited capacity of the 
government in terms of manpower and knowledge generation is an important factor in 
the ability to enforce the Greenlandic legal framework on international oil companies. 
Furthermore, the influence of international and domestically organised civil society, 
and other partnerships with (Arctic) states or non-state parties is expected to increase. 
The increasing dependencies between the Arctic region and the rest of the world will 
produce a denser web of governance arrangements and will affect the authority of 
individual Arctic states. It is the increased nesting of these multi-level and multi-actor 
governance arrangements that shapes the authority of the Greenlandic government 
over its oil and gas resources. 
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If the Greenlandic government wants to retain its central position and high degree of 
influence on the governance of oil and gas activities in Greenland, the capacity of its 
institutions should be the primary guideline for the pace of development. In this context 
capacity accounts to both a sufficient number as well as competent staff that have 
the right set of knowledge and skills to govern these new oil and gas activities. If the 
institutional capacity is not taken as a primary guideline, the Greenlandic government 
will formally remain the most important player while de facto other actors, whether it 
is the industry, (Danish) research institutes, or other states (through the Arctic Council) 
will take over their position and benefits flow to other places. 
7.2.2 The social license to operate and the need to study it in relation to the political and 
legal licenses of Greenlandic oil and gas activities
Traditionally, the development of oil and gas activities was an affair of oil companies 
and nation states: Activities should have political support and comply with national 
laws and regulations. Processes of political modernisation are however changing 
the roles of state and non-state actors. Globalisation and individualisation empower 
individual citizens and non-state actors, who demand a larger say in decision making 
processes. Chapter 5 shows that this is also the case for Greenland, where citizens and 
civil society organisations became more and more critical towards their government 
about the way it developed the offshore oil and gas activities. The lack of openness and 
transparency in the decision making process, the few formal moments to provide input 
and have influence on the decision making process, and questions about the benefits 
for Greenland fuelled the debate among societal actors. The social license to operate 
concept addresses this phenomenon and emerged as a third type of ‘license’ next to 
the political and legal licenses, which were already applicable to oil and gas activities. 
A social license to operate is generally defined as ‘the ongoing acceptance and approval 
from local communities and other stakeholders’. It is not a tick-the-box license but rather 
an ongoing process that runs through the entire lifetime of an activity. Unlike the legal 
and political licenses, it is not granted by a public authority. The absence of a granting 
authority and lack of standard procedure makes it intangible and raises questions 
as to who grants it and how it can be obtained and maintained. These questions are 
predominantly studied from a private sector company’s perspective, which is not a 
surprise as the other two licenses also need to be obtained by the company developing 
an activity. However, as Chapter 5 shows, it is also important to study the role of a 
national government in the social license to operate context: Society’s increasing 
demand for influence on the development of oil and gas activities results from the 
perceived failure of the prevailing legal and political systems. It is therefore also 
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important to understand the relations between the legal, political and social licenses 
to operate. As trust and legitimacy are the founding principles of a social license to 
operate and are also relevant to the legal and political licenses, the mutual relationships 
and interdependencies of the three licenses have been analysed by taking a closer look 
at the role of trust and legitimacy.
7.2.3 The role of trust and legitimacy in the legal, political and social licenses of oil and 
gas development in Greenland
In Greenland, the societal debate about oil and gas development was fuelled by a 
lack of throughput legitimacy regarding the decision making process, and a lack of 
integrity- and competence-based trust in government authorities. Stakeholders, such 
as critical citizens and environmental NGOs, put pressure on the political system 
outside of the regular election procedures, thereby influencing the political license. 
This has in turn influenced the legal license, illustrated by the amendments made to 
the regulatory framework twice since 2009. The case of oil and gas development in 
Greenland shows that different forms of trust and legitimacy are dominant in each 
of the licenses to operate. They complement each other, whereby the political license 
is mostly dependent on institutionalised trust and input legitimacy, the legal license 
is predominantly focussing on throughput and output legitimacy combined with 
institutionalised trust, and the emphasis of the social license to operate is on personal 
trust, throughput and output legitimacy. 
The level of trust and legitimacy of one license influences the other licenses: The 
proactive role of the Greenlandic government, by taking into account the criticism from 
individual citizens and civil society organisations, has made the political license a linking 
pin between the social license and the legal license. It illustrates how a social license 
to operate contributes to enhancing the requirements set forth by the legal license. In 
turn, the legal license now comprises more elements, such as earlier and prolonged 
public consultation periods, that can contribute to the establishment of a social license. 
It should however be noted that the requirements of a legal license cannot be expected 
to automatically deliver a social license. The changes made to the legal license are still 
a reaction on the debate in relation to the social license. The expectations of society 
are subject to continuous change and might have altered compared to what is now 
required by the legal license. Even though the government of Greenland has met some 
of society’s wishes, critique still exists and its relationship with society is still far from 
optimal. Large scale public protests against oil and gas activities have however not 
occurred until today. This is not necessarily the result of actively incorporating societal 
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critique into the legislation, but could also stem from the fact that most oil and gas 
activities have come to a halt since 2014.     
7.2.4 The challenges and opportunities in maximising the local benefits of oil and gas 
development
Maximisation of the benefits from the development of oil and gas activities was one of 
the main focus points in the Greenlandic societal debate, especially since these benefits 
could contribute to the long cherished wish of becoming (financially) independent from 
Denmark. In order to maximally benefit from the creation of an oil and gas sector, 
the development of a knowledge-based economy and strong educational sector 
are essential. This is essential because most of the activities take place offshore and 
require a set of (formal) qualifications, which are not present on a large scale within the 
Greenlandic workforce at the moment. It is thus of utmost importance for Greenland to 
work on the development of its human capital. Without having the right set of (formal) 
skills and qualifications, it is hard to seize the employment opportunities that the 
offshore oil and gas activities generate. 
Chapter 3 shows that local knowledge institutes are essential in creating the necessary 
base of human capital, which in turn enables small Arctic states such as Iceland, Faroe 
Islands and Greenland, to maximise local benefits. The Faroe Islands case shows that 
the income from exploration activities alone can be sufficient to kick-start a knowledge-
based economy that can even be exported to other countries. This has made the 
small Faroese society more resilient to the local boom and bust effects of oil and 
gas activities. It is also a major opportunity for Greenland and makes human capital 
development one of the top priorities. Establishing a critical mass of skilled labour takes 
time and is already one of the biggest challenges. Various initiatives, mainly revolving 
around the Building School, School of Minerals and Petroleum and Centre for Arctic 
Technology in Sisimiut, have been taken to increase the level of skilled workers for 
the extractive industries so that the Greenlandic society will be ready to seize the 
employment opportunities when they arrive. Lagging behind in capacity-building 
compared to the pace of industrial development prevents expertise and knowledge 
from becoming an export product, which can become a serious strain on the process 
of becoming a self-sustaining economy.
7.2.5 The contribution of human capital development to a social license to operate in 
small Arctic societies
The focus on local benefits in the social license to operate debate logically stems from 
the reason why the Greenlandic government started looking to develop the oil and gas 
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activities in the first place: Namely to diversify the economy and generate sufficient 
income to fulfil their wish of becoming (financially) independent from Denmark. It is 
expected that the benefits of the oil and gas development should include more than 
only taxes and royalties paid to the national government. As Chapter 4 shows, the 
high level of involvement from local people and businesses in new industrial activities 
generates clearer benefits for society and thereby contributes to the economic output 
legitimacy of a social license to operate. To ensure a high level of involvement it is 
necessary to create a critical mass of skilled workforce, preferably prior to or at the start 
of the new activities. This can be stimulated by incorporating policy measures on human 
capital development and knowledge transfer into the regulatory framework, especially 
when there is little or no experience with the sector that is to be developed. The case 
of oil and gas development in the Faroe Islands illustrates that policy measures that 
stimulate knowledge transfer can successfully initiate the creation of local businesses 
and participation in the industry. 
Next to the economic output legitimacy, a focus on human capital development also 
contributes to the creation of personal trust. Stimulated by knowledge transfer policy 
measures, stakeholders in the Faroese case started coming together in a hydrocarbon 
cluster. Oil companies, offshore industry and knowledge institutes established an 
institutionalised dialogue and structural cooperation on the development of human 
capital. Even though no commercially viable oil has been found in the Faroe Islands, 
the dialogue and cooperation between the stakeholders in this cluster has established 
a Faroese hydrocarbon sector that competes on a global level: Faroese offshore 
companies work on oil and gas activities worldwide and a growing number of citizens 
is working in the oil sector abroad. At the same time, working together on human 
capital development projects and interacting over a number of years, has enabled these 
stakeholders to show each other that they deliver as promised. Relationships are built, 
adding to a better mutual understanding and the creation of personal trust. Human 
capital development thus not only contributes to the economic output legitimacy of 
an activity, but also contributes to enhancing the level of personal trust. Especially in 
these small Arctic societies that face the challenge of maximising local benefits, human 
capital development contributes to several aspects of a social license to operate.
7.2.6 The international level social license to operate of Arctic oil and gas activities and its 
influence on Greenland
Next to the national level debate in Greenland, there is also an international debate 
about the offshore oil and gas development in Greenland. In contrast to the national 
level debate, the international debate is not so much focussed on human capital 
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development and the maximisation of benefits, but rather on the contribution of these 
oil and gas activities to global climate change. Furthermore, the international level 
debate is predominantly shaped by international environmental NGOs and involving 
international oil companies and nation states. The same activities are thus subject to a 
national and an international level debate, each of the debates having their own specific 
focus. Both debates have the potential to influence the social license to operate and 
thereby the implementation of offshore oil and gas activities in Greenland. The national 
and international debates briefly came together when Greenpeace scaled a drilling rig 
that was performing the exploration drills in Greenlandic waters in 2010 and 2011. The 
social license to operate concept does however not yet include a multilevel component. 
Chapter 6 develops a set of hypotheses and a typology for the interaction of the social 
license at multiple levels. Three main categories of social license to operate processes 
are identified based on the level of overlap:
1. All licenses are separate: Each license occurs both at the national and the 
international level, but there is no multilevel interaction between the licenses.
2. All licenses are one: Each license fully overlaps with its national/international 
counterpart.
3. Licenses are partly overlapping. To further operationalise this, three hybrid types 
can be distinguished based on which licenses partly overlap: 
a) There is one social license (national and international fully overlap), but there 
are separate political and legal licenses on both levels.
b) There is one political license and one legal license (for these two licenses the 
national and international level fully overlap), but the social license is separate.
c) All licenses partly overlap with their national/international counterpart.
Type 1 and 2 are considered to represent the extremes (fully separated and fully 
overlapping) and are therefore not likely to occur in practice. The hybrid types are 
therefore regarded to provide the best reflection of the interactions that could take place 
between licenses on different levels. Looking at the field of energy development, the 
case of oil and gas in Russia is an example of Hybrid type 1. The Russian government is 
consciously limiting the international influence on the national legal and political licenses. 
Even though these licenses are separate, the national and international social licenses 
to operate are well connected and can even be regarded as one: They share the same 
goals, values and beliefs namely to protect the environment from the negative impacts 
of oil and gas activities and to prevent the degradation of the existing legal framework. 
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Hybrid type 2 is illustrated by the development of wind energy on land or near the coast 
in several European countries. Here the political and legal licenses can be regarded 
as one, since the national level development of wind energy is driven by formal EU 
regulations (Directive 2009/28/EC) and international treaties (Paris Agreement). At the 
same time the social licenses on the national and international level are clearly separate: 
International environmental NGO’s see the development of wind energy as part of the 
solution to combat global climate change, while local fishermen and residents often 
protest against the development of these wind farms. 
The oil and gas development in Greenland is a good example of hybrid type 3, where 
none of the licenses fully overlap nor are they fully separated. The licenses interact with 
their national / international counterparts. With regards to the social license to operate, 
this interaction mainly takes place via social media and international environmental 
NGOs being active at the national level. In case of the political license, the interaction 
takes place via institutionalised inter-state cooperation as well as interaction with state 
and non-state actors in a range of governance arrangements. Interaction between 
the legal licenses runs via the ratification of legally binding international agreements. 
However, Greenland is to a limited extend part of binding international agreements 
relevant to the development of oil and gas activities. The interaction between the 
national and international legal licenses is therefore limited. 
7.3 The social license to operate: The case study of Greenland and a 
multilevel approach 
The previous sections have answered all the sub-questions of this research. Using the 
multilevel approach that has been developed in Chapter 6, this section concludes on 
how the social license to operate of Greenlandic oil and gas activities is influenced by 
legal and political licenses in a multilevel context and on the role of trust, legitimacy 
and human capital. 
7.3.7 The national level social license to operate needs to be studied in relation to the 
legal and political licenses using a broader definition of trust and legitimacy 
Until now, scholarly literature and business practices have a rather instrumental 
understanding of the social license to operate: They predominantly focus on the local 
project context and the relation between a company and its local stakeholders. This 
narrow focus of the social license to operate concept misses essential elements of 
today’s increasingly interconnected and complex society. As the case study of oil and 
gas development in Greenland has shown, governments still has an important role 
in the development of large industrial activities and a social license to operate does 
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not manifests itself in isolation from the political and legal licenses. In Greenland, the 
steadily increasing societal critique about the oil and gas exploration activities was 
mainly directed at the Greenlandic government and its role and performance related 
to the legal and political licenses.  
For a thorough understanding of the social license to operate and its relation with 
the political and legal licenses this research has shown that it is important to not only 
define output oriented forms of legitimacy, like it is usually done in social license to 
operate literature, but to use a broader definition and include input and throughput 
legitimacy as well. The critique of Greenlandic society was fuelled by a perceived 
lack of throughput legitimacy in the processes of granting a legal license, due to the 
closed nature of the authority issuing the license and the lack of access to decision 
making documents. Although the output legitimacy of the oil and gas activities was 
more obvious, due to the connection between the income of oil and gas activities and 
independency from Denmark, it became questioned in terms of risks outweighing the 
benefits. Furthermore, the societal critique was also based on a lack of integrity- and 
competence-based trust in the government and its authorities issuing the legal and 
political licenses. 
The societal debate and critique, mainly directed at the government, illustrate how the 
content of the legal framework (legal license) and the behaviour of the government 
(political license) influence the focus of the social license. The other way around, the 
social license can also influence the political and the legal licenses. As a result the 
national level Greenlandic legal license now contains more elements that contribute to 
the establishment of a social license, although it can never be assumed that the legal 
license contains all the elements. 
7.3.8 The social license to operate concept needs a multilevel approach
The environmental and social impacts of oil and gas activities often do not confine 
themselves to nation state boundaries, nor are these activities operated solely in 
a national level context: Oil and gas are subject to international commodity prices, 
transported and used all over the world and subject to high level international politics. 
Given the link between the combustion of oil and gas and global climate change, the 
development of oil and gas activities in the Arctic became part of an international 
societal debate. Both the national and the international level are thus relevant to the 
social license to operate of oil and gas development in Greenland. The existing definition 
of the social license to operate concept however lacks a multilevel component and 
is therefore not suitable to analyse the multilevel context in which these oil and gas 
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activities were being developed. Furthermore, to get an in-depth understanding of an 
international level social license to operate it is also important to take a closer look 
at the legal and political licenses on the international level. When studying all three 
licenses at the international level, the focus of the analysis should not only include 
the relation between society (both national and international) and the private sector 
company, but also on the role of nation states. 
As Rosenau shows, the role of world politics has changed from a state-centric world to 
a bifurcated system in which state actors engage in different governance arrangements 
with other state and non-state actors, such as international NGOs and multinational 
companies. The research presented in this thesis shows that on the international 
level the political license is shaped by multiple governance arrangements in which 
the Greenlandic government shares its authority with other actors: Foreign policy is 
a shared policy domain with Denmark and officially it is Denmark who has a seat at 
the table on the international level. Furthermore, Greenland participates in several 
intergovernmental fora, such as the Arctic Council or United Nations. These fora 
formulate policies and determine the direction for future development, although 
core decisions regarding where to develop oil and gas (or not) are still the domain of 
nation states. There are therefore no international binding agreements that determine 
which oil and gas resources should be left in the ground. This is however essential 
to determine, given the Paris Agreement (2015) to keep global temperature rise well 
below two degrees Celsius. One can question whether individual states are able to 
take this decision alone, as countries are still pursuing their oil and gas ambitions after 
the Paris Agreement. Moreover, Greenland, in contrast to Denmark, did not sign the 
Paris Agreement and did not undertook any commitments under the Kyoto Protocol’s 
second commitment period. 
The cooperation of (Arctic) states in or in the context of intergovernmental fora such as 
the Arctic Council has also led to the successful negotiation of legally binding agreements, 
including the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response (2013) and the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime 
Search and Rescue (2011). However, these binding agreements do not address the 
question which oil and gas resources should be left in the ground. Furthermore, the 
development of oil and gas activities in the different Arctic countries is still governed 
by a patchwork of different legal frameworks instead of one comprehensive legal 
framework for the entire region. This thus leaves the initiative to each of the Arctic 
states and results in different legal licenses across the Arctic.
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International environmental NGOs are trying to influence the decision making processes 
regarding the development of oil and gas development in the Arctic, both at the 
international as well as at the national level. To influence the decisions of Arctic states 
and international oil companies, international environmental NGOs did not only use 
existing national level governmental procedures but also shaped the international 
societal debate in court cases and by protest actions. These protest actions, such as 
scaling drilling rigs in Arctic waters, fuelled an international societal debate that was 
facilitated and held on the internet and social media. The media thus became a space 
of politics, whereby the internet functioned as a public space where powerful images 
of scaled drilling rigs accompanied by simple messages (#SavetheArctic) thrived. In 
this way the social license to operate of oil and gas activities in Greenlandic waters was 
shaped on the international level.
  
Part of the multilevel approach towards the social license to operate concept is not 
only to include another geographical level in the analysis, but also to create a better 
understanding of the possible interaction between the two different levels. Based 
on the analysis of the national and international social license to operate, it can be 
concluded that in the case of Greenland the political, legal and social licenses do not 
fully overlap nor are they fully separated: They interact with each other in various 
ways. With regards to the political licenses this mainly runs via the participation of the 
Greenlandic state in international governance arrangements and intergovernmental 
fora. The interaction between the legal licenses primarily runs via formal ratification 
procedures, but is limited due to the limited amount of international legally binding 
agreements that Greenland is part of, and. The reason for the social licenses to be 
regarded as separate albeit with some interaction, is that there is relatively limited 
participation of Greenlandic actors in the international societal debate. Vice versa the 
influence of international actors on the Greenlandic societal debate mainly runs via 
government procedures, mandatory for obtaining the permits for oil and gas activities 
and thus the national legal license. 
7.3.9 The importance of human capital development in a multilevel social license to 
operate of oil and gas development in Greenland
When studying the social license to operate of an activity, human capital development 
is often associated with the content of an Impact Benefit Agreement This thesis shows 
that in the context of small Arctic states, human capital development also has a strong 
link with the creation of trust and legitimacy in relation to a national level social license 
to operate. Furthermore, human capital development can play a role in the degree of 
interaction between licenses on multiple geographical levels. 
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In Greenland, the economic benefits and employment opportunities that the oil and 
gas activities were expected to generate, were of great importance in the societal 
debate. Working on human capital development to increase the level of formal skills 
and qualifications among the Greenlandic workforce and businesses, enables local 
stakeholders to better seize the employment opportunities that the oil and gas activities 
bring. In turn, increased participation of the Greenlandic workforce and local businesses 
in the oil and gas industry could contribute to the economic output legitimacy of the 
oil and gas activities. At the same time, human capital development also serves as a 
vehicle for different stakeholders (government, civil society and companies) to interact 
and build personal trust. 
Within the multilevel social license to operate context, human capital development can 
also be of importance to the degree in which the national and international level licenses 
interact and overlap. As human capital development was and still is a top priority for the 
Greenlandic government, the level of (formal) skills and competencies such as English 
proficiency is likely to increase over time. These skills and competencies are not only 
necessary to seize local employment opportunities, but could also contribute to the 
level of access that Greenlandic people have to international societal debates, which 
are mainly held in English. Although this is a theoretical exercise, because there are no 
offshore oil and gas activities in Greenland ongoing at the moment, the national and 
international social licenses might have moved closer together due to the development 
of human capital. This shows the importance of including human capital development 
in the analysis of the social license to operate of Arctic (energy) activities. 
7.3.10 Concluding remarks
The Greenlandic case study shows that the national social license to operate is 
inextricably linked to the national legal and political licenses to operate via different, 
complementary forms of trust and legitimacy. A proactive approach to address societal 
actors’ concerns regarding trust and legitimacy does not necessarily result in a solution 
that is perceived to be satisfying. It will thus remain a challenge for the Greenlandic 
government to address societal concerns, which is becoming extra difficult because 
amending the legal framework cannot continue indefinitely: Either the changes do not 
have the desired effect and societal actors lose their faith in whether legal amendments 
will be a solution to their concerns. Or, the changes are so frequent that companies 
lose their interest to invest in Greenland because it changes the rules of the game so 
often, which destabilises the investment climate. 
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The national social license to operate is also intertwined with the international level social 
license, which uses the internet and social media to influence national and international 
level decision making both by governments and by private sector companies. The 
interconnectedness is a challenge for Greenland when it comes to the social license 
to operate for oil and gas activities. International actors, such as environmental 
NGOs and investors, could potentially influence investment decisions of international 
oil companies regarding projects that are implemented at a local level. Already 
international environmental NGOs influenced the national societal debate via formal 
government procedures of the national legal license. What is more, at the international 
level Greenland is highly dependent on others, such as Denmark, to formally play a role 
in the international legal and political licenses. The interconnectedness of the national 
and international social licenses is however also an opportunity for the Greenlandic 
government. Being organised as a network and not necessarily following formal state 
structures, the international social license allows Greenland to take part without having 
to follow traditional, hierarchical structures. Unlike the connections that exist between 
the political and legal licenses at the international and national level, the connection 
between both social licenses to operate is vivid, fast and involves individuals directly. 
For both governments and companies it is important to realise that the implementation 
of activities locally, is thus subject to direct international level influences, primarily via 
the social license to operate. 
7.4 Theoretical reflections
This thesis presents new insights to governance literature that focusses on the social 
license to operate of industrial activities and more specifically oil and gas projects. 
Societal debate and scrutiny in relation to large industrial activities has increased 
since the 1990s and sparked the emergence of the social license to operate concept 
in corporate practices and scientific literature (e.g. World Bank 2003b; Thomson 
and Boutilier 2011; Boutilier 2014; Moffat & Zhang 2014; Morrison 2014; Hall et al. 
2015). Thomson and Boutilier defined the concept not as a conventional ‘tick-the-box-
license’, but rather as a continuum ranging from the mere acceptance of an activity 
to psychological identification. They distinguish between various forms of trust and 
legitimacy, including interactional and institutionalised trust and economic and socio-
political legitimacy. 
The research presented by the existing body of literature is however predominantly 
concerned with how, when and by whom a private sector company can obtain and 
maintain its social license to operate. It is therefore very much output oriented and 
lacks an in depth examination of the relation between the social license and the political 
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and legal licenses, which apply to an activity as well (Morrison 2014). In most literature 
these licenses are only mentioned to determine that the social license is something 
different, rather a process instead of a tick-the-box license that is granted by a specific 
authority according to a specific set of procedures. This thesis builds on the research 
by Morrison (2014), who studied the social license to operate directly in relation to the 
political and legal licenses. The role of the government and its changing relationship 
with society is often overlooked. The close connection between society’s increasing 
demand for influence on the development of industrial activities and its perception of 
the prevailing legal and political system and the failures thereof, makes these political 
and legal systems important to study in relation to the social license to operate. To study 
the interactions between the three licenses, a further operationalisation as presented 
and used in Chapter 5 is essential.
Existing scholarly work on the social license to operate literature usually distinguishes 
different levels of trust: trust in a person (i.e. personal or interactional trust) and trust 
in an institution (i.e. institutionalised trust) (Thomson and Boutilier 2011). This thesis 
builds on this operationalisation of trust and distinguishes the same two forms, as 
these are considered to be complete. With regards to legitimacy, existing literature on 
the social license to operate discusses the legitimacy of an activity mainly in terms of 
its economic and/or socio-political outcomes (Thomson and Boutilier 2011). By doing 
so, the focus is predominantly on the output legitimacy. While output legitimacy is an 
important form of legitimacy when it comes to the social license to operate concept, 
governance, political and public administration literature shows that this is not the 
only form: This thesis therefore distinguishes between input, throughput and output 
legitimacy (van Tatenhove 2011), whereby the economic and socio-political legitimacy 
are both regarded as different forms of output legitimacy (see Chapter 5 for further 
details). By distinguishing a variety of different forms of legitimacy, the social license to 
operate concept is better equipped to analyse and establish an in-depth understanding 
of the (lack of) legitimacy of an activity. Furthermore, this thesis has shown that the 
different forms of legitimacy do not only play a role in the social license to operate, but 
also in the political and legal licenses. By analysing the different forms of legitimacy in 
all three licenses, a more comprehensive view is established about the legitimacy of 
an activity.
There are also critical voices regarding the social license to operate concept. The 
concept would be counter-productive to the sustainable development agenda: it is 
initiated by risks to a company’s business case and also aims to reduce these risks, it 
focusses on reducing overt protest rather than investing in long-term development and 
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it implies that society at large can grant the license at the expense of local perspectives 
(Owen & Kemp 2013; Harvey 2014; Harvey & Bice 2014). The implementation of the 
concept in the practices of businesses is also contested: companies focus too much on 
outreach, based on the assumption that local stakeholders simply do not understand 
them (i.e. information delivery), and the implementation of the concept is usually done 
by professionals with a development background stimulating an outreach approach 
rather than integrating the concept in the daily practices of projects. 
In line with existing literature (Owen & Kemp 2013; Harvey 2014; Harvey & Bice 2014), 
this thesis acknowledges that the social license to operate should not support the 
notion that approval for an activity can be granted by society at large at the expense of 
local perspectives. However, in today’s globalised world the analysis of a social license 
to operate should not solely focus on the local level. Focussing on local communities 
and the national level context excludes important international dynamics that have the 
potential to influence either the social license to operate locally and/or the investment 
decision of a private sector company on the implementation of an activity locally. In 
a world where access to the Internet and social media is increasing (Laniado et al. 
2017), from 0,97 billion people in 2010 to 2,28 billion people in 2016 (www.statista.
com), the costs of geographical distance in social interaction have been removed 
(Cairncross 2001). Local and global are now in many cases inevitably connected via 
internet and social media, but also via global commodity prices, environmental impacts 
and international (trade) agreements. The international social license to operate and 
its interconnection with the local social license to operate is however a new field of 
research. The existing conceptualisation of the social license to operate, which is 
applied to the national level, is not suitable to apply to the international level and 
a new operationalisation of the concept is therefore made in this thesis. Using the 
concept of spheres of authority from post international theory by Rosenau, including 
multiple centres of decision making and changes in the authority of states, combined 
with a prominent role for the internet and social media as both a tool and a platform 
for dialogue has proved to be valuable in studying the international level social license 
to operate. How this contributes to the new operationalisation of the social license to 
operate is elaborated upon below.
The social license to operate emerged as a result of the failure of national level legal and 
political systems to adequately deal with the interests of stakeholders and focussed 
primarily on local communities (Thomson and Boutilier 2011; Boutilier 2014; Moffat 
& Zhang 2014). The failure of the same national level legal and political systems to 
adequately deal with global environmental and economic problems has resulted 
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in an international multi-level governance setting, where both state and non-state 
actors determine the outcomes of global politics (Ferguson and Mansbach 2007). 
Post-international theory challenges the division of the world into sovereign, legally 
dependent states and acknowledges that processes of transformation are empowering 
citizens and non-state actors as well as driving a de-territorialisation of politics (Rosenau 
1997, 2003, 2006). Where the social license to operate concept shows that on a national 
level the authority of states becomes shared with citizens and non-state actors, post-
international theory shows that also on the international level the authority of states 
is dispersed over different governance arrangements and actors. The traditional 
hierarchical power of states, but also other traditional institutions, still exists but is 
dispersed and shared with other actors in diverse governance arrangements. At the 
same time, an international movement of empowered citizens and non-state actors, 
which uses digital horizontal means of communication, is gaining influence on the global 
level next to the existing hierarchical organisations (Castells 2008). 
This thesis studies the role of nation states and traditional private sector companies 
and their position in this transforming society, both nationally and internationally. 
The outcomes of this research show that companies, and especially multinational 
companies, find themselves in the middle of these transformations. As proponents 
of the debated activities they are not only subject to changes in the three licenses 
and their mutual interaction; they are also active on multiple levels and the different 
debates that are held on each of these levels. On the one hand the multinational 
companies have to relate to more demanding citizens and other non-state actors, both 
on a national and international level, and on the other hand they also have to relate to 
the changing position of states. Where they used to rely completely on state authority 
to get approval for their activities, they now have to take a much greater responsibility 
themselves next to the state authority where they still rely on. This is not to fill a 
gap in the legal and political systems, but because roles, expectations and sources of 
power are changing. Decision making processes are bifurcated: Formally government 
authorities decide on the legal licenses, but informally it is the (lack) of support in society 
that puts pressure both on companies and on governments. Companies that do not 
acknowledge and act upon this greater responsibility get scrutinised by society, both 
nationally and internationally. 
7.5 Methodological reflections
A case study approach was used to conduct this research. This approach was 
appropriate given the research question, studying a real-life phenomenon, its 
contemporary nature and the lack of influence over the events by the researcher. The 
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debate about Arctic oil and gas development was a real-life phenomenon during the 
majority of the years that this research was conducted. However, in Greenland the oil 
and gas exploration activities never reached the scale or intensity that was expected. 
Only Cairn Energy performed exploration drills during the summer seasons of 2010 and 
2011. No other exploration drills were performed, only a number of seismic surveys. 
At the moment there are no offshore oil and gas exploration activities ongoing or 
planned in Greenland. Given today’s circumstances, it can be questioned whether 
these activities are ever going to take place. 
Even though no offshore oil and gas activities take place in Greenland at the moment, 
the outcomes of this research remain valuable. In today’s globalised world, the social 
license to operate of an activity is an interplay between the local and international level, 
especially when it concerns energy related activities. The case study of offshore oil and 
gas development in Greenland clearly illustrates this and has developed a multilevel 
understanding of the social license to operate concept. During this research, the case 
of Greenland was continuously placed into a broader perspective: It was compared 
to the cases of energy development in Iceland and the Faroe Islands, studied in the 
context of offshore oil and gas development in the wider Arctic and global debate on 
climate change.   
Not being immersed within an Arctic society during the time of research has enabled 
me to keep an overview and analyse the position of all actors without being part of the 
phenomenon. On the other hand, a social license to operate is a social phenomenon 
characterised by dynamics that are not always apparent from written sources. The true 
local meaning of a social license to operate can therefore be more difficult to grasp when 
not being part of a society. Conducting a set of interviews on two different moments 
in time, attending several Arctic conferences and closely following public opinion on 
Facebook and Twitter, has contributed to a better understanding of the social license to 
operate. Being able to read and understand Danish has facilitated better access to the 
discussions and documents on oil and gas development in Greenland. At the same time, 
not being Danish has prevented me from a bias regarding the relationship with Greenland. 
As this research has shown, the social license to operate does not only manifest itself 
locally but also internationally. The same activity can be debated on various locations, 
potentially at the same time or in multiple occasions. Although the observations 
that were part of this research were spread over time and took place in two different 
Greenlandic locations, on conferences in different Arctic locations and in Dutch Arctic 
Circle meetings, the social license to operate of Arctic oil and gas development is larger. 
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Especially on the international level it is not possible to be aware of each and every 
debate on every scale. However, having spoken to many different actors over a time 
period of four years has ensured that the most important aspects of the social license 
to operate of Arctic oil and gas developments have been captured. 
7.6 Recommendations
The research of this thesis has contributed to the understanding of the development 
of a social license to operate of controversial energy projects in a multilevel context. 
Studying the social license to operate in a multilevel context is however a new approach 
and requires further research in various theoretical and empirical settings to consolidate 
and enhance current insights. The final section of this thesis presents recommendations 
for future research as well as daily practices of companies and governments. 
7.6.1 Recommendations for further research
As Chapter 6 shows, the influence of the international level on a local social license to 
operate is present and runs via various mechanisms. In our increasingly interconnected 
and digital world, it can be expected that the international level influences become more 
important for the social license to operate of (local) energy projects that are clearly 
linked with global societal themes such as climate change. The investment decisions 
of oil and gas projects are often taken by international oil companies, subject to global 
commodity prices and a worldwide reputation. On the other hand, there is a tendency 
of increasing nationalism in the Western world, including a growing role of national oil 
companies. Future research is needed to create a more thorough understanding of the 
conditions that shape an international social license to operate in this highly dynamic 
context. Case studies of oil and gas developments in other parts of the world could 
deepen both the theoretical and empirical understanding of the social license to operate 
in multilevel context. Our understanding of the international influence on the local level, 
and vice versa, would benefit from case studies conducted in other parts of the world. 
In this context it is also interesting for future research to study the relationship between 
global civil society and local communities in the context of a social license to operate. 
Research in this thesis has shown that their views and beliefs do not necessarily 
have to align and can even contradict each other: Locally, the need for economic 
development might prevail over environmental and social risks, while globally the 
economic development is subordinated to climate change. Global civil society and 
local communities could enhance but also contradict or even counteract each other 
within a social license to operate context. This is an interesting field for future research, 
especially when combined with a closer look at the role of social media and the internet 
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in shaping this relationship. Furthermore, a closer look at the role and effectiveness 
of social media in shaping an international digital network, which is driven to change 
public opinion and steer decision making processes at the global level, would enhance 
current insights.
Even though the social license to operate concept originated in the extractive industries, 
it is not bound to activities related to fossil resources. Renewable energy projects also 
generate a lot of societal debate and require a social license to operate. Even though 
these activities clearly contribute to a greater goal, namely the transition to a society 
based on renewable energy, this is not sufficient for society. It would be interesting for 
future research to study the social license to operate of renewable energy development 
and examine the local – global nexus: Large renewable energy projects are often a 
result from international climate change negotiations and sustainability goals. On 
the other hand, there are often numerous small renewable initiatives that originated 
at the local level. Implementing renewable energy projects could generate negative 
environmental impacts as well. The limited space in some parts of the world also creates 
specific environmental and/or social challenges, for example when an offshore wind 
farm is planned in an area that will be designated as Natura2000. This could undermine 
a common point of view among environmental NGOs, which has appeared to be an 
important driver of the international social license to operate network. These are all 
interesting avenues for future research into the social license to operate of renewable 
energy projects in a multilevel context. 
This thesis has examined the development of oil and gas activities in the Arctic as one of 
the most controversial energy projects since the start of the century. It has appeared to 
be a case on which many people, both local and global, had an opinion. This has proven 
to be valuable for studying the social license to operate of oil and gas activities in the 
Arctic from a social science perspective. In this case the need for a social license to 
operate was apparent. This also raises the question what determines whether a social 
license to operate is always required and if there are cases in which a social license to 
operate is not relevant. What are the conditions that determine this? Does it depend 
on the level of trust and legitimacy of the political and legal licenses? Does it depend 
on the size of the project and its spatial impact? And can the social license to operate 
as it has been defined by this research also be applied to less controversial energy 
projects? These are questions that could be the start of future research, to examine 
the context of less controversial energy projects and their social license to operate.
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7.6.2 Recommendations for daily practices
This section presents a practical approach to the social license to operate, which can be 
used by companies, governments and others in their daily practices. It is best to start 
thinking about the social license to operate when commencing a project. If, for whatever 
reason, a project has already started, it is still valuable to start thinking about the social 
license of the project to see whether improvements can be made and act proactive 
instead of reactive. And even though it is rather late to start thinking about the social 
license to operate when overt protest occurs, it is still worth examining the (lack of a) 
social license to operate according to the multilevel approach outlined in this section. 
Step 1: Make an analysis of the local social license to operate of your project
The first step is to analyse the local social license to operate of your project. It is essential 
to examine all forms of trust and legitimacy.  The following topics and questions can 
help you to create a comprehensive understanding of the social license to operate:
• The interaction with stakeholders: How have you / are you planning to engage with 
your stakeholders? Is the way you approach and interact with your stakeholders 
tailored to their circumstances? Have you selected the right person to represent 
your project during those interactions?
• How is your project perceived? Have you got all the necessary competencies in 
your project organisation to successfully implement the activities? How do 
stakeholders perceive the competencies of your organisation? Based on what 
values and beliefs have you designed your project execution plan? And do these 
values and beliefs match the ones of the project’s stakeholders?
• Representative engagement: Who are your stakeholders? Which stakeholders 
will you engage or have you engaged in your project? Is this a representative 
selection? Do the representatives of stakeholder groups / organisations 
represent their backing? When are they / have they been engaged in your 
project? What will be / has been done with their input in the decision making 
processes of your project? Has this been communicated to them and if yes, how?
• The process: Which information will or has your project disclosed to the various 
stakeholders? When and how often in the decision making process will this be / 
was this done? How was the information disclosed? (i.e. digital or hard copy? In 
documents or face-to-face? In English and/or a country’s own language? In jargon 
or layman’s language?) And was this tailored to the needs of these stakeholders? 
Has your project been transparent on the decisions that have been or will be 
taken and the reasoning behind it? 
• Your project’s contribution to society: What does your project contribute to 
society / local stakeholders? This can be defined in economic terms (i.e. taxes, 
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royalties, employment etc.) or in socio-political terms (i.e. sustainability, welfare, 
health, mobility etc.). And does society / local stakeholders need or want these 
contributions?
  
The answers to all these questions will help analysing the different forms of trust and 
legitimacy, which enables you to get a better understanding of the social license to 
operate of your project. 
Step 2: Determine how the social license to operate connects to the legal and 
political licenses
As the research of this thesis has shown, the social, legal and political licenses of a 
project are closely connected. Since they can influence each other, it is important to 
determine how they are connected in the context of your project. 
How is the relationship between your project’s local stakeholders and the relevant 
government authorities involved in the legal and political licenses of your project? Has 
this relationship been under pressure recently? Is this relationship stable or subject 
to change? 
By analysing the (changing) relationship of society and local stakeholders with the 
government and its authorities involved in granting the legal and political licenses, 
one can get a good understanding of the value that these licenses have in society. The 
analysis can be made by using the same forms of trust and legitimacy. The outcomes of 
this analysis combined with the outcomes of Step 1, will indicate how the social license 
to operate is connected with the legal and political licenses to operate. 
Step 3: Analyse the social license to operate on other geographical levels
In today’s globalised and digital world, other geographical levels can be closer connected 
to a project than originally thought. Even without a large presence of local stakeholders 
on social media, a project can become part of an international debate that is held in the 
digital public space facilitated by social media and the internet. Although it can never 
be predicted, the likelihood is dependent on a project’s link with a larger global theme 
and whether global actors are pushing it to the fore. Internationally, digital horizontal 
means of communication play a large role in steering public opinion. This requires a 
different approach compared to the more traditional ways of communicating project 
information. To analyse the international social license to operate one has to look at 
the following aspects:
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• Connection to a global theme: Is there a (negative) connection of the project to 
an overarching, global theme that has the attention of the world’s society? How 
strong / direct is this connection? Are there any international organisations or 
is there a public movement already active against any activities that the project 
is aiming to implement or execute? 
• Social media: What has been said about the project or similar projects elsewhere 
on social media? What is the position of the project proponent’s organisation 
on social media? Are various actors connecting with each other on social media 
in relation to (the topic of) the project?
• Connection to the ‘real’ world: Identify any, internationally significant upcoming 
events that have to do with the global theme that the project is connected to. 
Such events are opportunities to connect the digital with the ‘real’ world and are 
important windows of opportunities to steer the international public opinion.
An analysis of the abovementioned aspects provides a better understanding of the 
international governance setting in relation to the social license to operate of a project. 
However, the international domain is extensive and in constant change. It is therefore 
essential to be immersed in the international digital public space, open up to networks 
and participate in dialogues.
Step 4: Identify the interfaces
When having a more profound understanding of the international social license to 
operate, it is important to identify the interfaces between the local and the international 
social licenses. The international license can influence the local license via social media, 
local legal license decision making procedures and pressure on the local political license. 
The other way around, the local social license to operate can influence the international 
one mainly via social media or traditional media. The effectiveness of these interfaces 
depends on a number of things, including local level English proficiency, access to 
internet/social media, a shared set of values and beliefs and historical relationships 
between local societal actors and international organisations. The answers on the 
questions in Step 3 are a good starting point at identifying the interfaces that are 
relevant for your project.  
Step 5: Adapt the project’s organisation 
The outcomes of the analyses in Step 1 to 4 provide an integrated and multilevel 
understanding of the social license to operate of a project. As said, the social license 
to operate is an ongoing process that runs through the entire lifecycle of a project 
and is subject to constant change. It is therefore important to integrate the multilevel 
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social license to operate approach into a project’s organisation. And because it touches 
upon so many different aspects, this should not be assigned to one specific person 
or function. It should preferably be integrated into the hearts and minds of all project 
team members and stimulated by a dedicated person in the same way that Health, 
Safety and Environment is also integrated into a project. The multilevel approach to a 
social license to operate is not an additional requirement, but is one of the key factors 
underlying a project’s success.
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Interview information
LIST OF INTERVIEWS 2015/2016
Sector Affiliation Position Date Interview mode
Public 
sector
European Commission 
–
DG MARE
Policy officer 17-12-2015 Skype
Public 
sector
Ministry of Industry, 
Labour & Trade GL
Special advisor / Socio-
economist 19-01-2016 Face-to-face
Public 
sector
Mineral License & 
Safety Authority
Head of the license 
department 18-02-2016 Face-to-face
Public 
sector
KANUKOKA – 
Municipalities 
Association of 
Greenland
Special advisor environment 
and resources 22-02-2016 Face-to-face
Private 
sector
Greenland Petroleum 
Services CEO 06-01-2016 Skype
Private 
sector Shell
Senior advisor Arctic 
& Senior advisor non-
technical risk integration in 
external relations
01-03-2016 Face-to-face
Private 
sector NunaOil Director 22-02-2016 Face-to-face
Civil 
society Greenpeace Denmark Arctic campaigner 19-01-2016 Face-to-face
Civil 
society WWF Greenland Senior advisor Greenland 19-02-2016 Face-to-face
Civil 
society
Inuit Circumpolar 
Council President of ICC Greenland 19-02-2016 Face-to-face
Civil 
society CSR Greenland
Project leader & Advisor to 
CSR Greenland 23-02-2016 Face-to-face
Civil 
society
Greenland School of 
Minerals & Petroleum Head of school 25-02-2016 Face-to-face
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Sector Affiliation Position Date Interview mode
Public 
sector
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs NL
Arctic Council Observer NL 09-05-2012 Face-to-face
Public 
sector
Department of Foreign 
Affairs GL
Head of office 16-05-2012 Skype
Private 
sector London Mining Communication manager 01-05-2012 Skype
Private 
sector Shell Senior advisor Arctic 05-06-2012 Face-to-face
Civil 
society WWF Denmark Greenland policy officer 19-04-2012 Skype
Civil 
society Greenpeace Denmark Arctic campaigner 01-05-2012 Skype
Civil 
society WWF Russia
Oil and gas officer, WWF 
global Arctic programme 01-05-2012 Skype
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LIST OF INTERVIEWS 2011
Sector Affiliation Position Date Interview mode
Public 
sector Premier’s Office GL Executive deputy 06-12-2011 Face-to-face
Public 
sector Premier’s Office GL Premier of GL 06-12-2011 Face-to-face
Public 
sector
Ministry of Domestic 
Affairs, Environment & 
Nature GL
Head of section nature & 
Head of section environment 07-12-2011 Face-to-face
Public 
sector
Bureau of Minerals and 
Petroleum Director 08-12-2011 Face-to-face
Public 
sector Nukissiorfiit CEO 06-12-2011 Face-to-face
Private 
sector Inuplan
CEO & Senior Engineer & 
Partner 05-12-2011 Face-to-face
Private 
sector NunaOil Director 05-12-2011 Face-to-face
Private 
sector CairnEnergy
Greenland country 
representative 06-12-2011 Face-to-face
Private 
sector
Greenland Petroleum 
Services CEO & Logistical officer 08-12-2011 Face-to-face
Private 
sector Royal Arctic Line COO 06-12-2011 Face-to-face
Private 
sector NunaMinerals CFO 07-12-2011 Face-to-face
Private 
sector
Greenland Minerals 
and Energy CEO 08-12-2011 Face-to-face
Private 
sector London Mining Communication manager 13-12-2011 Face-to-face
Civil 
society
Greenland Institute of 
Natural Resources
Director & Head of 
department of birds and 
mammals
07-12-2011 Face-to-face
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INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 2015/2016
Topic Question Asked to
Understanding SLO
What is your understanding of a Social License 
to Operate for oil and gas activities in the Arctic/
Greenland?
Everyone
Understanding SLO
What elements do you consider essential in 
obtaining and maintaining a social license to 
operate?
Everyone
Understanding SLO
How does your company act on obtaining and 
maintaining its social license to operate? And how 
is this concept embedded in your organisation?
Private Sector
Understanding SLO
Does your organisation collaborate with other 
parties to obtain and maintain a social license 
to operate for oil and gas activities in the Arctic/
Greenland?
Private Sector
Understanding SLO
If yes, what kind of parties do you collaborate with? 
(If possible mention the names of organisations/
government departments etc.)
Private Sector
Understanding SLO
If yes, in which phase of an activity do you a) 
approach which party to be or b) are you involved 
in obtaining and maintaining a SLO for Arctic/
Greenlandic oil and gas activities?
Private Sector
Understanding SLO
How does your government act when an actor 
wants to obtain and maintain its social license to 
operate? And how is this concept embedded in the 
relevant government authorities?
Public Sector
Understanding SLO
Does your organisation collaborate with parties 
who seek to obtain or maintain a social license 
to operate for oil and gas activities in the Arctic / 
Greenland?
Research Institutes
Understanding SLO
If yes, with what kind of parties do you collaborate? 
(If possible mention the names of organisations/
government departments etc.)
Research Institutes
Understanding SLO
If yes, has this ever led to criticism on your 
research institute and how has your organisation 
responded to this?
Research Institutes
Understanding SLO
Do you think the social license to operate for oil 
and gas activities in the Arctic / Greenland will 
significantly change in the future? And why?
Everyone
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Topic Question Asked to
Understanding SLO Does a social license to operate in the Arctic differ from a SLO for non-Arctic activities? And why? Everyone
Legal vs. Political 
vs. Social
Is there a relation for you between the Social 
License and the Legal and Political licenses that 
are needed to develop Arctic/Greenlandic oil and 
gas activities?
Everyone
Legal vs. Political 
vs. Social
If yes, can you describe the relation between these 
three types of licenses? Everyone
Legal vs. Political 
vs. Social
If no, why is there no relation between those 
licenses according to you? Everyone
Legal vs. Political 
vs. Social
What are the important differences and similarities 
between these three types of licenses? Everyone
Legal vs. Political 
vs. Social
How do you see the future for each of these three 
licenses and the relation between them? Everyone
Legal vs. Political 
vs. Social
What is your position and role with regards to 
these three types of licenses for oil and gas 
activities in the Arctic/Greenland?
Everyone
Legal vs. Political 
vs. Social
How is your company organised to deal with these 
three types of licenses? i.e. are there different 
departments taking care of it?
Private Sector
Legal vs. Political 
vs. Social
In what stages of a development are these three 
licenses of relevance to your company? And why? Private Sector
Legal vs. Political 
vs. Social
How is your organisation organised to deal with 
these three types of licenses? Civil Society
Legal vs. Political 
vs. Social
Do you have a different strategy towards each of 
these licenses in your campaigns? Civil Society
National vs. 
International
How do you view the national, regional and 
international dimension for each of the three 
licenses (Legal, Political and Social) related to oil 
and gas development in the Arctic/Greenland?
Everyone
National vs. 
International
Is the development of oil and gas activities in the 
Arctic/Greenland exclusively a matter of national 
decision making? And why?
Everyone
National vs. 
International
How do you experience the international attention 
for oil and gas activities in the Arctic/Greenland? Everyone
National vs. 
International
What are the challenges and opportunities 
related to the national, regional and international 
attention in the development of Arctic/Greenlandic 
oil and gas activities?
Everyone
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Topic Question Asked to
Company SLO vs. 
Industry SLO
One project can affect an entire company, and one 
company can affect the entire industry. Based on 
this reasoning, what is your understanding of a 
SLO for project, company and industry?
Everyone
Company SLO vs. 
Industry SLO
Which of these levels (project, company or 
industry) is of your concern? And if more than one 
level is of your concern, how are you organised to 
deal with these different levels?
Everyone
Company SLO vs. 
Industry SLO
What is your position and role concerning these 
three different levels and their SLO?
Everyone
Company SLO vs. 
Industry SLO
Are companies collaborating to work together on 
obtaining and maintaining an industry-wide SLO? Private Sector
Company SLO vs. 
Industry SLO
If yes, are all companies active in the Arctic 
involved? And how does this collaboration look 
like?
Private Sector
Company SLO vs. 
Industry SLO
If no, why is this not happening at the moment? 
And will this be different in the future?
Private Sector
General Arctic 
Energy
How do you view the future of oil and gas 
development in the Arctic and in particular in 
Greenland?
Everyone
Trust How do you work on building trust with various stakeholders?
Private Sector / 
Public Sector
Trust And does your trust building approach differ per type of stakeholder?
Private Sector / 
Public Sector
Trust If yes, how and please explain? Private Sector / Public Sector
Trust If no, why not? Private Sector / Public Sector
Trust
Are you involved in trust building with and 
between various stakeholders? For example 
between private sector companies and the local 
communities?
Everyone
Legitimacy Is the development of oil and gas activities considered legitimate among Greenlandic society? Everyone
Legitimacy If yes, what are the most important aspects supporting this legitimacy? Everyone
Legitimacy If no, why not? Everyone
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SUMMARY
The Arctic is changing. The effects of climate change are most profound in this part of 
the world: Sea ice extend is decreasing and temperatures are rising faster than anywhere 
else. The melting Greenlandic ice sheet is expected to contribute 6 meters to global 
sea level rise and is a threat for many densely populated coastal communities around 
the world. At the same time, the decreasing sea ice extend and rising temperatures 
also create new opportunities. The region is opening up to activities including fisheries, 
tourism, shipping, mining and oil and gas. Over the past decade an increase in economic 
activities was experienced throughout the Arctic and it was estimated that the region 
could potentially attract over $100 billion of investments. Shipping, mining and oil and 
gas were considered to be the main drivers of economic development and between 2010 
and 2015 offshore oil and gas exploration activities took place in many parts of the Arctic 
Ocean. Even though the development of Arctic offshore oil and gas activities has largely 
come to a halt now, it has sparked a lot of debate and controversy over the past years.
In 2009, right at the start of the boom in Arctic offshore oil and gas activities, Greenland 
obtained Self-Rule within the Kingdom of Denmark, thereby obtaining authority over the 
underground and thus the development of oil, gas and minerals. Greenland expressed 
the wish to develop these extractive resources to generate additional income and 
employment opportunities to support the long term wish of becoming (financially) 
independent from Denmark. In Greenland everything comes together: The melting ice 
sheet illustrating global climate change and at the same time a government expressing 
the ambition to develop oil and gas resources. Opening up to oil and gas development 
attracted the attention from some of the largest international oil companies and the 
world’s largest states, while Greenland has a population of only 56.000 people living 
on the world’s largest island. Furthermore, the oil and gas exploration activities that 
took place in Greenlandic waters were subject to critique from individual citizens and 
NGOs, both in Greenland and far beyond.
Critique, societal debate and resistance against large industrial activities, including oil 
and gas, is increasingly studied from a social science perspective by using the concept 
of a ‘Social License to Operate’. The social license to operate concept addresses the 
emergence of increasingly critical civil society organisations and citizens at a local level 
that seeks to have influence on the development of large industrial activities. However, 
the case of Greenland shows that the development of oil and gas activities is not solely 
an affair of state authorities and companies, nor is it solely a national affair: National 
level stakeholders want to become more involved in the decision making process and 
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at the same time oil and gas activities are closely linked to the globally debated theme 
of climate change and the transition towards renewable energy.
The traditional, rather instrumental focus of the social license to operate concept on a 
local project context and the relation between a company and its local stakeholders, 
therefore misses essential elements of today’s increasingly interconnected and complex 
society. Trust and legitimacy are in general considered key components of a social license 
to operate, but are also difficult to measure and therefore less examined. The role of 
human capital development is hardly studied, even though human capital development 
is one of the main challenge in small Arctic societies. Influences from political and legal 
arenas or other operational levels that could influence the implementation of an activity 
are not necessarily integrated in the current social license to operate approach.
The aim of this thesis is therefore to understand the development of a social license 
to operate of controversial energy projects by analysing the role of trust, legitimacy 
and human capital development in an Arctic context and by developing a multilevel 
approach of a social license to operate that includes legal and political licenses both 
in theory and in practice.
The central research question is: How is the social license to operate of Greenlandic 
oil and gas activities influenced by legal and political licenses in a multilevel context, 
what is the role of trust, legitimacy and human capital development and how does this 
contribute to a multilevel approach of a social license to operate?
1. What is the multilevel governance setting in which Arctic oil and gas activities 
take place and what is the authority of a state such as Greenland?
2. What is a social license to operate and how does it relate to the legal and political 
licenses of oil and gas activities in the Greenland?
3. In what way do trust and legitimacy play a role in the different licenses to operate 
for oil and gas activities in Greenland?
4. What are the challenges and opportunities for Greenland to maximise local 
benefits in the development of an oil and gas sector?
5. In what way does human capital development contribute to a social license to 
operate for oil and gas development in Greenland and other small Arctic states?
6. How has the social license to operate of Arctic oil and gas activities developed 
at the international level and how does it interact with the local level?
To answer these research questions, a case-study approach was selected. The selection 
of the Greenlandic case is based on a controversial energy development, evoking debate 
in society both at a national and international level, and the accessibility of information 
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regarding the activities at hand. Primary data to study this case was collected in two sets 
of semi-structured interviews (December 2011 and February 2016) and observations, 
and supplemented by secondary data from literature, project and policy documents, 
social media and newspapers.
Chapter 2 explores the multilevel governance setting of Arctic oil and gas activities and 
studies the changing spheres of authority in Greenland (sub-question 1). The Arctic 
sphere of authority on oil and gas consists of many different governance arrangements. 
Crucial in this respect is the expanding role of the Arctic Council with regards to facilitating 
the development of binding regulation related to offshore oil and gas activities, as well 
as the increasing role of non-Arctic states in this governance arrangement. Another 
important element is the changing Danish-Greenlandic relationship. It is expected that 
other (Arctic) states will try to influence the Greenlandic oil and gas arrangements 
when Greenland becomes more independent from Denmark. It is therefore considered 
important that the capacity of the Greenlandic government and civil society should be 
the primary guideline for the pace in which oil and gas activities are being developed. 
If not, Greenland would run the risk of formally being the most important actor, while 
de facto other actors would take over. This would hamper the maximisation of benefits 
from the offshore oil and gas activities for Greenland and its society.
Chapter 3 therefore takes a closer look at the challenges and opportunities of 
maximising the local benefits of energy development for small Arctic states (sub-
question 4). In this respect it is interesting to compare Greenland to the Faroe Islands 
and Iceland: Like many Arctic states, Iceland and the Faroe Islands used to be the 
resource-based economies, which Greenland is today. Remotely located in relation to 
the world economy, Iceland and the Faroe Islands have succeeded in maximising local 
benefits and developing a knowledge-based economy related to their energy sector. 
The cases of the Faroe Islands and Iceland show that it is possible for small societies 
to create a critical mass of human capital, by developing strong knowledge institutes 
and stimulating the exchange of knowledge.
Chapter 4 examines the role of human capital development in relation to obtaining and 
maintaining a local social license to operate for the development of energy activities in 
small Arctic states, including Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland (sub-question 5). 
When looking at the social license to operate of Arctic energy activities, human capital 
development plays an important role in the maximisation of local benefits via increasing 
the level of (formal) skills and capacities among a local workforce. This enables the local 
workforce to seize (higher skilled) job opportunities and develop a knowledge-based 
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economy that could eventually be exported to other countries. In this way human capital 
development contributes to one of the elements of a social license to operate, namely the 
economic legitimacy of an activity. Furthermore, human capital development requires 
the input of multiple stakeholders (i.e. state authorities, private sector companies, 
schools and universities). Since human capital takes time to be developed, it offers a 
platform for cooperation between different stakeholders. In this way, human capital 
development can create a basis of interactional trust between the various stakeholders 
involved in the development of energy activities such as offshore oil and gas.
Chapter 5 analyses the role of trust and legitimacy, as two fundamental elements of 
not only the social license but also the political and legal licenses to operate. Two forms 
of trust (personal and institutionalised trust) and three forms of legitimacy (input, 
throughput and output legitimacy) are being distinguished. The close connection 
between society’s increasing demand for influence on the development of industrial 
activities and its perception of the prevailing legal and political system and the failures 
there of, makes these political and legal systems important to study in relation to the 
social license to operate. This chapter develops a broader perspective on the social 
license to operate concept by studying the role of various forms of trust and legitimacy 
as well as their role in the interaction between the social, legal and political licenses 
to operate (sub-questions 2 and 3). The case of offshore oil and gas development in 
Greenland shows that the three licenses to operate are complementary to each other, 
as each of the licenses has a different emphasis with regards to trust and legitimacy.
Subsequently, chapter 6 develops a set of hypotheses and a typology for the interaction 
of the social license to operate at multiple levels, including interaction with the political 
and legal licenses (sub-question 6). The case of offshore oil and gas development in 
Greenland, where the exploration activities were debated at a national and international 
level at the same time, shows that there is a need for the social license to operate concept 
to include international dynamics as well. Three types of a broad, multilevel social license 
to operate have been defined based on the level of overlap between the licenses (political, 
legal, social) on each level (fully overlapping, party overlapping, not overlapping).
The first type concerns a situation in which all licenses are separate, meaning that 
each license occurs both at the national and the international level, but there is no 
multilevel interaction between the licenses. A second type can be identified in which all 
licenses are one, meaning that each license fully overlaps with its national/international 
counterpart. Type 1, where there is no interaction between licenses at all, is in the 
current globalised world not likely to occur. Type 2, where all licenses fully overlap with 
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their national/international counterpart, is also not likely to occur as it would assume 
that national boundaries have completely evaporated.
The third type identified in chapter 6 concerns situations where the licenses are partly 
overlapping. This type has been further operationalised into three hybrid types: a) 
There is one social license (national and international fully overlap), but there are 
separate political and legal licenses on both levels; b) There is one political license 
and one legal license (for these two licenses the national and international level fully 
overlap), but the social license is separate; c) All licenses partly overlap with their 
national/international counterpart. The hybrid types are regarded to provide the best 
reflection of the interactions that could take place between licenses on different levels
Hybrid situations such as in Greenland, where licenses do not fully overlap and are 
not completely separate, are indeed becoming more likely in our globalising society. 
The nation states system still exist, but is increasingly becoming networked through 
involvement in multiple governance arrangements across different scales. This 
bifurcated system, where the national state system evolves through its co-existence 
and interaction with the network (civil) society and global markets, influences the way 
in which the different licenses manifest themselves at different levels.
Chapter 7 concludes that based on the research presented in this thesis, the national 
level social license to operate concept needs to be studied in relation to the legal and 
political licenses using a broader definition of trust and legitimacy. Furthermore, the 
environmental and social impacts of oil and gas activities often do not confine themselves 
to nation state boundaries, nor are these activities operated solely in a national level 
context. Incorporating multilevel dynamics into the social license to operate concept is 
thus essential in analysing the multilevel context in which Arctic oil and gas activities 
were being developed. With regards to the Arctic context, it is important to consider 
the role of human capital development as it has a strong link with trust building and 
legitimacy at a national level and can play a role in the degree of interaction between 
licenses on multiple geographical levels within a multilevel social license to operate 
concept. This thesis shows that it is thus important for both governments and companies 
to realise that the implementation of energy activities locally, is thus subject to direct 
international level influences, which run primarily via the social license to operate. Future 
research, based on case studies conducted in other parts of the world, could enhance 
the multilevel social license to operate concept as developed in this thesis. Furthermore, 
the multilevel social license to operate concept would benefit from further research into 
the role and effectiveness of social media in shaping an international digital network, 
which is driven to change public opinion and steer decision making processes.
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